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Executive Summary 
Worldwide, the commercial collection of non-timber forest products (NTFP) has increased, with 
growing demands on domestic and international markets. This provides income opportunities 
for local people and links usually remote rural areas, where the resources are collected, with 
global markets. At the same time, it also enforces dependencies, increases the risks of 
overexploitation and extinction of the resource and often leads to contestation between different 
actors for access to these lucrative resources. Thus, actors modify and adapt existing 
governance systems to secure or gain access to the resource and profit from it. 
Commercialisation of NTFP leads to both positive and negative developments in remote rural 
areas. 
Most studies examining the commercialisation of NTFP apply an apolitical research approach, 
analysing the livelihood dependency of local communities on the resource, the impacts on 
environmental aspects and the commodity chain starting from the production or collection via 
processing to the marketing of the product on the national or international market. These 
studies are generally uncritical towards power relations, marginalisation processes within the 
local population due to their livelihood dependencies on one or few resources, and the related 
negotiation processes between state authorities and non-state actors as ways of understanding 
actors’ access and involvement in the processes and steps of collecting, processing and 
trading. Looking at these factors is especially critical when the resources are extracted and 
traded in the margins of states, like borderlands.  
Following this gap in the literature, this thesis aims to provide an in-depth understanding of 
negotiation processes among state authorities and non-state actors, which shape governance 
systems and networks regulating access, extraction and trade of locally available natural 
resources in borderlands. Central questions are: How do actors adapt governance systems 
regulating commercial collection and trade of the resource in response to changes in relation 
to the resource, like an increased resource value? What kinds of production networks emerge 
in borderlands? What roles do state and non-state actors play in the negotiation processes 
shaping governance systems that control access to and benefit from commercial NTFP 
collection and trade in borderlands?  
The thesis uses the case of yarshagumba collection and trade in the remote high Himalaya of 
the Nepal-India trans-boundary region within the Kailash Landscape to explore these 
questions. Yarshagumba is a resource collected in the high alpine grasslands of the Himalayas 
and traded to and consumed mainly in mainland China. The common pool resource 
‘yarshagumba’ has been transformed from a non-valued natural resource to a highly demanded 
product on the international market.  
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The study consists of two parts: (1) the collection and (2) the trade of yarshagumba, in which I 
focus on different aspects of governance systems and negotiation processes between actors. 
In part 1, I conduct a comparative analysis of the community-led and governmental governance 
systems in the yarshagumba collection sites and their adaptive capacity and multi-level learning 
processes. In part 2, I study the trans-border connectivities, power and embeddedness of state 
and non-state actors within the informal yarshagumba trade network in the borderland of India 
and Nepal. Thus, I apply different concepts, such as governance of commons, access to natural 
resources, adaptation of governance systems, global production networks and borderlands, 
and analyse the two parts separately using the broader field of research ‘political ecology’ as 
the basis.  
The study follows an inductive qualitative research approach applying different data collection 
techniques such as guided interviews, focus group discussions, participatory observation and 
document analysis. In order to analyse interactions, relations and impacts across the Nepali-
Indian border, the study understands the border region on both sides of the border as one 
conjunct research area. This approach is especially helpful in the analysis of the informal cross-
border trade network of yarshagumba across the Indian-Nepali border.  
The collection and trade of yarshagumba is part of complex political, social and economic 
systems in the borderlands within the Kailash Landscape. These systems are regulated by 
diverse governance systems and networks and involve various types of actors on multiple 
scales and beyond state borders. These governance systems are the outcome of negotiation 
processes between state authorities and non-state actors to respond to the pressures on the 
existing resource due to the value increase and the new demands and interests of actors. Every 
yarshagumba collection site has an individually-designed governance system consisting of 
governmental regulations and local communal arrangements, which are either complementary 
to or replace governmental regulations. Currently, both the revision of government policies in 
India and Nepal and the communal management arrangements are immediate amendments in 
reaction to the pressures on the resource, rather than long term strategic interventions. This 
adaptation and learning process is so far missing. 
Borderlands are regions with opportunities producing cross-border social and economic spaces 
through trans-border connectivities and cross-border networks. There, sovereign power and 
the border as line of separation are continuously negotiated and reinforced by state authorities 
and non-state actors for personal gain. Both state authorities and non-state actors are closely 
enmeshed in these formal and informal governance and network structures, whereby state 
authorities can play different roles and can have several functions. The dichotomies of formal / 
informal and legal / illegal become blurred and regulatory spaces are re-interpreted by state as 
well as non-state actors.  
In both parts of my case study the results show that the local people are vulnerable to some 
extent, as they depend on the global market developments and are exposed to the 
governmental regulations, but they are not passive players in the collection and trading 
systems. They are active participants along with the state authorities in shaping governance 
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systems and trading networks suitable and appropriate to their demands and interests. Local 
people are not in resistance to government authorities in borderlands, but out of necessity, 
jointly negotiate spaces with state representatives across borders.  
As a result of these negotiation processes between actors, I conclude that, in the margins of 
states, like borderlands, governance systems and networks for commercial collection and trade 
of NTFP move in and out of legality and use or bypass governmental regulations. Rather than 
formal rules and regulations, negotiation processes between actors play a key role to determine 
who has access to the resource and who benefits from the trade network. Thus, these 
governance systems and networks in borderlands are complex constellations. They are more 
than institutions. They are an interplay of rights, institutions, power structures, and social and 
economic relations between actors beyond borders adapting to changing conditions. They are 
dynamic and differ from resource to resource and from location to location.  
For sustainable and equitable management of natural resources in margins of states, policy-
makers need to consider the political, social and economic dimensions related to natural 
resource management and resource production networks. Besides other recommendations, 
they should reflect on state authorities’ own role, behaviour and involvement in the systems 
and cross-border networks. A change in the way of thinking is required, by recognizing the 
communal management arrangements and starting to formalize these when appropriate to 
ensure natural resource governance systems that are context-specific, innovative, legally 
sanctioned and enforced. 
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Preface 
An extract from my field notes from Nepal, May 2017: 
‘After a long day of walking along the Mahakali River in Nepal, which forms the border 
to India, we reach a small remote village with approximately 30 houses. An elderly 
woman welcomes us. Her son sits next to her, busy packing food items. It is the 
beginning of May. The yarshagumba season has started. The village seems empty. 
Many residents of the nearby villages have already gone or are preparing to go to the 
remote yarshagumba collection sites up in the mountains in the coming days. After 
drinking tea the son takes us to the only ‘lodge’ of the village, where we can get dinner 
and stay the night. The ‘lodge’ is a two-story building with a shop and restaurant on the 
ground floor and sleeping and storage space under the roof. Next to the ‘lodge’ is the 
newly constructed Api Nampa Conservation Area (ANCA) office where staff is busy 
registering yarshagumba collectors and collecting the fees for the entry permit to the 
collection sites. Some villagers take a permit; others just pass by. On the other side, the 
local police post is located with a few police officers stationed there. Not far away down 
at the Mahakali River a steel rope is installed to cross the river – and border. Local 
people use it for their daily movements across the river. It is not an official border 
crossing point, but Indian and Nepali authorities seem to accept its existence and “do 
not bother much” (interview with young man from the village). We sit down, drink tea 
and observe the life around the ‘lodge’. The lodge-owner sells food items like rice, sugar, 
packed noodle soups and biscuits and other equipment like plastic sheets, foam mats, 
batteries, torches and ropes – essential items to camp in the remote yarshagumba 
collection sites for several weeks. In the evening a man arrives who is returning from 
collection. He is in a good mood and orders several drinks of locally brewed strong 
alcohol. Later we will get to know that he had taken a loan from the lodge-owner to 
purchase food and equipment in exchange for selling his collected yarshagumba to the 
lodge-owner for an agreed price in advance. During the evening, more people arrive: 
other villagers and a local shepherd and trader with more than 40 goats to transport 
grain, salt and other items to the upper valley and across the border to Taklakot, China. 
They come to have drinks and snacks and to hear the latest news. Also some of the 
ANCA officials and police officers join.  
The described village lies in a very strategic location in the transboundary region of 
India, Nepal and China. On the one hand, it is an important overnight station along the 
trail from Darchula town, Nepal, to Taklakot, China and from the yarshagumba collection 
sites to town; on the other hand, it links India and Nepal through an important unofficial 
border crossing point. This remote village is a central trading hub, where most likely 
legal and illegal yarshagumba worth more than one million USD passes through in a 
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season. State representatives and non-state actors are closely enmeshed and involved 
in the yarshagumba network. The simple ‘lodge’ is a multi-functional place, where 
traders, yarshagumba collectors, state representatives, businessmen and villagers 
meet and exchange news, commodities and money.’ 
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1 Introduction 
Worldwide, the commercial collection of non-timber forest products (NTFP) has become more 
and more important as a livelihood source for local communities (Belcher and Schreckenberg 
2007; Neumann and Hirsch 2000). It has linked rural areas, where the resources are collected, 
with global markets, but it has also enforced dependencies between actors. In particular, when 
prices of the collected resources are high, actors struggle and negotiate to have access to the 
resource and to benefit from the trade (Le Billon 2001). In these negotiation processes, state 
and non-state actors form new and adapt existing governance systems regulating resource 
access and extraction. Actors also build up social and economic trading networks in order to 
suit their own interests and meet their own demands (Folke et al. 2005; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Van 
Schendel and Abraham 2005). Regions along borders provide opportunities for forming cross-
border networks and using regulatory spaces beyond the national territory for their own 
benefits. These negotiation processes between actors about access to resources and the 
resulting trading networks are the focus of this thesis using the case of yarshagumba in the 
borderlands of India, Nepal and China within the Kailash Landscape. Yarshagumba is a 
resource collected in the high alpine grasslands of the Himalayas and traded to and consumed 
mainly in mainland China. 
In this chapter, I provide the context and outline of the thesis, as well as a short description of 
the Kailash Landscape, the phenomenon of yarshagumba and the structure of the thesis.  
1.1 Context of the research 
Worldwide billions of people use medicinal and aromatic plants (MAP) or NTFP for various 
healthcare, religious as well as cultural purposes and as fibre, food supplements or construction 
material (Uprety et al. 2016; WHO 2002). This has led to increased commercial collection and 
harvesting of MAP and NTFP with growing demands on domestic and international markets 
(Hamilton 2004; Neumann and Hirsch 2000; WHO 2013). For the people involved in the 
collection and trade, this development provides, on the one hand, income opportunities; on the 
other hand, the high demands increase the risk of overexploitation and extinction of the 
resource, and the rise of social conflicts about access to the resource. Thus, commercialisation 
of collection and trade of NTFP leads to both positive and negative developments in rural areas 
and, therefore, to pressures on available governance systems to adapt and manage the 
collection and trade in an equitable and sustainable way (Belcher and Schreckenberg 2007; 
Kusters et al. 2006).  
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1.1.1 Management of commercial collection of NTFP 
Medicinal plants are an environmental product group traded at local, national and international 
levels, typically unprocessed, in response to demands from pharmaceutical, cosmetic and food 
industries (Lange 2006). Most of them are not cultivated but are harvested wild in remote 
regions of the world (Belcher und Schreckenberg 2007). According to a study by Vasisht et al. 
(2016) over 700.000 t of medicinal plants, valued at USD 3.6 billion, were globally registered 
as being exported in 2014. Further, the study calculated that the global export grew by 2.4 % 
in volume and 9.2 % in value per year from 2000 until 2014.  In Asia, India and China are the 
top consumers of medicinal plants (Kala et al. 2006; Vasisht et al. 2016). Nepal, situated 
between these two large economies, officially exports over 3000 t (estimated worth USD 3.4 
million) to China and nearly 1000 t (estimated worth USD 15.7 million) to India annually (Vasisht 
et al. 2016). However, most likely the actual figures for Nepal are much higher (He et al. 2018; 
Pouliot 2016; Pyakurel et al. 2018).  
According to global studies, the commercialisation of NTFP collection creates employment 
opportunities and contributes significantly to community livelihoods and local economic 
development (Belcher und Schreckenberg 2007; Hamilton 2004; Kusters et al. 2006; Neumann 
and Hirsch 2000; Schippmann et al. 2006). In many regions of the world, harvesting NTFP is 
the main source of cash income for local people (Lange 2006; Rasul et al. 2012). This is also 
the case in many parts of the Himalayan region (Kala et al. 2006; Negi et al. 2016; Olsen 2005; 
Pouliot et al. 2018; Pyakurel et al. 2018; Shrestha et al. 2014; Wangchuk et al. 2012).  
The increased demands for NTFP as well as the intensified collection threaten the sustainable 
growth of NTFP. Human aspects and environmental conditions are deeply connected and 
reinforce each other. They are, according to the understanding of ‘political ecology,’ interlinked 
with each other and cannot be analysed separately. The management of benefit-sharing and 
sustainable harvesting practices of a NTFP depends on the biology and habitat of the resource, 
its market development and the established governance systems for resource management 
(Negi et al. 2015; Weckerle et al. 2010). Governance systems consisting of various types of 
actors and institutions regulate, constrain, enable and legitimate the behaviour of individuals 
and groups in society and the interactions between them (North 1990; Scott 1999). They 
determine the property rights and regulations for extraction and usage of resources (Ghate and 
Chaturvedi 2016).  
Worldwide, NTFP are collected within different governance systems and property rights 
regimes. Each habitat has different regulations for extraction and usage of resources. The 
habitats of NTFP can be state-owned, community or private property such as community-
managed forests, grazing grounds or protected areas (Acheson 2006; Agrawal and Ostrom 
2001). Whether state-owned property with governmental regulations, community property with 
local-level management or private property is the most suitable governance system for 
ensuring just access and sustainable management of resources has been under discussion for 
many years among scholars, policy-makers and representatives of development agencies. 
There is no simple answer (Acheson 2006; Agrawal 2003; Dietz et al. 2003) and the answers 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
 5 
have changed over time according to the prevalent discourses of resource management 
(Doolittle 2010).  
1.1.2 NTFP collection and trade in the Himalayas 
The ecological diversity of the Himalayan Mountains makes the area a habitat with a vast range 
of available NTFP with high market values (Kala et al. 2006; Uprety et al. 2016). Due to the 
rising demand for NTFP from the Himalayan region, prices on the local, national and 
international markets have increased over the last years (Pyakurel et al. 2018). Consequently, 
over the last decades, the region has faced more intense harvesting of NTFP by the local 
communities and at the same time the region has faced habitat loss for NTFP due to land use 
change, deforestation and over-grazing (Ives and Messerli 1989; Uprety et al. 2016). In 
addition, power asymmetries between actors within the collection and trading networks and 
poor legal frameworks threaten the sustainable management of NTFP in the region (Gaull and 
Hauser 2009; Heinen and Shrestha-Acharya 2011; Kunwar et al. 2013; Pauls and Franz 2013). 
This is in line with the understanding of political ecology regarding, on the one hand, how 
humans affect the environment and political and economic relations determine environmental 
changes; and on the other hand, how environmental changes lead to socio-economic changes 
and further to political implications (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Robbins 2012).  
Out of all NTFP collected in the Himalayas, yarshagumba (English: caterpillar fungus; 
ophiocordyceps sinensis) is the most valuable medicinal product1 (Negi et al. 2016; Shrestha 
et al. 2014). It is collected in the Himalayan high alpine grasslands of Bhutan, India and Nepal 
and on the eastern Tibetan plateau in China, and it is mainly traded and consumed in mainland 
China (Winkler 2009). Its prices have increased tremendously since the late 1990s (Yeh and 
Lama 2013) leading to rapid socio-economic transformations in the communities and ecological 
changes in the high-alpine grasslands (Cannon et al. 2009; Negi et al. 2006; Shrestha and 
Bawa 2014). Over the last few years in several collection sites in Nepal and India, it was 
documented that the yarshagumba collectors have perceived that their collected amount of 
yarshagumba per season is declining. The collectors relate this perception mainly to 
overharvesting and overall degradation of the habitat (Negi et al. 2016; Pant et al. 2017; 
Shrestha and Bawa 2014; interviews in the collection sites April to June 2017). Further, in the 
whole Himalayan region the number of collectors has risen and social conflicts about access 
to the collection site have increased leading to several casualties during the season every year 
(ANCA 2016; ICIMOD 2015; ICIMOD 2016; Mansarowar National Daily 2017; Singh 2017; The 
Record Nepal 2014). Most of the habitats for yarshagumba in the Himalayas in India and Nepal 
are either state-owned or community properties located within protected areas, community 
                                               
1 Although, strictly speaking, yarshagumba is neither a medicinal plant nor a NTFP, it is placed under 
these categories in Nepali and Indian official documents, as well as in scientific literature (Caplins 2016; 
Pant et al. 2017). Specifically, it is not a NTFP because it is not a forest product, but instead grows above 
the tree-line, and it is a fungus, rather than a plant. As a natural product collected for medicinal purposes, 
it fits within these categories for the purpose of discussion of resource management and trade. 
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forests or state forests (Negi et al. 2006; Pant et a. 2017), which determines the access and 
management rights of collectors from nearby villages and from villages further away. 
In general, as is well documented in the literature, for natural products with high market prices 
the collection is intensified, which raises the pressure on the resource. This creates new 
demands and conflicts between users about access and extraction, and increases the risk of 
overharvesting and extinction of the resource (Belcher and Schreckenberg 2007; Kusters et al. 
2006). Further, high prices encourage informal trade structures (cf. Le Billon 2001). These 
developments are also seen in the case of yarshagumba, which I call the ‘yarshagumba 
phenomenon’ (further details about the yarshagumba phenomenon are provided in section 
1.4). The governance systems in which NTFP are embedded, are under pressure to adapt and 
respond properly to these forces, especially when these changes happen suddenly (cf. 
Anderies et al. 2004; Dietz et al. 2003; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Young 2009). How do communities 
and government authorities in the Himalayas adapt to these changing developments, forces 
and conditions? What negotiation processes are triggered between actors to secure or gain 
access to the highly valuable resource and benefit from its trade?  
‘Bundles of rights’ alone do not determine the access to resources. People’s ability to access 
a resource and to participate in its trade also depends on social relations, cultural norms, their 
power within the context, and political and economic conditions (Hendersen et al. 2002; Ribot 
and Peluso 2003). Introducing the case study and the local context of the thesis, the extract 
from my field notes presented in the preface shows that power and political and economic 
interests of state and non-state actors influence access to the resource yarshagumba, the 
benefits from the high-value resource and the traded quantity. The people living in the 
borderlands of India, Nepal and China, called the Kailash Landscape (further introduced in 
section 1.3), are highly connected across the borders and take advantage of the possibilities in 
the borderland by establishing trans-border networks. This enables them to participate in a very 
lucrative, but partly informal production network. 
1.2 Outline of the research 
This section includes the elaboration on the research gap in the available literature on 
commercialisation of NTFP in relation to studies on governance systems and political ecology. 
Policy implications of this gap are also addressed. This literature review is followed by an 
explanation of the aim of the thesis and an introduction to the two parts of the thesis – the 
collection and trade of yarshagumba. 
1.2.1 Research gap - studies on NTFP and political ecology 
Most studies analysing the commercial collection and trade of NTFP apply a value or 
commodity chain approach; only few of them link the commercialisation of NTFP to in-depth 
analysis of dependencies and power relations between actors influencing the collection, 
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processing and trading processes. Many comparative and case studies of NTFP collection for 
the national or international market apply a value or commodity chain approach to analyse the 
actors’ involvement and economic benefits in the production, processing and marketing of the 
commodity in a linear network structure. They measure the contribution of NTFP 
commercialisation to local livelihood systems and how costs and benefits are distributed along 
the value chain and between the different actors (Belcher und Schreckenberg 2007; Kusters et 
al. 2006; Neumann and Hirsch 2000; Shrestha et al. 2017). Further, these studies analyse the 
relation between commercialisation of collection of NTFP and environmental impacts. Kusters 
et al. (2006) conclude, although communities are highly depending on the resource and have 
a high interest to ensure sustainable resource production, often the commercial collection of 
NTFP has negative environmental impacts. Also, they highlight that most of the NTFP are not 
cultivated, but collected wild in remote areas, where often property rights regimes are either 
not clear or not respected by collectors.  
In this regard, studies from the Himalayan region examine property right regimes and their 
impact on access rights of local population to their resources, as well as on resource 
management. In particular, these studies focus on the community-managed forests and 
protected areas in Nepal and India and on the analysis of the socio-economic and ecological 
situation and/or management structures for NTFP (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Dhakal 2014; 
Kanel and Kandel 2004; Kumar 2006; Paudel 2004; Singh 2016; Subedi et al. 2013; Thoms 
2008). These studies on value chains and property rights regimes examine the close 
relationship between socio-economic systems and environmental systems, as well as resource 
rights and regulations, however, the political dimension within the value chain of a NTFP and 
how these processes trigger changes within governance systems are less addressed.  
Also in relation to yarshagumba collected in the Himalayas and on the Tibetan plateau, several 
studies have been published to analyse its impacts on livelihood systems and on the ecology 
of its habitat over the last 10 to 15 years (Baral et al. 2015; Caplins 2016; Childs and Choedrup 
2014; Hopping et al. 2018; Linke 2017; Negi et al. 2006; 2016; Pant et al. 2017; Pyakurel et al. 
2018; Tan 2018). Most of these studies are case studies focusing on one specific collection 
site or valley in the mountains of Bhutan, China, Nepal or within India’s Uttarakhand state (Bum 
2016; Cannon et al. 2009; Pouliot et al. 2018; Sharma 2004; Shrestha and Bawa 2013; 2014; 
Shrestha et al. 2014; 2017; Singh et al. 2010; Stewart 2014; Thapa et al. 2014; Weckerle et al. 
2010). The studies mainly apply an apolitical approach, analysing the livelihood dependency 
of local communities on the resource and the management systems regulating the collection in 
specific sites. The studies are generally uncritical towards power relations and negotiation 
processes between state authorities and non-state actors as ways of understanding actors’ 
access and involvement. The political and economic dimension in relation to environmental 
change in line with the understanding of ‘political ecology’ receives relatively little attention. 
One of the aspects of political and economic dimension in relation to environmental change is 
the marginalisation of the local population. The marginalisation of the local population can be 
one outcome of their dependency on one resource as livelihood income, which is something 
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only a few recent studies in the region have explored. These studies analyse governance 
systems and power relations involved in the collection and trade of NTFP using the perspective 
of political ecology (Caplins 2016; Stewart 2014; Tsing 2015; Yeh and Lama 2013). They 
emphasize the social construction and production of resources, which leads to a process of 
marginalisation of local communities that depend on natural resources like NTFP. Although 
NTFP habitats are usually located in remote regions, they are not isolated, but connected to 
global markets through the commercial collection and trade of NTFP. The regions are 
integrated in market structures and processes associated with globalisation. The local 
communities can become marginalised within the processes of globalisation and 
commercialisation of resources due to communities’ increased dependency on one resource, 
the power asymmetries between actors, and the political and economic dimensions within the 
production network of resources (Stewart 2014; Yeh and Lama 2013).  
In contrast, marginalisation is not necessarily an outcome of all commercial NTPF collection 
processes in rural areas. While Stewart (2014) and Yeh and Lama (2013) elaborate in detail 
about the marginalisation processes of the local Tibetan population in relation to yarshagumba 
collection on the eastern side of the Tibetan plateau in China, Caplins (2016) emphasizes that 
the dependency of the local population on yarshagumba in the Garhwal region, India, also 
empowers the local population to regulate the access to their collection sites and to manage 
their resources themselves. She focuses mainly on the perspective of the local population and 
their adaptation processes to the changing conditions. The role of the state as sovereign 
forming regulatory spaces, as well as the interrelations between state and non-state actors and 
the negotiation processes that are triggered between them regarding who will benefit from the 
resource have not been explored in detail. In this thesis, I build up on the approach and findings 
of Caplins (2016) to look further in detail at the governance systems of the commercial 
collection of yarshagumba and its adaptation processes, the role of the state authorities and 
local population, and their interrelations between each other. The marginalisation processes 
play a role in the whole yarshagumba phenomenon, but they will be not explicit analysed further 
in this thesis.  
In the commercialisation of NTFP, besides the collection of NTFP, the trade plays a key role in 
the production network of resources. Up to now, knowledge about governance systems and 
interrelations of state and non-state actors within the NTFP trade structures and the networks 
across borders is limited. He et al. emphasize that “details of market flows and the value of 
plant material traded are rather scarce in the literature, and the governance of cross-border 
trade for MAPs in the Himalaya is particularly poorly understood” (2018: 101). Although the 
NTFP collection and sale in Nepal, especially of yarshagumba, is such an important livelihood 
source for communities in the mountain region (Childs and Choedrup 2014; Shrestha et al. 
2017; Uprety et al. 2016) as well as important revenue for the Government of Nepal, only a few 
recent regional studies on trans-boundary commodity trade networks between Nepal and India 
(Choudhary et al. 2014; Gellner 2013; Hausner and Sharma 2013; Subedi et al. 2013) and 
between Nepal and China (Harris 2013; He et al. 2018; Shneiderman 2013) exist. Some of the 
studies focus on value chain analysis of specific NTFP or medicinal plants (Choudhary et al. 
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2014; Subedi et al. 2013); others follow traditional trading routes and network structures across 
borders in the Himalayan region to study the trade flows and volumes (Harris 2013; He et al. 
2013).  
Shneiderman (2013), Gellner (2013) and Hausner and Sharma (2013) use a different approach 
by taking a non-state centric perspective (cf. Scott 2009) to analyse social and economic cross-
border network relations of local communities looking from both sides of a border. Building on 
the ideas of Scott (2009) and Goodhand (2005), they understand border regions and 
borderlands as regions at the margin of states, where sovereignty is not fully enforced or even 
non-existent. They argue that state and non-state actors act within, beside and outside 
governmental regulations and form new regulatory spaces and networks beyond national 
borders (cf. Van Schendel and Abrahahm 2005). Scott (2009) speaks of resistance of the local 
population to the sovereign power of the state. Like Caplins (2016), these scholars focus mainly 
on the perspective of the local population to analyse and explain their point of view and 
understanding of networks, trade and cross-border movement.  
So far in the literature on commercialisation of NTFP, the interrelation of the governmental 
systems and the perspectives of actors to analyse the local realities in relation to access to 
resources and cross-border networks and trade are limited. Furthermore, in borderlands at the 
margins of states, the roles and relations of state and non-state actors across the border and 
their negotiation processes to form adaptive governance systems and networks for cross-
border trade have not been examined in depth as yet. These topics are therefore the focus of 
this thesis.   
These gaps in the research also translate into a lack of attention to aspects of political ecology 
in policy discourses in relation to the yarshagumba phenomenon. In the last five years, the 
issues related to yarshagumba in the high mountain areas have arrived on the agendas of 
government officials in the ministries and state departments of India and Nepal. However, 
policy- and decision-makers in the governments of India and Nepal continue to see the issues 
as regulatory and managerial challenges. The prevalent opinion on government level is that 
overharvesting of yarshagumba and social conflicts about access to its collection sites are 
mainly due to the increased number of collectors and unsustainable harvesting rules and 
techniques. For them, the solution is to get a deeper understanding of the bio-geographical 
conditions of yarshagumba to address its challenges (ICIMOD 2016; interviews with 
government representatives of State Forest Department (SFD) of Utttarakhand State, India and 
of Department of Forests (DoF) and Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation 
(DNPWC), Nepal, 2016 and 2017). They argue that if the bio-geography of yarshagumba is 
better understood (further details see section 1.4) and its carrying capacity within a habitat 
known, revised governmental regulations can be formulated, in order to limit the total collected 
amount per collection site and to ensure sustainable harvesting of the resource by the 
collectors. This will lead to a sustainable income source for the local people. The more complex 
interrelations between state and non-state actors on multiple scales, the governance systems 
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in the collection sites and which role the border plays in this regard, aspects that political 
ecology points to, are given less attention so far.  
1.2.2 Aim of the research, its approach and research questions 
This thesis aims to contribute to the broader questions of commercialisation of NTFP collection 
and trade, governance systems of common resources and related negotiation processes of 
state and non-state actors to benefit from the extraction and trade of local resources. Following 
the perspective of political ecology, the thesis provides an in-depth understanding of 
negotiation processes of state authorities and non-state actors to shape governance systems 
for regulating NTFP collection and to shape trade networks in order to benefit from the available 
resources. Central questions are:  
- How do actors adapt governance systems regulating commercial collection and trade 
of the resource in response to changes in relation to the resource, like an increased 
resource value?  
- What kinds of production networks emerge in borderlands? 
- What roles do state and non-state actors play in the negotiation processes shaping 
governance systems that control access to and benefit from commercial NTFP 
collection and trade in borderlands?  
The thesis uses the case of yarshagumba collection and trade in the remote high Himalaya of 
the Nepal-India trans-boundary region within the Kailash Landscape to explore these 
questions. The Chinese part of the Kailash Landscape is less in the focus. The production 
network of yarshagumba in this trans-boundary region became highly complex because its 
value increased tremendously within a short time (Pouliot et al. 2018). On the one hand, more 
actors appeared demanding access to the resource, the dependency of the local communities 
on the resource increased, signs of habitat degradation became visible and the risk of 
overexploitation of yarshagumba has risen (Pant et al. 2017; Shrestha et al. 2017). As a result, 
local communities are vulnerable to other actors’ decisions, any environmental or economic 
changes, and deteriorations of the situation.  
On the other hand, state and non-state actors reacted to the changing conditions through 
innovative human actions. They formed new institutions, established networks using 
opportunities across national borders and adapted governance systems to regulate the 
resource extraction and trade for their own benefit. I argue that the local population are not 
vulnerable and passive players in the yarshagumba phenomenon. They are active participants, 
along with the local state authorities, in shaping the governance systems to regulate the access 
and to benefit from the resource. These established governance systems are the outcomes of 
negotiation processes between state and non-state actors. Rather than formal rules and 
regulations, negotiation processes between actors play a key role in determining who has 
access to the resource and who benefits from the trade network.  
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The thesis analyses the developments of governance systems in Nepal and India and the 
relationships between actors on local, national and trans-boundary levels for collection and 
trade of yarshagumba. The case study asks how governance systems have adapted to the 
changes due to the value increase of yarshagumba and the further developments it has 
triggered in the trans-boundary region. It also asks what kinds of production network for 
yarshagumba emerged in the borderland within the Kailash Landscape. Further, what roles do 
state authorities, communities and other actors in the borderland play to change, bypass or use 
regulations in order to develop new governance systems to benefit from the collection and trade 
of yarshagumba? In this regard, political ecology provides an important basis to critically 
scrutinize the political, social and economical dimensions of the collection and trade of the 
natural resource yarshagumba. 
The thesis focuses on two different aspects of the production network of yarshagumba: the 
collection and the trade. The consumption of yarshagumba is not further addressed here. Using 
the field of political ecology as the basis for the thesis I integrate different research concepts, 
like governance of and access to natural resource (Agrawal 2003; Ostrom 1990; 2005; Pahl-
Wostl 2009; Ribot and Peluso 2003), global production networks (Hendersen et al. 2002) and 
studies on borderlands (Gellner 2013; Goodhand 2005; Van Schendel and Abraham 2005) to 
focus in detail on specific aspects of the collection and trade of yarshagumba in part 1 and part 
2. The focus of parts 1 and 2 is further described in the following.  
The first part of the thesis focuses on the governance systems regulating access to and 
management of yarshagumba collection. The extended abstract Wallrapp et al. (2018) 
‘Institutional Issues, Power Struggles and Local Solutions – Governance Systems of 
Yarshagumba Collection in India and Nepal in the Kailash Landscape’2 (presented in Chapter 
4) and the publication Wallrapp et al. (forthcoming) ‘Governing the yarshagumba ‘gold rush’: 
comparative study of governance systems in the Kailash Landscape in India and Nepal’3  
(presented in Chapter 5) contribute to the scientific discussion on governance of commons 
when rapid changes in the social-ecological systems occur (Ostrom 1990). Adaptive capacities 
of systems and learning processes have been identified as essential elements of governance 
systems for governing social-ecological systems during periods of abrupt change (Dietz et al. 
2003; Agrawal 2003); in this case, the tremendous increase of the value of yarshagumba within 
a short time. The case study focuses on the adaptive capacity and multi-level learning 
                                               
2 Wallrapp, C. Keck, M. and Faust, H. (2018): Institutional Issues, Power Struggles and Local Solutions 
– Governance Systems of Yarshagumba Collection in India and Nepal in the Kailash Landscape. In: 
Aktuelle Forschungsbeiträge zu Südasien, 8.Jahrestagung des AK Südasien, 19./20. Januar 2018, Köln 
edited by C. Butsch, A. Follmann and Müller J. Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises Südasiens in der 
Deutschen Gesellschaft der Geographie. 
3 Wallrapp, C., Keck, M. and Faust, H. (forthcoming): Governing the yarshagumba ‘gold rush’: a 
comparative study of governance systems in the Kailash Landscape in India and Nepal. In: International 
Journal of Commons, accepted for publication. 
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processes of community-led and governmental governance systems in India and Nepal, 
building the analysis mainly on the resource governance learning concept of Pahl-Wostl (2009).  
The case study is a comparative analysis of the governance systems in India and Nepal, as 
the two regions in India and Nepal differ in terms of both legal and social context. In Nepal 
yarshagumba collection and sale in all community forests and conservation areas is legal 
(MoSFC 2017). In India, in contrast, the commercial collection of yarshagumba is legal only in 
community forests and sale is allowed only with the previous approval of the State Forest 
Department (Uttarakhand Biodiversity Board 2017). However, collection happens wherever 
possible in India and an informal trading network to Nepal enables the trade of the collected 
products (Caplins 2016; Negi et al. 2016). In order to get a better understanding of the existing 
and adapting governance systems, the comparative study asks the following research 
questions: 
- What developments can be identified in the institutional settings and the management 
mechanisms in areas where yarshagumba is collected? 
- What are the learning processes of governmental actors, communities and formal and 
informal institutions and how do these influence each other in the process of adapting 
to rapid changes in the high alpine grasslands of India and Nepal?  
The second part of the thesis focuses on the trade of yarshagumba by studying the trans-border 
connectivities, power and embeddedness of state and non-state actors in the borderland of the 
Kailash Landscape. While yarshagumba is traded from the Himalayan Mountains of India and 
Nepal via several towns and cities into China, I focus only on the production network in the rural 
Kailash Landscape within India and Nepal. The production network consists of three processes 
interrelated with each other. Firstly, the governmental marketing system for NTFPs in India is 
legal, but disadvantageous, for Indian collectors and traders. Secondly, their preferred informal 
trade route to sell their yarshagumba harvest runs from India through Nepal. Thirdly, the 
legalization process through the Nepali governmental mechanism is used for yarshagumba 
harvested both in India and Nepal. The publication Wallrapp et al. (2019) ‘Production networks 
and borderlands: the cross-border yarshagumba trade in the Kailash Landscape’4 (presented 
in Chapter 6) analyses this part of the production network in-depth by linking the concept of 
global production networks by Hendersen et al. (2002) with findings from borderland studies 
(Doevenspeck 2011; Goodhand 2005; Nordstrom 2000; Van Schendel and Abhraham 2005). 
Taking a non-state centric perspective (Gellner 2013; Scott 2009), studying the cross-border 
activities from both sides of the state border (Baud and Van Schendel 1997) and using the 
perspective of the local population and of relevant local state actors (cf. Doevenspeck 2011) 
enables an in-depth analysis of the informal cross-border trade network of yarshagumba in the 
borderland of the Kailash Landscape. In the case study, we focus the analysis on the power 
and embeddedness of state authorities and non-state actors on both sides of the border and 
                                               
4 Wallrapp, C., Faust, H. and Keck, M. (2019): Production networks and borderlands: cross-border 
yarsagumba trade in the Kailash Landscape. In: Journal of Rural Studies 66: 67-76. 
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relate the findings to the function of a border as line of separation. The guiding research 
questions are:  
- How are state authorities and non-state actors in the yarshagumba trade network 
socially and economically embedded and connected across the border? 
- What role does the border play in the trading system of yarshagumba in the borderlands 
of the Kailash Landscape? 
In the process of trans-border connectivity, actors in borderlands question, negotiate, subvert 
and re-enforce borders. At the same time borders influence the configuration of production 
networks in borderlands.  
The production networks of NTFP in border regions are complex. By dividing the analysis of 
the production network of yarshagumba into two parts – the collection and the trade – I am able 
to present an in-depth case study on the commercial collection and trade of NTFP in margins 
of states, like mountain and border regions, using a political ecology perspective and combining 
it with other related fields of research. Both parts examine negotiation processes of state and 
non-state actors, the social, economic and political relations between actors and the existing 
governance systems consisting of governmental regulations and communal arrangements, 
which determine access to a resource and its trading network. 
Looking beyond the case study, the thesis contributes to the field of governance of commons 
and global production networks. It provides suggestions to further link the concept of global 
production networks with findings of borderland studies. Furthermore, for policy-makers and for 
international and national development agencies supporting the policy-making process, the 
thesis is highly relevant to have an in-depth understanding of the underlying political and 
economic dimension of resource extraction and market structures of NTFP in the Himalayas in 
order to decide about the ‘right’ steps towards development of the region and sustainability of 
natural resources.  
1.3 The Kailash Landscape 
The Kailash Landscape is a cross-border area encompassing parts of three countries: China, 
India and Nepal. It is an area of approximately 31,000 sqkm and includes the State of 
Uttarakhand in India, Pulan County in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in China and parts 
of far western Nepal including the districts Darchula, Baitadi, Bajhang and Humla (currently 
under Province 7 following federal restructuring) and the protected area Api Nampa 
Conservation Area (ANCA) (ICIMOD 2010). 
In 2009, the Governments of China, India and Nepal agreed to work together on cross-country 
issues in the border region, which they called the Kailash Landscape. In the Himalayas, the 
Kailash Sacred Landscape Conservation and Development Initiative is the first initiative 
between the three countries to exchange data and work jointly on identified local, national and 
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cross-country issues related to environment and livelihood systems. Since 2009 several cross-
country projects have been initiated based on a regional cooperation framework. 
The Kailash Landscape is a culturally rich and ecologically diverse region with an elevation 
range from below 600 masl up to over 7000 masl (ICIMOD 2010). Especially the Indian and 
Nepali parts of the region are characterised by high mountains and deep valleys with forest 
cover, agricultural areas and alpine grasslands above 3200 to 5000 masl. In contrast, the 
northern part of the Kailash Landscape on the Tibetan Plateau in TAR, China is mainly 
characterised by high alpine rangelands with pastoral activities (ICIMOD 2017).  
The region is far from the capital cities Delhi, Beijing and Kathmandu and considered remote 
and on the margin of these states from the viewpoint of the different governments. On the other 
hand, the region is highly culturally, economically and socially connected across the three 
countries, as it has been for centuries (Bergmann, 2016; ICIMOD 2011), and as this study 
shows, the region is highly influenced by global demands and processes.  
The research for this thesis was conducted in only specific areas of the Kailash Landscape, 
mainly focusing on the high mountain areas of Nepal and India. Yarshagumba is mainly 
collected in these areas, and the borderland of Nepal and India along the Mahakali valley is an 
area with well-established cross-border trade networks for yarshagumba and other medicinal 
and wildlife products from the region. On the Chinese side of the Kailash Landscape 
yarshagumba is not found. I conducted research on both sides of the border in the Kumaon 
region in the State of Uttarakhand in India and the adjacent protected area ANCA in Darchula 
District in Nepal. Within this area, I focused on two valleys on the Indian side, Darma and Johar 
valleys, and two valleys on the Nepali side, Chamelyia and Mahakali valleys. The selection of 
the valleys is further described in section 3.4. In the following I use the term Kailash Landscape 
to indicate not the entire transboundary region, but instead this selected study area within this 
wider region. See figure 1 for localising the study area within the context of the Kailash 
Landscape and Asia. 
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Figure 1: Localising the study area: a) overview map of Asia, b) map of the Kailash Landscape and c) 
the border region of India, Nepal and China with the four research valleys and selected yarshagumba 
collection sites (detailed and Kailash map: own source, based on ICIMOD 2017; overview map: map 
data 2018 google) 
 
In the Kailash Landscape, two ethnic groups are predominant: a community that is known as 
the Rang in India and the Shauka in Nepal, and a community that can be characterised by their 
religious affiliation to the Hindu community. The Rang/Shauka community is an indigenous 
group and listed as indigenous tribe in India and Nepal. They are located in the upper parts of 
the Johar, Darma and Chaudans valley in India and in the upper parts of the Mahakali valley in 
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Nepal. In the Chamelyia valley in Nepal and in the lower parts of the Indian and Nepali valleys 
the Hindu community is dominant.  
The Rang/Shauka community traditionally practiced transhumance and trans-Himalayan trade 
linking the Gangetic plains with the trading town Taklakot/Burang in Pulan County, China on 
the Tibetan Plateau (Leder 2003). Over the centuries, they have established a well-functioning 
trade system with social and economic networks across the neighbouring countries (Bergmann 
2016). In line with this trading system, they have established a livestock grazing system that is 
highly adapted to the diverse ecosystems in the Himalayan region, which offer only seasonally 
sufficient resources for grazing. Due to these limited resources and harsh conditions, the 
Rang/Shauka community has developed a close sense of community and strict customary laws 
to regulate access to and usage of their trading routes and pasture areas (Hoon 1996; Leder 
2003). Their summer pasture areas are nowadays also yarshagumba collection sites. Although 
the Indo-China war in 1962 and the dominance of the Chinese on the Tibetan Plateau reduced 
their seasonal movements and trade systems, they continue some of their practices and most 
customary laws are still alive (Bergmann 2016). The Hindu communities of this study area in 
the lower parts of the valleys are less homogenous and depend mainly on subsistence farming 
and external labour work (Pathak et al. 2017).  
The increased demands of NTFPs and particularly the price increase of yarshagumba in the 
late 1990s on the Chinese market (Pauls and Franz 2013; Yeh and Lama 2013) changed the 
livelihood strategies of most local people in the Kailash Landscape over the last 10 to 15 years 
(Negi et al. 2006; 2016; Pant et al. 2017). Besides yarshagumba, chiraito (swertia chiravita), 
panch aunle (dactylorhiza hatagirea), kutki (neopicrorhiza scrophulariiflora), jatamansi 
(nardostachys jatamansi), ban lasun (wild garlic) and satuwa (paris polyphylla) are important 
NTFP for commercial collection and trade in the Kailash Landscape (Kala et al. 2006; Olsen 
2005; Uprety et al. 2016; interview with representatives of trader associations). However, since 
the early 2000s yarshagumba is the most valuable natural resource in the Himalayas (Childs 
and Choedup 2014; Shrestha and Bawa 2014; Shrestha et al. 2017). It is therefore not 
surprising that the local population has adapted their livelihood systems to concentrate on 
yarshagumba collection and sale in the region and that other actors from distant villages and 
even state representatives are interested in benefitting from this highly valuable resource. 
Consequently, the access to the collection sites and the trade of yarshagumba is highly 
contested by the different actors.  
1.4 The yarshagumba phenomenon 
Yarshagumba is biologically, ecologically, socially, economically and politically an interesting 
resource and since its market increase, has triggered many changes and developments in the 
Himalayan region. In the following, I call these changes and developments the yarshagumba 
phenomenon.  
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1.4.1 Bio-geography of yarshagumba 
Yarshagumba, or yarsagumba, is the Nepali word for ophiocordyceps sinensis, or in English 
‘caterpillar fungus’. In Tibetan language the fungus is called yartsa gunbu, which means 
literarily ‘summer grass – winter worm’, or dōng chóng xià cǎo in Chinese, which means the 
inverse ‘winter worm – summer grass’ (Yeh and Lama 2013). These names reflect the 
indigenous understanding of a life cycle in which an insect transforms into a piece of grass. In 
this study I will use the term yarsagumba or yarshagumba.  
The rare fungus is found only in the high mountain areas of the Himalayas of India, Nepal and 
Bhutan and the eastern part of the Tibetan Plateau in China (Cannon et al. 2009; Sharma 2004; 
Shrestha and Bawa 2013; Singh et al. 2010; Thapa et al. 2014; Winkler 2009). It is distributed 
in grass- and shrub-lands at an altitude of 3000 to 5200 masl and that receive a minimum of 
250mm average annual precipitation (Negi et al. 2015; Winkler 2009).   
In the scientific understanding, yarshagumba is a parasitic fungus growing in the body of a 
caterpillar of the ghost moth of the family Hepialidea (Cannon et al. 2009). It is actually a 
combination of two separate organisms forming a complex. The caterpillar larva of the ghost 
moth acts as the host insect for the fungus. The parasitic fungus infects the larvae while in the 
ground during the summer. Before the caterpillar larva can mature into a moth, the mycelium 
overtakes the caterpillar’s body, replacing the caterpillar with fungus and thereby killing the 
caterpillar. In the following spring, just when the snow is melting, the fruiting body of the fungus 
grows out of the now dead caterpillar’s head and protrudes above ground. This protrusion 
resembles a grass sprout and signals the presence of the body of the fungus in the ground to 
the local collectors (Negi et al. 2006). If the yarshagumba is not picked by collectors at an early 
stage while coming out of the ground, the fungus produces spores in the fruiting body and 
disperses them in late summer (Shrestha et al. 2014).  
Many details of the complex interaction between the two life cycles of the fungus and of the 
moth are not yet fully scientifically understood. The complex biology and difficult accessibility 
of the habitat of the yarshagumba makes scientific research difficult. Uncertainties are still 
associated with the specific species of the moth, its life cycle and larval stage as well as its 
primary food source(s) and other details related to the complex relation between the moth and 
the fungus (interview with Dr. C. S. Negi, Pithoragarh, India, January 2017). Therefore, it has 
so far not been possible for biologists and ecologists in the Himalayas to precisely calculate 
and define the sustainable harvesting amount of yarshagumba and carrying capacity of the 
habitat (ICIMOD 2016). The bio-geography of the yarshagumba depends on various factors 
like the complex interaction between the fungus, the host caterpillar, the alpine plants upon 
which the moths feed and the overall ecological and climatic conditions in the high-alpine 
grasslands. This makes the production of yarshagumba vulnerable to any changes in its 
environmental habitat (Hopping et al. 2018; Negi et al. 2015). 
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1.4.2 Medicinal use 
Since several hundreds of years yarshagumba has been known for medicinal use in Tibetan 
and Chinese medicine. The caterpillar fungus was first mentioned in Tibetan medical texts in 
the fifteenth century followed by Chinese texts two centuries afterwards (Winkler 2005). 
Traditional Chinese medicine values it as a tonic to replenish kidney, liver and immune 
functions and as an aphrodisiac for both men and women. Tibetan medicine uses it for treating 
hepatitis B and enhancing the immune system, kidney, lung and heart function. It is also used 
for improving health conditions including fatigue, dizziness, amnesia, heart and respiratory 
diseases (Yeh and Lama 2013). Baral et al. (2015: 63ff.) provide a summary of potential 
pharmaceutical use, including what has so far been explored and documented in various 
studies, mainly from China.  
In contrast to the Chinese and Tibetan medicine, in the ayurvedic and other types of traditional 
medicine in Nepal and in India yarshagumba is hardly known or utilized (Negi et al. 2016). This 
could be an explanation of why yarshagumba was not valued in the Himalayas before the late 
1990s until the demand and prices on the Chinese market increased and the Himalayan region 
became connected to the Chinese market (Linke 2017; Yeh and Lama 2013).  
1.4.3 Ecological and social developments in the Himalayas 
In the late 1990s, individuals who knew about the high prices for yarshagumba in China 
searched for new collection sites and were successful in the high alpine grasslands of the 
southern side of the Central Himalayas in parts of India, Nepal and Bhutan. With this, in the 
following years, what had been an unknown and unvalued natural resource found in the 
Himalayas changed to a highly valued and demanded product on the international market. This 
trend is still on-going and, subsequently, causes rapid socio-economic and ecological 
developments in the yarshagumba collecting sites in the Himalay as well as in the nearby 
villages and towns.  
The increase in the prices of yarshagumba triggered a ‘gold rush’ in the Himalayas and 
increased the dependency of local people on this single resource. For example in the local 
market in Darchula town, Nepal, the prices increased from approximately 100 USD per kg in 
the early 2000s to approximately 12.000 USD per kg in 2017 (interview with representative of 
ANCA, Nepal, May 2017; Pouliot et al. 2018). Over the last two decades, yarshagumba 
collection became one of the main sources of income in many high Himalayan mountain 
villages of Bhutan, India, and Nepal (Cannon et al. 2009; Childs and Choedrup 2014; Negi et 
al. 2006; 2016; Shrestha et al. 2014; 2017). Today, according to a recent study in ANCA (Nepal) 
the “average [annual] household cash income from O. sinensis is USD 2174 … confirming the 
dominant role of O. sinensis in cash generation“ (Pouliot et al. 2018: 65). Also on the Indian 
side Negi et al. highlight the high significance of yarshagumba harvest for the local people: “In 
fact, the income generated by the Yartsa Gunbu, restricted to a bare one and half months 
period far exceeds the traditional sources of income combined” (2016: 202). This cash income 
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has led people to stop engaging in their traditional livelihood systems like farming and livestock 
keeping and causes a high dependency of the local people on the collection of yarshagumba 
every year (Childs and Choedrup 2014; Negi et al. 2016; Shrestha et al. 2017; Wangchuk and 
Wangdi 2015).  
Besides the socio-economic developments, yarshagumba collection has also triggered socio-
ecological implications in the mountain regions and in particular in the collection sites. In the 
Kailash Landscape each year around 10,000 to 30,000 collectors from nearby villages and 
other villages in lower areas stay for one to two months (from the end of April until mid-June) 
in the collection sites and set up temporary campsites along the tree line at altitudes between 
3400 and 3800 masl. Earlier, only 10 to 20 shepherds stayed on these pasture areas for 
livestock grazing in the summer months. Nowadays, the number of collectors has risen to 200 
to 3000 per season per site. The actual number of collectors varies from site to site and 
depends on the location, dimension and management system at the site (ANCA 2016). During 
their stay they cut firewood daily, tread down plants, while camping and searching for 
yarshagumba, and lack adequate waste disposal and sanitation facilities.  
Collectors stated that in the collection sites of India and Nepal the total amount of collected 
yarshagumba per person has declined over the past 5 years (ICIMOD 2015; Negi et al. 2015), 
which was also analysed by Hopping et al. (2018) in the whole Himalayan region and by 
Stewart (2014) on the Tibetan Plateau. A number of different reasons for the decline are 
possible. Most likely, the increased numbers of collectors and their stay in the collection sites 
have an effect on the yarshagumba production and its habitat. Locals also perceive that the 
fragile high alpine eco-systems are degrading, which might have an impact on the life cycle 
and food sources of the ghost moth as well. Further, collectors, for instance, harvest pre- and 
post-mature yarshagumba, which influences the life cycle of the caterpillar fungus (Shrestha 
and Bawa 2013). Additionally, it is likely that climate change and its effects on the bio-
geography of yarshagumba also play a role in the production of the fungus as well as the 
survival and reproduction of the host, the ghost moth (Hopping et al. 2018; Negi et al. 2015; 
Stewart 2014).  
The tremendous increase in numbers of people accessing the grasslands for the collection of 
yarshagumba, the high dependency of collectors on yarshagumba harvest for cash income, 
the perceived degradation of the habitat and the perceived decline of the yarshagumba harvest 
per collector are challenges faced in most of the collection sites in the region. These 
developments are described and analysed by several scholars in case studies within the region 
(e.g. Cannon et al. 2009; Linke 2017; Negi et al. 2016; Thapa et al. 2014; Shrestha and Bawa 
2013; 2014; Pant et al. 2017; Tan 2018; Weckerle et al. 2010). Most of these case studies 
focus on the analysis of the socio-economic and ecological situation and/or management 
structures in one particular valley or collection site. The governance systems and the 
negotiation processes of actors involved in the yarshagumba collection and trade and how that 
influences the access, benefits and availability of yarshagumba is less examined in the 
literature. These aspects are the focus of this thesis. 
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1.5 Structure of study 
For analysing the negotiation processes between state and non-state actors in the production 
network of yarshagumba I apply different concepts, which are further elaborated in chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 provides details about the methods for the qualitative research, the applied 
techniques for data collection, the selection process of the study area and the method for data 
analysis. The analysis of part 1 of the thesis, focusing on the negotiation processes and 
governance systems regulating the collection of yarshagumba in the Kailash Landscape, is 
presented in Chapter 4 and 5. Chapter 4 presents more an overview of the issues related to 
yarshagumba collection and the respective governance systems in the two countries, India and 
Nepal. Chapter 5 also analyses and compares the current governance systems in the collection 
sites in India and Nepal, but provides more details and analysis regarding their adaptive 
capacities and learning processes.  
The analysis in part 2 of the thesis, focusing on the negotiation processes and trade of 
yarshagumba between India and Nepal in the Kailash Landscape, is presented in chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 includes a detailed analysis of the governance systems in the borderlands of the two 
countries, India and Nepal, the configuration and power relations within the informal cross-
border network linking state and non-state actors from both countries for trading yarshagumba, 
and what role the border plays in this regard. Further, in chapter 7, I discuss the central 
questions of the thesis on the governance systems and roles of state and non-state actors in 
negotiation processes to shape governance systems in borderlands for accessing and 
benefitting from local available natural resources. Finally, in chapter 8, I draw conclusions from 
this research and provide recommendations for ways that policy-makers and international and 
national development agencies can think differently in policy-making processes related to 
natural resource management.  
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2 Conceptual framework 
The collection and trade of yarshagumba are part of complex political, social and economic 
systems in the region regulated by diverse governance systems and involving various types of 
actors on multiple scales and beyond state borders. I argue that members of the local 
population are not vulnerable and passive players in the yarshagumba phenomenon, but active 
participants, along with the local state authorities. Together, both shape the governance 
systems and networks to regulate the access and to benefit from the locally available resource. 
These governance systems are the outcomes of negotiation processes between state and non-
state actors. Rather than formal rules and regulations, negotiation processes between actors 
play a key role in determining who has access to the resource and who benefits from the trade 
network.  
The thesis consists of two parts: (1) the collection and (2) the trade of yarshagumba, in which 
I focus on different aspects of governance systems and negotiation processes between actors. 
Thus, I apply different concepts and analyse the two parts separately.  
In order to analyse these complex systems and negotiation processes of actors, the conceptual 
framework of this thesis is based on the broader field of research known as ‘political ecology’ 
(section 2.1). For part 1, regarding the collection, the further concepts of governance systems, 
property rights, common pool resources, adaptive capacity and learning processes are highly 
relevant (section 2.2). For part 2, regarding the trade, the analysis is based on the concept of 
global production networks and the research field of borderlands (section 2.3). These concepts 
are discussed in this chapter in relation to the understanding of political ecology to form the 
conceptual framework of the thesis. Additionally, in the respective chapters 4 to 6 the concepts 
are discussed in relation to the specific research questions for part 1 and part 2.  
2.1 Political ecology as the basis of the thesis 
Political ecology developed as a radical critique against the apolitical and de-politicizing effect 
of mainstream environmental research and practice (Mung’ong’o 2009). Environmental 
scholars tend to describe resource scarcity, environmental change or conflicts in relation to 
population growth and intensifying per capita human impacts on the environment. Further, they 
tend to emphasize ‘technical’ solutions to environmental problems (Watts 2000). This is for 
example, also reflected in the prevailing opinion of the policy-makers in Nepal and India about 
the phenomenon yarshagumba, described in section 1.2.1. Worldwide, this apolitical 
perspective and the related environmental practices has especially had impact in the research 
field of development studies on the understanding of phenomena such as deforestation, soil 
degradation and water scarcity, particularly in the so-called ‘third world’. This has also 
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influenced the design and implementation of governmental and non-governmental 
interventions in the form of development programmes (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Bryant and 
Bailey 1997). In contrast, political ecology is a field of research based on the concept of ‘political 
economy’ that attempts to provide a framework for understanding the political sources, 
conditions and ramifications of human-environmental interactions and to promote alternative 
understandings of livelihood struggles (Peet et al. 2011; Robbins 2012; Watts 2000).  
Blaikie and Brookfield, the pioneers of political ecology, have defined the field of research as 
one that “combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy. Together, 
this encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, 
and also within classes and groups within society itself” (1987: 17). Watts defines ‘political 
ecology’ as a lens “to understand the complex relations between nature and society through a 
careful analysis of what one might call the forms of access and control over resources and their 
implications for environmental health and sustainable livelihoods” (2000: 257). Fundamental 
questions of political ecology are related to just and equal access to resources, their distribution 
and control, and their relationship to the regimes of regulations (Bauriedl 2016). Contemporary 
political ecology is not a single theory, but rather a broad field of research that examines the 
interrelations of political economy, ecological processes, power relations and discourses within 
the environment (Newell 2012) acting on multiple scales (Robbins 2012).  
The common premise within political ecology is that, on the one hand, environmental changes 
and ecological conditions are the product of political and economic processes and, on the other 
hand, these processes generate or exacerbate environmental changes and conditions 
(Paulson and Gezon 2004). Environmental changes, crises and conflicts are not created in 
isolation from political decisions, social and economic conditions. Therefore, they cannot be 
understood and solved in isolation from the political and economic context. There are strong 
interrelations between socio-political conditions and environmental changes, crises and 
conflicts. Thus, the central assumption is that environmental change is not a neutral process 
amenable to technical management. Rather, environmental change has political sources, 
conditions and ramifications that affect existing socio-economic inequalities and political 
processes (Bryant and Bailey 1997: 28).  
Other linked assumptions that inform the work of political ecologists are: “they accept the idea 
that costs and benefits associated with environmental change are for the most part distributed 
among actors unequally … which inevitably reinforces or reduces existing social and 
economic inequalities … which holds political implications in terms of the altered power of 
actors in relation to other actors” (Bryant and Bailey 1997: 28f.). The first part of the assumption 
refers to the capacities of each person, household or social group to respond to changes to 
which all are equally exposed. Depending on each ones’ capacities a person or group benefits 
or bears the costs of environmental changes.  
The second part of the assumption stresses the point of marginalisation of actors and that 
environmental and developmental concerns are inseparable. Any change in the environment 
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must affect the political and economic conditions and vice versa. In particular, if communities 
depend on natural resources for their livelihoods, any changes in relation to the natural 
resource will have effects on the socio-economic situation and with it on the political status quo 
and governance system. One of the contributions of political ecology was a refined concept of 
marginality in which its political, ecological and economic aspects may be mutually reinforcing: 
“land degradation is both a result and a cause of social marginalisation” (Blaikie and Brookfield 
1987: 23). Furthermore, pressure of production on resources is transmitted through social 
relations, which impose excessive demands on the environment (Watts 2000). Consequently, 
local populations are vulnerable and are becoming marginalised, because the local production 
systems undergo transitions to overexploitation of natural resources on which these 
populations depend, as a response to state development interventions and/or increasing 
integration in regional and global markets (Robbins 2012; Yeh and Lama 2013).  
The local communities can become marginalised within the process of commercialisation of 
resources due to communities’ increased dependency on one resource, the power 
asymmetries between actors, and the political and economic dimensions within the production 
network of resources. The communities’ high dependency on one resource as their main or 
only livelihood source makes them vulnerable to environmental changes, changes within the 
market structure of the resource or changes in property rights or rules for collection and trading 
due to governmental interventions (Yeh and Lama 2013). Global market demands and political 
and economic decisions of state authorities and powerful non-state actors like traders and 
consumers, influence the behaviour of local collectors and push them further into dependency 
on the resource and on other actors’ decisions (Caplins 2016; Caplins et al 2018; Stewart 
2014). This leads to the marginalisation of local people and degradation of the habitats, which 
reinforce each other.  
The third part of the assumptions refers to the possibilities for resistance and adaptation. Thus, 
environmental change not only signifies wealth creation for some and impoverishment for 
others, but it also thereby alters the ability of actors to control or resist other actors. In relation 
to that, Robbins (2012) emphasizes that political ecology promotes the understanding of 
livelihood struggles from multiple dimensions and perspectives. To overcome these forces of 
marginalisation, often local people have created alternatives, adaptations and creative human 
actions. An example of this in our case is the establishment of communal arrangements for 
securing or gaining access for local communities to collection sites of yarshagumba. Further, 
local communities have resisted state interventions or regulations, like state-dictated 
conservation and protected area guidelines (Bloomer 2009; Robbins 2012). These ‘creative’ 
human actions are not always legitimated by law, but can be socially accepted (Scott 1999).  
Proximity and access to natural resources combined with the impact of these resources on 
one’s livelihood contributes to the fact that illegal extraction or trade of resources are socially 
accepted and therefore legitimized by society (Caplins et al. 2018; Shova and Hubacek 2011; 
Van Schendel and Abraham 2005). In relation to NTFP collection in India and Nepal, scholars 
document that despite the existence of “various policy measures, excessive and illegal 
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gathering of medicinal plants persists” (Negi et al. 2010: 104). These activities or arrangements 
encourage conflicts between state authorities and communities, as well as between different 
communities, about resource access (Le Billon 2001). State and non-state actors form new 
institutions and networks and negotiate power to legitimate access and trade of resources, also 
beyond national borders (Van Schendel and Abraham 2005). These ‘creative’ human actions 
raise questions about governance systems, property rights, legitimacy, function of borders as 
well as the state and non-state actors’ interrelations in these networks and governance 
systems. Therefore, besides regulatory spaces, social and economic dimensions are central in 
this thesis to analyse the negotiation processes between actors to shape governance systems 
for accessing and benefiting from local resources.  
2.2 Governance systems for accessing resources 
Governance systems for natural resources regulate the human-environmental relationships. 
They are not fixed and static; they are complex constellations. States and communities adapt 
and modify systems to the changing political and economic conditions and to their own 
interests. This is also the case in the high alpine grasslands, where changes are triggered by 
the transformation of the common pool resource ‘yarshagumba’ from a non-valued resource to 
a highly demanded product. The governance systems developed in the yarshagumba collection 
sites are the outcome of negotiation processes of state and non-state actors to adapt to the 
pressures on the existing governance systems due to the change in the value of the locally 
available common pool resource. These resource governance systems consist of 
governmental regulations and communal management arrangements, which have been 
adapted to the changing conditions. The governance of common pool resources and their 
adaptation processes and legitimacy are conceptualised in this section. 
2.2.1 Resource - a product of nature 
Before going into the conceptualization of governance systems I reflect on the word ‘natural 
resource’. In recent debates about human-environmental relationships and especially within 
political ecology, scholars argue that nature, which is not influenced by humans, does not exist. 
All nature is socially constructed or produced, which is then called ‘natural resource’ (Castree 
2001). The transformation of nature into a resource is influenced by human desires, demands 
and practices; or, from a political economy perspective, determined by the conditions, means 
and forces of production through markets and actors (Mung’ong’o 2009). Le Billon (2001) 
emphasizes that resources are not, they become. Castree and Braun (2001) use the term 
“social nature” to emphasize on the different ways in which actors socially construct nature. 
However, it should be not be overlooked that still nature and, therefore, resources have a 
biophysical and material basis (Demeritt 2000; Escobar 1999), which is in this case study the 
bio-geography of yarshagumba growing in the high alpine grasslands.   
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Castree highlights that “nature is defined, delimited, and even physically reconstituted by 
different societies, often in order to serve specific, and usually dominant, social interests. In 
other words, the social and the natural are seen to intertwine in ways that make their separation 
- in either thought or practice - impossible” (2001: 1). In the case of the resource yarshagumba, 
most of the actors within the production network, like collectors, traders and state authorities, 
see yarshagumba only as a lucrative income or revenue source, which suddenly ‘appeared’ in 
their mountain regions. In contrast, the Chinese consumers see the species yarshagumba as 
a highly valuable medicinal product used for curing health issues (Baral et al. 2015). The Nepali 
and Indian local communities hardly used the product as medicine and do not value it 
accordingly. For them, it is important that it grows on their high alpine grasslands and ancestors’ 
lands and they can claim property rights for exclusive collection. Until the discovery of 
yarshagumba, the high alpine grasslands in the Himalayas were of little interest to the 
governmental authorities and distant communities in Nepal and India. In the last few years, it 
has led to the design and enforcement of policies and guidelines and to conflicts and 
negotiation processes between actors. The transformation of nature into tradable commodities 
is thus a deeply political and social process. It involves the definition of property rights, the 
organisation of labour and the allocation of profits (cf. Le Billon 2001; Mung’ong’o 2009).  
This transformation of resources is not a static process; it is dynamic, continuously changes 
over time and is influenced by contemporary discourses on for example governance systems 
for conservation and natural resource management, as well as in our case on medicinal 
practices. Additionally, institutions, knowledge and power of actors determine the production 
networks and market structures of commodities (Doolittle 2010; Mung’ong’o 2009). Further, 
production networks influence the production of nature and impact the local realities (Yeh and 
Lama 2013). Governance systems determine how much impact is made on the local natural 
resources due to the commercialisation of the resource, but also the other way around, 
governance systems adapt to the local realities. They reinforce and influence each other. Thus, 
yarshagumba and the respective high alpine grasslands are both resources produced through 
the global market demands.  
2.2.2 Governance systems of commons 
Worldwide, most of the natural resources in remote areas, like forests and high alpine grazing 
grounds, are still common pool resources (Acheson 2006; Bauer 2004; Herrera et al. 2014). 
Common pool resources are defined through subtractability (if the resource is used by one 
person it cannot be used by another one anymore) and difficulties of excluding other people 
from having access and using the resource (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1999). To manage 
common pool resources justly and sustainably, an effective governance system is required 
(Dietz et al. 2003).  
Governance systems determine property rights and rules to curb the exploitation rate of the 
resource by establishing a management mechanism to limit access, extraction and trade of the 
resource (Acheson 2006; Agrawal 2003; Ostrom 1990). Governance systems are understood 
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as an interplay of different institutions to describe the process of decision-making and the 
process by which decisions are implemented (Pahl-Wostl 2009). Institutions regulate, 
constrain, enable and legitimate the behaviour of individuals and groups in society and the 
interactions between them (North 1990; Scott 1999). They determine the “framework within 
which human interaction takes place” (North 1990: 4). In the literature, the distinction is made 
between formal (governmental) and informal (socially-accepted) institutions. Formal institutions 
are usually linked to official, governmental or bureaucratic formalities and are legally binding. 
Informal institutions are mainly based on social norms, socially and culturally shared 
understandings and rules, which are not formally encoded (Ghate and Chaturvedi 2016; Pahl-
Wostl 2009). The actual natural resource governance systems are a complex blend of various 
formal and informal institutions (Cleaver 2003). All institutions influence the decision-making 
process of actors regarding the management of natural resources (Ghate and Chaturvedi 2016; 
Pahl-Wostl 2009).  
 
Property rights and related discourses 
Property rights legitimate the access to and usage of resources. Specifically, for natural 
resources, property rights can include distinct usage rights, rights to exclude others, 
management rights, and rights to sell (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). Worldwide, habitats of NTFP 
lie within state-owned, community or private property such as community-managed forests, 
grazing grounds or protected areas (Acheson 2006; Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Ostrom 1990; 
Ostrom et al. 1999). Each property rights regime has different regulations for extraction and 
usage of resources determined by its regulations and laws. However, often property rights for 
commercial collection or home consumption of NTFP are not clearly regulated and legitimised 
by state authorities, or property rights contradict each other. Further, often they are not 
efficiently enforced (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Herrera et al. 2014). Whether state-owned, 
collective or private properties are the most suitable property regimes to manage natural 
resources has been debated between scholars for several decades. The respective prevailing 
opinion and discourses have changed over time and have influenced the decision- and policy-
makers and conservation and development programmes on state-level in the past up to now, 
worldwide, as well as in India and Nepal.  
Over decades, conservation and natural resource management, for example of forests and 
grazing grounds, has been based on the model of state-driven, top-down protection and 
management of valuable resources (Singh 2016). This discourse was mainly guided by the 
understanding that communities are not able to manage resources sustainably due to the 
“tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968). The “tragedy of the commons” emphasizes that it is 
rational for everyone to free ride on the efforts and costs of others, when incentives for 
sustainable usage are lacking (Agrawal 2003; Ostrom 1990). Consequently, traditional 
community lands were nationalised. Communities depending on resources for their livelihood 
either lost access to these resources or, if they continued using these resources, the activities 
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were declared illegal and they were fined and sanctioned by government authorities (Bauer 
2004; Doolittle 2010; Herrera et al. 2014).  
Building on the discussion about the problematic of ‘freeriders’ and ‘tragedy of the commons’, 
studies about governance of commons come to the conclusion that effective and sustainable 
natural resource management of common pool resources, if certain conditions are fulfilled to 
implement, monitor and enforce rules and regulations (Agrawal 2003; Dietz et al. 2003; Ostrom 
1990). Ostrom derived eight design principles of sustainable governance of collective property 
(1990: 90). These are: “clearly defined boundaries, proportional equivalence between benefits 
and costs, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution 
mechanisms, minimal recognition of rights to organise and nested enterprises.” In following 
studies, several scholars reviewed and refined the criteria list (Agrawal 2003; Baland and 
Platteau 1996; Wade 1994). The scholars tried to generalise the conditions by defining 
technical and organisational factors influencing the natural resource management. In addition 
to the criteria list, Agrawal (2003) highlights that local context, power and micro-level politics 
within communities and groups are critical to understanding how resources are used and 
managed. This outcome by Agrawal (2003) creates the link to political ecology by looking 
beyond the more technical and organisational factors describing governance of natural 
resources. Agrawal puts emphasis also on the socio-economic and political relations of 
resource management.  
Over the past two to three decades, there has been a growing consensus that the active 
participation of communities is a necessary ingredient to ensure successful conservation and 
management of common pool resources (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Doolittle 2010). This 
change of the prevailing opinion in the scientific world as well as within governments and 
leading governmental and non-governmental development organisations has led to the 
development and implementation of community forest programmes and establishment of 
conservation areas. In the study area of this research, community forests5 and the protected 
area ANCA in Nepal were established. In these governance models, the communities are seen 
as partners, who participate in the design, implementation and monitoring of management 
strategies for the management of their natural resources (Howard 2015; Ostrom 1990).  
Recently, these models have been more and more frequently criticized as being ineffective in 
management and often leading to unequally shared benefits within the community. The 
apparent participation of communities has not led to more empowerment of communities, as 
participation of community members was rather reported on paper than practiced and 
implemented on the ground. Additionally, decisions are still made by government authorities, 
                                               
5 The van panchayats (community forest councils) in Uttarakhand State of India developed already at 
the beginning of 20th century due to resistance by the local people to the transformation of all forestland 
into state-owned property under British-India. After several years of protests and conflicts, the British 
government accepted the formation of van panchayats in the high mountain regions of today’s 
Uttarakhand State of India and handed over patches of forests around the villages to community councils 
for their own management (Singh 2016). 
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development organisations or dominant community members (Howard 2015) than through 
participatory decision-making processes with the involvement of representatives of the 
community. 
Following the changing conceptualizations of property rights for natural resource management 
over the last decades, we can see that the prevailing opinion about the ‘right’ way in which 
property ownership is defined has changed over time depending on the prevalent ideology, 
culture and contemporary understanding of human-environmental relationships. Influenced by 
work within political ecology, more recent studies emphasize that, under various regimes of 
property rights, access to resources is determined by political, social and economic conditions 
(Agrawal 2003; Paulson and Gezon 2004; Ribot and Peluso 2003; Robbins 2012).  
 
Power, legitimacy and access 
Coming back to the outcome of the work of Agrawal (2003) that local context, power and micro-
level politics within communities and groups are critical to understanding how resources are 
used and managed, I discuss further what legitimates access to resources beyond 
governmental regulations. The actors’ ability to control, maintain or gain access to resources 
depends also on the power and social and political-economic relations of the actors within the 
community and social group (Ribot and Peluso 2003).  
Power within political ecology is not explicitly conceptualised (Paulson and Gezon 2004). Ribot 
and Peluso define power as: “… embodied in and exercised through various mechanisms, 
processes and social relations – that affect people’s ability to benefit from resources” (2003: 
154). As a personal attribute, power is defined as the “ability of an individual to impose his or 
her will on another, and the power to control settings in which people may act and interact” 
(Paulson and Gezon 2004: 28). Power shapes environments for human action and interaction 
and is wielded and negotiated through practices and processes between actors. 
The social identity of actors, characterized by factors such as affiliation to a certain ethnic 
group, common customary rights, shared understandings and beliefs, but also knowledge and 
social status, influences formal and informal processes facilitating resource access. Social 
relations like ethnicity and kinship or economic dependencies can build up patron-client 
relationships, which is especially widespread in the trading network of yarshagumba. It can also 
encourage privileged access to state officials for non-state actors for e.g. easier documentation 
practices or handing out of certificates and licences (Adihkari 2015). Consequently, access to 
and management of natural resources varies from location to location depending on the 
informal and formal institutional setting, the actors, their knowledge and power relations and 
the socio-economic and cultural context (Acheson 2006; Ghate and Chaturvedi 2016; Ribot 
and Peluso 2003).  
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What members of society consider as legitimate, changes over time and is subject to 
continuous discussions on assumptions, discourses, concepts and power within society and 
between actors within a production network (Lund 2008; Sikor and Lund 2009). Usually, so-
called legal activities are legitimated by law, while illegal activities are not legitimated by law. 
However, some of the power relations, actions, and institutions might be acknowledged or 
recognized as legitimate by some actors, but not by others, which can create conflicts and 
tensions. In general, legitimacy refers to the status of an institution and action that is socially 
accepted by a social group and therefore respected, but not necessary legally sanctioned by 
law (Scott 1999). These are considered ‘licit’ actions or interactions (Van Schendel and 
Abhraham 2005), which are illegal by law, but are socially accepted by the involved actors.  
Power relations and legitimacies are not static; they are dynamic processes responding to 
changing situations (Sikor and Lund 2009). When conditions change, thus, actors constantly 
negotiate power relations to allocate rights and duties within a governance system, as well as 
costs and benefits within a production network (Singh 2016; Mung’ong’o 2009).  
As discussed above, the understanding of marginalisation of local communities used here is 
based on political ecology and recognizes regional and global market developments, as well 
as governmental and non-governmental interventions. The marginalisation of local 
communities can imply losing access to their own resources, which was especially the case 
during the transformation of community land into state-owned properties. Marginalisation can 
also be related to the high dependency of local communities on one resource for income, which 
makes them vulnerable to any price or market fluctuations or environmental changes (Robbins 
2012; Yeh and Lama 2013). Adapting to these pressures and developments, local people form, 
within the possibilities available to them, their own management mechanisms and governance 
systems for securing their own access to the resource. This is also seen in this case study, 
where every collection site of yarshagumba has an individually-designed governance system 
consisting of governmental regulations and local communal arrangements, which are either 
complementary to or replace governmental regulations. Thus, governance systems on the 
ground are complex constellations. They are an interplay of rights, institutions, power 
structures, and social and economic relations between actors. They differ from location to 
location. Further, due to the varieties of governance systems in each location, the capacities of 
governance systems to adapt to sudden changes differ, as do their learning processes.  
2.2.3 Adaptation of governance systems when changes occur 
As emphasized in the section on political ecology, social and ecological systems are highly 
interlinked and dynamic systems that adapt to changes from outside or within these systems. 
Governance systems are influenced by short-term disturbances and societal or environmental 
changes, like climate changes, changes in property rights and management mechanisms 
through governmental or non-governmental interventions. Additionally, changes in livelihood 
strategies, population growth and resource demands on local, national and global markets lead 
to changes within the social-ecological system (Anderies et al. 2004; Folke 2007; Folke et al. 
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2005; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Plummer et al. 2013). Triggered by these changes, struggles between 
different interest groups are part of a constant negotiation process for power between actors to 
adapt the governance systems according to their interests (Mung’ong’o 2009; Singh 2016).  
Governance systems play a decisive and critical role in adapting to the changes, demands and 
interests of different actors on various levels and to keeping the social-ecological system in 
balance (Folke et al. 2005). Pahl-Wostl defines the adaptive capacity of governance systems 
as the “ability of a resource governance system to first alter processes and if required convert 
structural elements as a response to experienced or expected changes in the societal or natural 
environment” (2009: 355).  
Adaptation of a governance system can happen on several levels and in various forms 
depending on learning processes within the system. Pahl-Wostl (2009) developed an approach 
for analysing the multi-level and multi-loop learning processes within governance systems 
ranging from incremental learning (single-loop learning) to structural change (triple-loop 
learning). Single-loop learning refers to a gradual improvement of actions towards a strategic 
goal without questioning the underlying assumptions. Double-loop learning refers to a reflection 
on assumptions, for example about cause-effect relationships within a value-normative 
framework. In triple-loop learning, one begins to reconsider underlying discourses, values and 
beliefs to transform the context within which the governance system is embedded (Pahl-Wostl 
et al. 2013). Further details on the framework and its application are elaborated in chapter 5.  
The ‘adaptive capacity’ or the ‘ability to change’ of governance systems depends on the design 
and constellation of the system itself. It also depends on what kind of actors are involved, the 
institutions available and implemented, the relationships between actors, their networks across 
levels, the interactions across administrative boundaries, vertical integration, and the prevalent 
discourse of governance and property rights (Dietz et al. 2003; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Ostrom 2005; 
Young 2009).  
Instead of depending on one property rights regime, over the last two decades, scholars have 
argued for more complex governance systems to be able to regulate human-environmental 
relationships. These systems have a better ability to alter processes and, if required, convert 
structural elements, like assumptions and prevalent discourses within society, when changes 
occur. In line with the understanding of political ecology, over the last two decades, several 
new understandings and ideas for governance systems have developed, combining multiple 
actors on various scales and levels. These systems consider local realties including power 
relations between actors, local legitimacies and social and economic conditions (Dietz et al. 
2003; Folke et al. 2005; German and Keeler 2010; Sharma-Wallace 2018).   
The ‘adaptive governance’ approach by Folke et al. (2005) highlights the social dimension 
within governance systems for renewal and reorganisation to connect individuals, organisations 
and institutions at multiple levels. For a successful learning environment within a governance 
system, characteristics and roles of key persons are important elements. Key persons can 
provide leadership, trust, vision and meaning for the transformation of governance systems. In 
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contrast, key persons, either state or non-state actors, can also hinder or delay learning 
processes or misuse knowledge and power for their own interests.  
Similarly, ‘polycentric institutions’ and ‘hybrid natural resource governance systems’ describe 
a mode of governance, which is characterized by a balance between local self-organization 
and governmental regulations as complementary instruments of governance (German and 
Keeler 2010; Ostrom 2005). Scholars that have developed this model argue for linking stronger 
governmental actors, research facilities and communal institutions to develop innovative ideas 
and create an environment for learning processes on various levels and loops (German and 
Keeler 2010; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2013).  
Governance systems depending only on one single governance regime are less flexible and 
adaptive. Consequently, instead of understanding governance systems only as an interplay of 
different institutions, I apply in the thesis a more holistic approach to governance systems, 
including governmental regulations and communal arrangements, as well as considering 
different legitimacies, relations and networks of state and non-state actors as part of 
governance systems. This enables an in-depth analysis of the negotiation processes of state 
and non-state actors, which shape the governance systems for yarshagumba collection. These 
governance systems, the negotiation processes between actors and their adaptation and 
learning processes are further discussed in chapters 4,5 and 7. 
2.3 Production networks in borderlands 
For analysing the trade networks in the borderland of the Kailash Landscape and the related 
processes of negotiations between the state and the non-state actors, I use the concept of 
‘global production network’ (GPN) by Hendersen et al. (2002) as a basis for analysis and link it 
to findings of borderland studies. Like the approach of political ecology, the concept of GPN 
and the research field of borderland studies focus on questions about power and political and 
economic relations between actors within a certain space or network. The concept of GPN 
comes from the field of research on political economy and is an approach for analysing the 
relationships between production, trade and consumption of products. The approach 
incorporates all kinds of network configurations, including informal arrangements between 
actors, in a non-linear way by analysing the power and embeddedness of actors within 
networks (Hendersen et al. 2002; Neilson et al. 2014; Pauls and Franz 2013).  
In the GPN concept, actors’ embeddedness in production networks is characterized by their 
personal relationships to other network actors, their opportunities to gain access to resources 
via theses relations as well as their related personal obligations and dependencies (Keck, 2016; 
Li, 2007). Power is defined by the ability of actors to influence other actors in their doings as 
well as to define, enforce and revoke the prevalent system of rules and regulations (Hendersen 
et al., 2002; Neilson et al., 2014). These two analytical categories are further discussed in 
chapter 6. Here, I want to focus on the specific situation of networks in borderlands as well as 
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on the role of the state as actor involved in cross-border networks. In the GPN literature, “to 
date the explicit theorization of the state’s role has been somewhat lacking” (Neilson et al. 2014: 
3). Thus, in the following I elaborate further on the state and non-state actors in borderlands 
and the functioning of informal cross-border networks by linking the concept of GPN with the 
findings of borderland studies, which is also further discussed in chapter 6 and 7.  
2.3.1 State and non-state actors in borderlands 
Besides all other actors involved in governance systems for collection and trade of NTFP, the 
state plays a special role. The state as sovereign designs, revises and enforces formal 
regulatory spaces to define where, how and by whom collection and trade of resources are 
allowed to take place. These are formal institutions, like laws, policies, guidelines and 
strategies, but common contemporary discourses also influence policy- and decision-makers, 
as discussed earlier. However, the state is clearly not a unitary entity, but a “constellation of 
functions and capacities” (Neilson et al. 2014), within which the implementation of functions 
and capacities varies, both from state authority to state authority and from location to location. 
State authorities are not homogeneous and all-encompassing; “the sovereign power is better 
conceptualized as multifaceted, partial and conflicted” (Jones 2012: 3). Despite defined 
territories and sovereign power within a state territory, there are many loosely administered 
places, where the authority of the state is weak or non-existent. These regions are called the 
margins of a state. Margins of a state are usually remote, difficult to access and sparsely 
populated areas, such as high mountain regions and regions close to international borders 
(Scott 2009).  
Like resources, international borders are also socially constructed through the actions of states 
and individuals (Gellner 2013). From a state-centric perspective a border is a line of separation 
between sovereign states and regulatory spaces marking the end of the territory of one state 
and the beginning of another one. This enables a distinction between the ‘us’ and the ‘them’ 
(Newman 2006). States control the movement of people and goods across the border. Thus, 
borders are normally perceived as institutional mechanism aimed at protecting what is inside 
by excluding whatever originates from the outside (Newman 2006).  
From the perspective of the local population and state authorities located near an international 
border, rather than a line of separation, for them a border provides besides constraints also 
opportunities for interactions across the border. Gellner emphasises regarding the borders 
within South Asia, that “whatever the spurious precision of the lines drawn or claimed in treaties 
and maps – they are fuzzy and contested, and also because in many places along the borders 
the local populations have strong ties across them and often carry on daily life in disregard or 
even in ignorance of them“ (2013: 7). Individuals or social groups in these border regions 
systematically contest or bypass state control. These border-crossers are acquainted with 
different regulatory spaces and are skilful in using different currencies, languages and social 
and economic systems. The term ‘borderlands’ is used by scholars to describe these social, 
economic and geographical spaces on both sides of a border defined by the creation of 
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opportunities and constraints during interactions of actors across borders (Chan and Womack, 
2016; Gellner 2013; Goodhand 2005; Scott 2009). In my case study, the borderland of the 
Kailash Landscape encompasses the triangle where India, Nepal and China meet and where 
social and economic networks across the borders are established.  
Borderlands vary in terms of their structural and political characteristics including terrain, 
demography, resources and geo-political importance, which influences the extent to which the 
central state is present, formal regulations are enforced and the border controlled. In 
borderlands, often local people are more related to the people across the border than to the 
central state since they may have historical kinship links and have built economic and social 
networks across the border. The characteristics of a borderland also constitute the relationship 
between the central state, the local state authorities and the local non-state actors as well as 
actors across the border (Goodhand 2013). “Territoriality and trans-nationality are negotiated 
in everyday practices” (Van Schendel and Abraham 2005: 49) by the local people, but also by 
local state representatives. The result is a variety of forms of everyday trans-nationality that 
states often treat as suspect, if not illegal, practices.  
Local state representatives in borderlands at the margin of states also do not necessarily fully 
implement and obey the national laws and regulations. Local state representatives often make 
use of the weak sovereign power at the margins of states for their own advantage and in a way 
that reinforces the weak sovereign power. They operate “outside the laws of the state, often 
undermining state’s goals of regulation and order“ (Jones 2012: 3). Although formal regulatory 
spaces build the basis for legitimated behaviour, what is often perceived as legal or illegal in 
borderlands is not only governmental law, but the outcomes of what the local population or 
local state representatives and powerful non-state actors consider as appropriate (Korf and 
Raeymaekers 2013; Lund 2008). The ‘re-interpretation’ of laws provides room for rent-seeking 
and ambiguous behaviour of state representatives as well as local people. State agents are 
often drawn into cross-border politics of scale, which can entail infiltrating a porous state 
structure. According to studies on the Bangladesh-Indian border, a heavily guarded segment 
of the border can easily be an area where border guards are heavily involved in private gain 
from cross-border movements of goods and people (Jones 2012; Van Schendel and Abraham 
2005). To equate the state with legal practices and non-state actors with illegal practices in 
borderlands is too simplistic. “A state actor can function simultaneously as a formally 
recognized official, a non-state actor … and a black-marketer. A state actor can 
simultaneously vote sanctions into law and then ignore them for profit or power” (Nordstrom 
2000: 42). Clear distinctions between legal and illegal, state and non-state, or local and 
international are often impossible to make. State and non-state actors in borderlands are 
closely enmeshed with each other enabling networks in line with, beside or outside national law 
and legality, where the transitions are fluid.  
Local people are, on one hand, less powerful and vulnerable to these porous state structures 
and interpretations of laws by local state representatives, but, on the other hand, this situation 
also provides them opportunities to negotiate their own regimes and regulatory spaces within 
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or outside state sovereignty (Caplins et al. 2018; Scott 2009). They can actively participate in 
the formation of networks and negotiation processes with state representatives to shape local 
governance systems for regulating the local trade network. Therefore, instead of using a state-
centric perspective on borderlands by perceiving a border region at the margins of two states 
and local actors as vulnerable and marginalised, I understand borderlands as a region with 
opportunities producing social and economic spaces through trans-border connectivity and 
cross-border networks. There, territoriality, sovereign power and the border as line of 
separation are continuously negotiated, questioned and reinforced by state and non-state 
actors.  
For many years, studies related to borders and borderlands were highly influenced by a state-
centric perspective (Van Schendel and Abraham 2005). “Borderlands are treated not as entities 
in their own right, but as the margins of states, societies, nations, economies and cultures” (Van 
Schendel and Abraham 2005: 43). Borderlands were only seen in their relationship to the 
central state and its territory. More recent studies on borderlands have changed the perspective 
by seeing the border ‘from below’ (Doevenspeck 2011) and analysing the region from both 
sides of a border as one unit of analysis by focusing on local realities (Gellner 2013; Goodhand 
2013; Korf and Raymaekers 2013; Shneiderman 2013; Van Schendel and Abraham 2005). I 
apply these perspectives in my study, which enables me an in-depth analysis of the political, 
economic and social relations of state and non-state actors in the governance systems and 
networks in the borderland within the Kailash Landscape.  
2.3.2 Functioning of ‘informal’ networks 
In borderlands, both formal and informal networks develop. In a borderland setting, making a 
distinction between formal and informal is often difficult as trade and exchanges across borders 
can be illegal by law, but ‘licit’ or socially accepted, sanctioned and protected by powerful local 
persons and local state representatives, as described in section 2.3.1. Also, what is considered 
legal on one side of the border may be considered illegal on the other side. The different 
regulatory spaces on both sides of the border encourage informal cross-border networks to 
take advantage of the situations on both sides, as in my case the informal trade of yarshagumba 
from India to Nepal shows. I define ‘informal’ as a network that is illegal by law but socially 
accepted, and therefore visible in the borderlands. These networks can include state and non-
state actors. As described in section 2.3.1, state representatives can have several functions 
within networks and wear several different hats at the same time.  
These networks in borderlands are often built on patterns of mobility, trade and exchange as 
well as on cultural and kinship networks that have been in existence for centuries (Van 
Schendel and Abraham, 2005). They are often based on specific codes of conduct, non-
transparent power relations, and rules that are orally passed on and not formally established. 
The relationship between actors within these informal networks depends mainly on their 
personal relations and connections. Trust, credibility and reputation are key features to 
describe the personal relations between actors in these informal trade networks where formal 
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contracts and reliance on legal tools that protect the actors from various forms of abuse are 
absent (Grillot, 2016; Keck, 2016; Nordstrom, 2000; Tong, 2014).  
Following the understanding of Grillot (2016), who analysed businessmen in the Sino-
Vietnamese border, trust is a social mechanism and instrument of social organisation. But its 
impact can only be measured over the long term. “Trust always involves an element of risk 
resulting from our inability to monitor other’s behaviour, from our inability to have a complete 
knowledge about other people’s motivations and, generally, from the contingency of social 
reality” (Grillot 2016:180). Such inability becomes exacerbated in the context of informal trade 
across borders where state and non-state actors are involved. 
Belonging to the same community or social group and having the same cultural, social and 
economic understanding, beliefs and codes of conduct influences the social cohesion and 
therefore trust-building between actors. Personal ties and knowing someone reduces the risk 
of fraud, facilitates monitoring each other’s behaviour and allows social sanctioning when an 
actor is perceived to violate the agreement or code of behaviour within the informal network 
(Van Schendel and Abraham 2005). In addition, the social cohesion within an informal network 
enables the institutionalization of practices and agreements operating according to a system of 
rules known to all participants.   
Besides the importance of the social relationship and the character and reputation of a person, 
trust between actors across the border is also influenced by issues related to state stability and 
security on the state-level. This is especially the case between actors with cultural differences 
and less social cohesion. Although these disputes can be a long way from the study area or lie 
long time in the past, the unsolved historical issues can affect the border area and the decisions 
of the traders themselves.  
Any changes within the regulatory space where the cross-border network is situated, like 
changes in the government regulations or in the geopolitics of the region, and any changes 
along the product flow, demand adaptation by the actors within the networks to continue 
benefiting from the trade (cf. Harris 2013; Keck 2016). The systems within a network are 
institutionalised, but power and relations between state and non-state actors can shift these 
when changes occur. Thus, the configuration and functioning of the production networks are 
continuously negotiated between actors.  
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3 Research methods and research area 
This chapter includes a detailed presentation of the applied research methods, techniques, the 
selection of the research area and the limitations of the study. 
3.1 The qualitative research method 
The focus of the research on negotiation processes about access rights and on informal trade 
networks in a geopolitically sensitive border region called for a qualitative research approach. 
While quantitative research aims to explain and confirm isolated cause and effect relations of 
phenomena, in comparison a qualitative research approach seeks to explore and to understand 
complex processes and relations by using a mainly inductive approach for developing theories 
based on the research findings (Flick et al. 2003; Lamnek 2010). By exploring the institutions 
and actors related to the collection and trade of yarshagumba in the transboundary Kailash 
Landscape, the study aims to understand the complex institutional systems, relations and 
negotiation processes between different actors across the border region. Guided interviews 
and focus group discussions with different types of actors from the two countries – government 
officials from different departments and authority levels, researchers, community leaders, 
collectors and traders from India and Nepal – provided different perspectives on the topic and 
enabled a deep reflection from different angles. Especially in relation to policies and other 
formal institutions, besides reviewing and analysing the content of different documents, it was 
relevant for the study to get a deep understanding of how these policies and institutions were 
interpreted and, therefore, implemented in reality on the ground.  
I followed a reflexive and flexible approach to research (Lamnek 2010). I selected the research 
locations and formulated the first research questions and guiding interview questions on the 
basis of my previous knowledge about the topic and literature review. While conducting the 
fieldwork, I continuously reflected on the collected data, adjusted the data collection techniques 
and specified the focus of the research. During this process various information was explored 
with attention to its meanings in order to find patterns, anomalies, controversies and processes 
relevant for the broader focus of my research (Doolittle 2010). In this context, the following data 
collection techniques were applied: guided interviews, focus group discussions, informal 
conversations, participatory observation and document analysis, which will be further described 
and explained in chapter 3.5.  
The empirical fieldwork was conducted from August 2016 until September 2017 in India and 
Nepal. In China, I did not conduct any interviews or collected data. The main fieldwork period 
was from end of April until the middle of June, when yarshagumba is collected in the mountains. 
During this time in 2017, I visited the two selected valleys in India as well as the two selected 
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valleys in Nepal to conduct the bulk of the interviews with the local actors in the collection sites 
(see table 1). Each field trip was at least 10 days and maximum 21 days including walking up 
to the yarshagumba collection sites. Other interviews with researchers and government 
representatives of India and Nepal were conducted in Kathmandu, Dehradun, Nainital and 
other cities within the whole data collection period. 
Table 1: Timeframe of fieldwork 
 Time of field trips Country Location 
1 August 2016 India Pithoragarh, Nainital 
2 January 2017 India Nainital, Pithoragarh, Munsiyari (Johar valley), 
Dharchula 
3 March 2017 Nepal ANCA, Darchula 
4 April 2017 India Almora, Pithoragarh, Dharchula, Johar valley, Darma 
valley 
5 May 2017 Nepal ANCA, Darchula, Mahakali and Chameylia valley 
6 June 2017 India Dharchula, Darma valley 
 
The limited seasonal collection period for yarshagumba was a serious time constraint for 
gathering data. The collection season usually starts end of April and runs until the snow is 
melted in the sites and grass is growing, which is usually mid or end of June. In the year 2017, 
the snow cover was very low and at the beginning of June the grass was already quite high. 
Consequently, the yarshagumba collection stopped and collectors left the collection sites 
earlier than usual. The planned visit to the collection site in the Johar valley in mid of June had 
to be cancelled. I left the option open to return the following year in 2018 to the Johar valley, if 
it turned out that data were missing. However, after analysing the data for the Indian valleys, I 
realised I had sufficient information to put the Johar valley into the context of the other valleys 
in India and Nepal. 
3.2 Positioning myself as a researcher 
Following a pre-condition of qualitative research, the vantage point from which this research 
was developed presumes that knowledge, data and facts cannot be separated from either the 
researcher or the context in which data are collected (cf. Doolittle 2010). 
From the end of 2013 through 2017, including during the fieldwork period, I was employed as 
project staff for the German Development Cooperation (GIZ) in the Kailash Sacred Landscape 
Conservation and Development Initiative. During this time I lived in Kathmandu, Nepal and 
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made regular visits to the Kailash Landscape and held meetings with government 
representatives and project partners from China, India and Nepal for discussing the project and 
issues in the region including the phenomenon ‘yarshagumba’. When I started the PhD 
programme in May 2016, I had already conducted two joint field trips to yarshagumba collection 
sites in Nepal with governmental staff from ANCA and project colleagues. The findings 
triggered the process for the development of local ANCA yarshagumba management 
regulations aiming to clarify access rights and responsibilities between the different 
governmental authorities and communities with regard to the collection of yarshagumba in 
ANCA (see Chapter 5).  
Through the project work I had already gained a good understanding of the challenges related 
to yarshagumba collection and trade in the Kailash Landscape before starting the PhD. 
However, a deeper understanding of the underlying processes and relations within this complex 
landscape of actors, especially across the border of India and Nepal, was missing. Thanks to 
the project set-up and my project supervisor at GIZ I could integrate my thesis research and 
fieldwork into my regular project work. This kind of double role during this time I experienced 
positively, because I was well known in the Kailash Landscape and respected and accepted by 
the local leaders and government authorities, which enabled trust and easier access to the 
local people. However, I was also perceived as supporting and being related to the ANCA 
office, the Nepali government authority. Often I was confronted with complaints and certain 
expectations of the community members to provide support and solutions to their problems. By 
staying with the community members and getting the approval and trust of the community 
leaders, this perception was reduced and I was accepted as researcher so that I could ask 
questions and listen to their conversations.  
During all field visits a field assistant accompanied me who was responsible for solving logistical 
issues and providing explanations and translations from Hindi, Nepali or Kumaoni into English. 
The trips in Nepal as well as the trip in India in June 2017 were assisted by one Nepali field 
assistant, who spoke Nepali as well Hindi. An Indian field assistant assisted the other trips in 
India. Both had good knowledge of the region and about yarshagumba collection previous to 
the fieldwork. Additionally, two or three porters were part of our research team to walk up to the 
yarshagumba collection sites, and supported in carrying camping equipment, cooking utensils 
and food. They also happened to be very good informants, as they were part of the local 
community and collectors themselves.  
Language was an issue throughout the fieldwork, since only a few community members spoke 
English. Consequently, most of the interviews, conversations and group discussions were 
conducted in Hindi, Kumaoni or Nepali and needed translation by the research assistant. As is 
well known, in the course of translation some information always gets lost. I worked to 
overcome this challenge by reflecting about the content and overall context of the interview 
after each interview with the field assistant. 
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3.3 Research in a border region 
Research in border regions provides opportunities and challenges, and the research and 
fieldwork is special in several ways. On the one hand, research in border regions is special due 
to the circumstance that two sovereign states meet along a borderline creating a space for 
contact and separation. In order to analyse relations, interactions and impacts across the 
border related to the yarshagumba collection and trade, the study understood the border region 
on both sides of the border of India and Nepal as one conjunct research area following the 
approach of Baud and Van Schendel (1997). This approach was especially helpful in the 
analysis of the informal cross-border trade network between India and Nepal (see chapter 6) 
as it enabled looking from both sides of the border at the same phenomenon and same actors. 
Additionally, the research on the legal frameworks and governance systems in the two 
countries provided an opportunity to compare the different governance systems for 
yarshagumba collection and trade with each other. The comparative analysis, which was 
utilized mainly for comparing the different governance systems of the collection sites, presented 
in chapter 5, allowed an assessment of whether the findings are for example location specific 
or linked to legal conditions in a country. 
On the other hand, borders are usually located in a peripheral area with great distance to capital 
cities, and related to this, usually characterised by less infrastructure and other governmental 
service provisions than areas close to the central state. Here it was no different. Besides this 
remoteness, the Kailash Landscape is extremely mountainous. Road infrastructure especially 
on the Nepali side was very limited. Consequently, during the main fieldwork phase I walked 
over 400 km. Walking for days on the local trails was physically exhausting, but also provided 
a great opportunity for participatory observation and time for reflection on the previous 
interviews and discussions.  
Additionally, border regions are often considered geopolitically sensitive by state authorities 
resulting in restrictions for border crossings and high militarization, as is the case in the upper 
Darma and Johar valley in the Indian mountain areas close to the Chinese border. Both aspects 
made my research difficult, leading to restrictions, limited access to specific areas and long 
detours. To give an example: the official border crossing points between Nepal and India, India 
and China, and Nepal and China within the Kailash Landscape are only open for local citizens. 
That meant for me, as German citizen, that I was not allowed to cross the bridge in Darchula 
town from Nepal to Dharchula, India. Instead, I had to drive 12 hours along the river south to 
cross the border into India at an international border crossing point and drive back another 12 
hours north on the other side of the river. Consequently, the fieldwork needed realistic logistical 
planning and enough time to overcome these circumstances.  
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3.4 Identification and selection of yarshagumba collection sites 
In the upper valleys of the Kailash Landscape every village and community has access to a 
high-alpine grassland, where yarshagumba is found. In total there are more than 100 collection 
sites in the region.  
In India, due to the partly illegal nature of the collection and sale of yarshagumba, the sites are 
not officially documented. Therefore the first fieldtrips in August 2016 and January 2017 were 
used to meet different community representatives and build up trust with community leaders to 
receive ‘permission’ to join them for some days in the following season for collection. In this 
process, the Johar and Darma valley were selected as the main research valleys. In Nepal the 
situation was easier. Firstly, I had visited some collection sites earlier in 2014 and 2015. 
Secondly, in the process of the development of the local yarshagumba guidelines for ANCA, 
representatives of the ANCA office documented the location of yarshagumba collection sites in 
the two main valleys, Mahakali valley and Chameylia valley. In total 63 sites were listed in these 
two valleys (ANCA 2016).  
After analysing the first information, the individual sites in the valleys differed according to 
dimension, institutional settings, property rights and management systems. In order to have a 
realistic representation of the different conditions in the collection sites I chose seven collection 
sites in four valleys for the case study: Bona, Baling and Tejum in India and Api, Buddhi, 
Kuntison and Lolu in Nepal. Each site is different from the other ones by representing a different 
combination of the criteria (table 2). 
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Table 2: Detailed characteristics of the collection sites (modified according to Wallrapp et al. 
(forthcoming)) 
Location Key characteristics of the collection site 
In
d
ia
 
Bona –  
Johar valley 
• Medium size high alpine grassland 
• Site located within state forest 
• Site used as grazing ground from Bona community 
• Traditional grazing institutions 
• Closed site - access exclusively for selected community members 
(Rang community) 
Baling –  
upper Darma 
valley 
• Medium size high alpine grassland 
• Site located within community managed forest 
• Site used as grazing ground from Baling community 
• Traditional grazing institutions 
• Closed site - access exclusively for selected community members 
(Rang community) 
Tejum –  
lower Darma 
valley 
• Small high alpine grassland 
• Site located within state forest 
• Used as grazing ground by shepherds from villagers from lower valley 
• Closed site –access exclusively for selected community members 
(mixed community of Hindus and Rang) 
N
e
p
a
l 
Api – 
upper Mahakali 
valley 
• Large high alpine grassland 
• Site located within community managed forest and protected area 
ANCA 
• Site used as grazing ground from Rang/Shauka community 
• Traditional grazing institutions 
• Closed site - access exclusively for selected community members 
(Shauka community) 
Buddhi –  
upper Mahakali 
valley 
• Small high alpine grassland 
• Site located within community managed forest and protected area 
ANCA 
• Not a traditional grazing ground 
• Open site - access not restricted (mainly Hindu community from various 
villages) 
Kuntison – 
upper Mahakali 
valley 
• Small high alpine grassland 
• Not a traditional grazing ground 
• Site located within community managed forest and protected area 
ANCA 
• Closed site - access exclusively for selected community members 
(Shauka community) 
Lolu –  
Chameylia 
valley 
• Large high alpine grassland 
• Used as grazing ground by shepherds from villagers from lower valley 
• Site located within protected area ANCA 
• Open site - access not restricted (mainly Hindu community from various 
villages) 
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3.5 Data collection techniques 
I have applied different qualitative research techniques to understand better the actors’ roles, 
perspectives and power relations influencing the access to and management of yarshagumba 
collection and the trade networks. The following techniques were used: guided interviews and 
informal conversations, focus group discussions with community members, participatory 
observation and document analysis. These will be further described and explained in the 
following sections.  
In total 92 guided interviews on community level were conducted – 41 in India and 51 in Nepal. 
Out of that 62 were interviews with community members, which includes collectors, traders and 
other villagers (13 women and 49 men). 30 interviews were with local authorities on community 
level, such as local representatives from the forest department, community committees, the 
protected area ANCA and police (3 women and 27 men). Additionally, eight guided interviews 
with representatives of the Nepali and Indian government, six with researchers and six with 
representatives of traders’ associations, members of NGOs and a journalist were made (all 
men). In total 13 focus group discussions were conducted – seven in India and six in Nepal – 
with five to fifteen participants each. Detailed lists about the interviews are presented in Annex 
3 and 4.  
I made efforts to conduct interviews with women and men with different social backgrounds 
and from all age groups. However, usually more men participated in the focus group 
discussions and interviews. Although both men and women go for collection to the sites, men 
are more open to answer questions, while women are more reluctant to speak with outsiders. 
Also few women work in the local authorities. Therefore, it was not easy to encourage women 
to conduct an interview.  
Although it consumed a lot of time and energy, conducting the interviews with the communities 
in the yarshagumba collection sites during the season proved beneficial. Instead of visiting 
them in their homes at any other time of the year, participating in the yarshagumba collection 
and living in the camp sites enabled me to participate in the daily life of a collector. I could 
observe camp site settings, social and ecological conditions, collection techniques, open social 
conflicts between actors and everything else that was happening on the route to and in the 
collection sites. Further, it enabled me to meet different community members, collectors and 
traders, and ask the ‘right’ questions.  
3.5.1 Guided interviews and informal conversations 
Guided interviews and informal conversations were the main techniques I used for data 
collection. Guided interviews combine predetermined questions and open conversation 
(Longhurst 2010). They serve the purpose of allowing the interview partners to place their own 
ideas and thoughts on a certain topic while at the same time making sure that all important 
areas of the research are covered in the interview (Desai and Potter 2006: 145). The guidelines 
I developed for the interviews covered a wide range of topics (see the guided questionnaire in 
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Annex 2) and were used for all different types of interviewes. Prior to conducting guided 
interviews the questions were discussed with the research assistant to ensure that the 
questions were well understood and appropriate to the cultural context. That also gave the 
opportunity to reflect jointly on topics and add and modify questions accordingly.  
In general, the guiding questions were used in an open and context-dependent way for enabling 
an open conversation (Lamnek 2010). Unstructured interviews provide the interviewees with 
the opportunity to take the discussion in whichever direction they choose (Desai and Potter 
2006: 144). The order of the questions, the number of questions and the questions being asked 
were adapted to the specific interview situation and interview partner. The guiding questions 
were adjusted during the time of the fieldwork and continuously updated on the basis of the 
empirical findings, for example during the first visits in India the interviews focused on collection 
management systems and policies, whereas later the primary topics changed to property rights, 
customary rights and power relations between state and non-state actors.  
Informal conversations played a crucial role during the whole fieldwork. People were curious 
about a woman from outside South Asia walking up into the mountains for yarshagumba 
collection. The research team was constantly asked questions related to the purpose of the 
visit. Whenever the purpose was explained, usually community members were happy to share 
their perspective and knowledge in an informal conversation. This information was very helpful 
for improving the overall understanding of certain issues. Furthermore, the informal way of 
conversation without recorder and notebook seemed to make it easier for people to share their 
opinion (cf. King and Horrocks 2010) in my case on property rights, trade and illegal issues, 
especially in India.  
Location and duration of the guided and informal interviews varied significantly. During the day 
community members often did not have much time, so interviews were sometimes conducted 
while collecting yarshagumba, while walking, having food or tea together. In these situations, 
the interviews had more the character of informal conversations than guided interviews. 
Sometimes the interviewee agreed after a short conversation to meet again later at another 
time for a longer interview. During the evening hours while preparing dinner or having a drink, 
usually community members were more flexible and welcoming for longer discussions.  
I conducted most of the interviews myself with the help of the research assistant for translation, 
as most of the interviewees on community level could not speak English, but Nepali, Hindi or 
Kumaoni. The research assistant usually translated my question and the answer immediately 
into English. Sometimes during short conversations, he conducted the interview himself and 
translated only at the end. The interviews with higher government authorities in India and Nepal 
as well as with researchers were usually conducted in English by myself. During guided 
interviews, I as well as the research assistant took field notes. 
After each guided interview I discussed with the research assistant the key content, situation, 
impressions and conditions of the conducted interview. First, we shared our field notes and 
typed memos into the computer. When field notes were not taken during the interview or 
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informal conversation, then minutes were typed up based on our recollections of the 
conversations. The regular reflection on the guiding questions gave the opportunity to identify 
gaps and further fields of interest, to clarify misunderstandings, to modify questions or rephrase 
them when not understood. 
Most of the time recording interviews or conversations was not suitable or possible in the 
specific situation, either because interviews were conducted ad hoc, outside at an open place 
or in a more informal setting like during walking, while having tea or food together with the 
interview partner. Often also interviewees were not comfortable being recorded, which was of 
course respected. Therefore, few interviews were recorded. Back in Kathmandu, the few were 
transcribed and translated from Hindi or Nepali into English.  
3.5.2 Focus group discussions 
The focus group discussions were used complementarily to the individual guided interviews. In 
general, a focus group discussion is broadly defined as “a research technique that collects data 
through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher” (King and Horrocks 2010: 
65). In comparison to one-to-one interviews a group interview can reveal the social and cultural 
context of people’s understandings and beliefs as well as their collective opinion about 
interdependencies and relations (King and Horrocks 2010; Lamnek 2010). In this study, the 
technique ‘focus group discussion’ was used for three different purposes.  
Firstly, in August 2016 the technique was utilized for getting an overview of the different 
collection sites and their management systems in the Indian part of the Kailash Landscape. For 
that a group of six community members from different villages of the Indian part of the Kailash 
Landscape were brought together to discuss their common understanding of yarshagumba 
collection sites and issues related to them. While interacting within the group, the task was to 
draw a sketch map of the region and to locate and differentiate the collection sites. The figure 
2 shows the sketch map of the Indian Kailash Landscape. The research assistant and I guided 
the discussion by asking questions when the discussion stopped or went into a different 
direction. Furthermore, we observed the interaction between the community members and took 
notes.  
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Figure 2: Sketch map of the Indian part of the study area (own source August 2016) 
 
Secondly, two focus group discussions were organised in January 2017 with local 
representatives from the two selected main research valleys, Johar valley and Darma valley in 
India. During these sessions the purpose was to introduce the research, to get an overall 
understanding of the specific issues of access rights to yarshagumba collection and the trading 
system in India, to build up the trust between the research team and communities and finally 
to decide about the collection sites for detailed research and visits during the collection season. 
The groups each consisted of five to ten persons.  
The third technique was a modified concept of focus group discussion. It consisted of 
discussions with community members in the collection sites with the usage of scientific 
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knowledge material. In the collection sites, collectors are very busy and do not have much time. 
Therefore, using posters was a good technique to get the attention of people and make them 
interested before starting the focus group discussion. A group consisted of five to 15 people.  
At the beginning, we, the research team, presented posters about the life cycle of yarshagumba 
and the perceived issues in the collection sites, like e.g. cutting of firewood or waste disposal, 
which were reported in the previous field trips and are partly also documented in related studies 
from the Himalayan region. Especially, presenting and explaining the life cycle stimulated a lot 
of interaction between the community members (figure 3). Following this, questions related to 
management systems, roles and responsibilities of institutions and actors were asked to guide 
the discussion.  
 
Figure 3: Focus group discussion with presentation in Bhuddi (own source May 2017) 
 
These modified focus group discussions had several positive effects. Presenting knowledge 
material broke the ice with the community members in the collection sites. For us, within a short 
time we got the attention and trust from the collectors. For the community members, besides 
getting to know the ‘outsiders’ and the purpose of their visit to the collection site and of collecting 
information, the collectors appreciated that we shared information with them through the 
knowledge material, which they considered highly valuable. They were thankful for the 
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knowledge shared with them and used it further for analysing key issues and possible solutions 
in their specific collection site. 
Usually a focus group discussion took between 30 to 45 minutes, with a maximum of 1.5 hours 
when the sketch map was prepared. Like after guided interviews, my research assistant and I 
shared key points of interest for the research, impressions and observations after the focus 
group discussion and typed them into the computer. We also reflected on our approach, group 
members, the sequence of posters and the questions we raised, which triggered most or no 
discussions. If required, we adjusted the technique. 
3.5.3 Participatory observation 
Besides guided interviews, informal conversations and focus group discussions, participatory 
observation has been an essential part throughout the field trips to the Kailash Landscape, but 
particularly while staying in the collection sites, in the simple lodges, teahouses and trading 
hubs along the way as well as in the villages and towns like Darchula, Nepal and Dharchula, 
India. Experiencing the difficult access to the collection sites (e.g. walking eight to ten hours a 
day, crossing landslides and icy mountain streams), the harsh conditions while camping at the 
collection sites (e.g. minus temperatures and snowfall over night, high altitude or continuous 
rainfall) as well as the difficulty of finding even one yarshagumba on the ground made me 
understand that although yarshagumba collection is often perceived by town people and 
government representatives to be ‘easy’ and ‘fast’ money, in reality it is hard work and people 
risk their health and life while going for collection.  
Furthermore, it made me realize how far the collection sites are from the influence of the 
government authorities. This allows the local communities to establish their own systems, which 
are accepted and legitimized by the local people without government authorities knowing about 
it. This experience was relevant for an overall understanding of the context of access rights and 
different perspectives of actors (cf. Lamnek 2010). In addition, by staying together with the 
collectors and local traders in collection sites or trading hubs a deeper level of trust was built 
up to share information on difficult and sensitive topics, like prices, the legal and illegal trading 
system and routes, management systems and the involvement of government authorities in the 
whole process.  
Every day in the evening, I wrote down my impressions, ideas of first findings, gaps and 
observations (see preface for an extract of my field notes). This included descriptions and 
impressions of the landscape, the village or campsite setting, social behaviour, the conditions 
in the collection sites and the collection techniques, as well as still open or new questions. 
Often these reflections of the day were the basis for the interviews and conversations on the 
following days.  
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3.5.4 Document analysis 
In addition to qualitative interviews, I analysed different types of documents, which I sometimes 
used to triangulate the information received in the interviews. Document analysis is, according 
to Bowen, “a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents …” (2009: 27). The 
systematic analysis consists of skimming documents, selecting relevant ones and coding and 
summarizing important content (Bowen 2009). The selection of documents has been guided 
by the research questions. Especially relevant for the research have been documents 
specifying governmental regulations and strategies. In summary, these different document 
types were analysed: 
• regulations, laws and acts related to forests and protected areas on national and state-
level in India and Nepal, 
• regulations, laws and acts related to NTFP collection and trade on national and 
international level, 
• treaties between India and Nepal, India and China, and Nepal and China about 
movement of goods and people across the national borders, 
• policies and strategy papers related to NTFP, forests and protected areas, 
• reports and studies from organisations working in the research area and 
• newspaper articles. 
3.6 Data analysis 
In order to analyse the data material collected in the field, such as memos of field notes, 
observations and transcribed and translated interview records, a qualitative content analysis 
according to Mayring (2010) was chosen. The analysis of Mayring (2010: 13) aims to draw 
conclusions on certain aspects of communication by analysing, in the broader sense, 
communication material in the form of texts and by proceeding in a systematic and theory-led 
fashion. The qualitative content analysis integrates the inductive development of categories 
and their deductive application. Mayring distinguishes three forms of qualitative content 
analysis: summary, explication and structuring. In the technique ‘summary’ the aim is to reduce 
the material while the main content of the material still remains and at the same time to allow 
an abstraction of the content. In this way, categories are developed inductively. ‘Structuring’ 
means to apply the already defined categories to the summarised text material using a 
deductive application of categories. That was done according to content and type of material.  
I applied the qualitative content analysis following Mayring by sorting and reducing my research 
data according to similar content. Subsequently, I developed step-by-step categories. Using 
the example of analysing the governance systems in the collection sites, in the first step 
categories were developed, like ‘informal and formal institutions for regulating grazing and 
yarshagumba collection.’ While reading and reflecting on the different categories in the second 
step, gaps were detected where further material was needed in order to gain a deeper 
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understanding. Using the same example, the outcome of the first content analysis was that 
formal and informal institutions regulating the access to collection sites were often overlapping 
and contradicting each other, but at the same time actors confirmed and insisted on the 
implementation of the regulations.  
Using the third form of qualitative content analysis, the explication, I collected and analysed 
additional data, like legal documents, and conducted interviews with researchers, community 
leaders and government authorities to gain deeper understanding of the legal rights in forest 
and grazing areas as well as of legitimization processes within the community. Linking the 
findings of the data with the conceptual frameworks of my study, the analysis revealed that e.g. 
especially access rights to high alpine grasslands were interpreted in situations and over time 
by different type of actors differently, which I identified later as learning processes and learning 
loops (further analysed in Chapter 5). Using the techniques of ‘summary’, ‘structuring’ and 
‘explication’ enabled me step by step to understand more and dig deeper into the complex 
processes and systems and to link the findings with key theoretical concepts.  
3.7 Study limitations 
This study was limited due to language differences, my positioning as researcher and at the 
same time as project staff and the partly secretive nature of yarshagumba collection and trade, 
especially in India. My inability to understand and communicate in Nepali or Hindi shaped the 
information I was able to gather. Furthermore, my involvement in the Kailash Landscape project 
coupled with my status as an outsider greatly influenced the opportunities the interview partners 
and local community members granted me to have access to collection sites and information.  
In general, the study on yarshagumba in the borderlands of India and Nepal was also limited 
due to the partial informality of yarshagumba collection and trade. Given the nature of collection 
and trade, I was only able to interview a small number of traders, who stated openly that they 
are directly involved in the informal India-Nepal trade. The traders were willing to talk about the 
relations within the networks, but reliable figures about trade volumes and values could not be 
gained from the interviewees. My study attempted to mediate this limitation as well as possible 
by using related studies from the region and comparing the statements of the interviewees with 
the data in the studies.  
At the beginning of the research, I had the intention to collect data on collected quantities of 
yarshagumba per collector and season over the last five years as well as data on the 
environmental degradation of habitats in the collection sites to compare them with different 
management mechanism and regulations per site in India and Nepal. This would have enabled 
me to assess the performance and success of sustainable management of the habitat and give 
an indication of whether sustainable management of yarshagumba collection was occurring in 
different collection sites. However, that was not possible due to the fact that collectors are 
usually not honest in answering questions about their collected quantities. Under- or 
overestimation are both common due to fear of being looted or loosing status. Additionally, the 
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publicly available geospatial data of this geo-sensitive border region between India and China 
are not detailed enough to identify on the images over the last 20 to 30 years the environmental 
changes in the collection sites, like for example the shifting of the tree-line due to intensive 
firewood collection.  
Therefore, in the thesis I am not able to evaluate the different governance systems in the 
collection sites according to sustainability of the resource. However, the different adaptation 
and learning processes by communities and governmental authorities give indications of 
whether rules for managing the campsites, regulating access and extraction of the resource 
are designed and implemented. Some communities have introduced very strict access 
regulations, which limit the number of collectors per seasons; others have set up clear rules for 
managing the campsites. Consequently, I cannot provide the scientific evidence for the 
correlation between governance systems and quantity of collected yarshagumba and 
degradation of the habitats; only indications for good or bad management systems can be 
derived.  
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4 Institutional Issues, Power Struggles and Local Solutions – 
Governance Systems of Yarshagumba Collection in India and 
Nepal in the Kailash Landscape 
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Keywords: Governance of commons, access to resources, yarshagumba, Himalayan 
Mountains 
4.1 Introduction  
Ophiocordyceps sinensis (English: caterpillar fungus), locally known as yarshagumba, is a 
fungus, which grows in the body of a larva of a moth in the high alpine grasslands of the 
Himalayan region between 3200 and 5000 meter above sea level. It is found in some parts of 
the Tibetan Plateau and in the Himalayan Mountains of Bhutan, India and Nepal (Shrestha and 
Bawa 2014; Winkler 2009). Collected from May to July, this non-timber forest product is traded 
as medicinal product mainly to China. The price increased tremendously in the late 1990s 
(Winkler 2008; Yeh and Lama 2013), which triggered a “gold rush” and led to the development 
of new collection sites in the Himalayan Mountains (see pictures 1 to 4 in Annex 1). A product 
unknown by local communities has transformed into a high value resource changing livelihood 
strategies of entire villages within only ten to fifteen years (Shrestha and Bawa 2014). These 
developments have evoked institutional issues and power struggles in the rural communities. 
New and old actors have increasingly questioned existing governance systems regulating 
livestock grazing and the access to these high alpine grasslands. 
The tremendous increase of people accessing the grasslands for the collection of 
yarshagumba, related conflicts, and the high dependency of collectors on yarshagumba 
harvest for cash income are challenges faced in most of the collection sites in the region. 
Additionally, the local population perceives that their habitats are degrading the yarshagumba 
harvest per collector is declining. These are all aspects analysed by several scholars (cf. 
                                               
6 As lead author I conducted the primarily research for the publication and contributed the majority of the 
content, with some theoretical and editorial inputs by the other authors.  
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Cannon et al. 2009; Negi et al. 2016; Pant et al. 2017; Shrestha and Bawa 2013; Weckerle et 
al. 2010).  
Yet, while most of these studies focus on the analysis of the socio-economic and ecological 
situation and/or management structures in one particular valley or collection site, the 
institutional frame of yarshagumba collection is rarely examined. Governance systems of 
different collection sites are hardly ever compared in the literature.  
4.2 Theoretical considerations and methodical implementation 
Using the conceptual frameworks of “the governance of commons” (Agrawal 2003; Dietz et al. 
2003; Folke et al. 2005; Ostrom 1990; Pahl-Wostl 2009) and “hybrid governance” (German and 
Keeler 2010) we compare the governance systems of yarshagumba collection in two different 
legal settings of Nepal and India in the border region of the Kailash Landscape. 
We analyse governmental actors and institutions in the two countries, and focus on actual 
communal arrangements regulating the access to and management of yarshagumba collection 
on the ground. The comparative study provides insights into the dynamics, changes and 
limitations of the governance systems established since the discovery of yarshagumba.  
The empirical fieldwork was conducted in four valleys of the Kailash Landscape. In total, we 
assessed seven collection sites in two valleys of the Api Nampa Conservation Area (Nepal) 
and two valleys in the Kumaon Region (India). The qualitative empirical research comprised 
mainly key informant and in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and participatory field 
observations.  
4.3 Results 
Yarshagumba is a common pool resource. This kind of resources is defined through 
subtractability – if the resource is consumed by one person it cannot be consumed by another 
one anymore – and the difficulty to exclude other people to have access and use the resource 
(Ostrom 1990). The key concern with commons is that users try to maximize their benefit per 
unit, while ignoring involved costs per unit imposed on others. Users tend to pursue their short-
term interests, which results in outcomes that are not in anyone’s long-term interest, like the 
complete exploitation of the resource (Agrawal 2003; Ostrom 1990).  
Dietz et al. (2003) argue that local communities can manage common pool resources 
effectively, while they usually fail when sudden changes occur. Therefore, researchers plead 
for more complex governance systems (Dietz et al. 2003; Folke et al. 2005), linking and 
combining governmental actors, research facilities and communal institutions to overcome 
challenges that are the result of depending only on one single governance regime (German 
and Keeler 2010; Pahl-Wostl 2009). Governmental actors are likely to face challenges 
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regarding the enforcement of rights or resentments by holders of customary rights. At the same 
time, communal arrangements have usually difficulties with applying sanctions and adjusting 
to rapid changes when new drivers and actors are introduced. Thus, hybrid natural resource 
governance systems are needed, which are characterized by a balance between local self-
organization and governmental regulations as complementary instruments of governance 
(German and Keeler 2010).  
Before yarshagumba was discovered in the Himalayan Mountains, the collection sites were 
common grazing grounds for the local population. Well-defined boundaries, conflict resolution 
mechanisms, monitoring and graduated sanctions (Acheson 2006; Ostrom 1990) were 
principles integrated in the local governance systems managing grazing. Additionally, social 
homogeneity of users, community sense and social capital made rule devising and 
enforcement possible. However, these local systems now struggle with new and old actors 
demanding access to the yarshagumba collection sites, and with community members ignoring 
social norms to increase their own benefits.  
In Nepal the collection and sale of yarshagumba is legal for local communities, whereas in India 
the extraction of yarshagumba is happening in a legal grey zone. Government institutions in 
India and Nepal have formulated guidelines, but struggle with their implementation and often 
neglect local contexts. Communities have created site-specific arrangements since the late 
1990s to deal with the pressure and to control and limit access for people from other 
communities. The limited formalisation of these arrangements leads to disputes and makes 
collectors vulnerable to criminal elements and ambiguous institutional and individual behaviour. 
Additionally, it encourages unsustainable harvesting of the resource and rapid habitat 
degradation.  
In sum, our data shows that the governance systems in India and Nepal regulating 
yarshagumba collection are a complex blend of governmental actors and institutions on various 
scales and local communal arrangements adapted to the characteristics of each site. Against 
this background, we argue that neither the sole existence of governmental actors and their 
formal institutions nor community arrangements alone are sufficient for the effective 
governance of yarshagumba collection in the remote high alpine grasslands. Instead, they need 
to be complementary (German and Keeler 2010). New actors and drivers stimulate changes 
and, thereby, put pressure on the existing governance systems. It requires more complex and 
adaptive governance systems to be flexible and robust to sudden changes.  
4.4 Conclusion 
Yarshagumba collection sites in the Himalayan mountains of India and Nepal have experienced 
a “gold rush” in recent years, which has evoked institutional issues and power struggles in the 
rural communities. In this context, there is a need to create a system to govern these collection 
sites that builds on trust, open communication and cooperation between the community and 
the government. We recommend, as a starting point, to establish common platforms for 
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stakeholders from different levels and sectors from the government, relevant research facilities 
and communities on the regional level in both countries. Joint meetings could encourage 
exchange and understanding, create awareness and provide the opportunity to share local and 
scientific knowledge among relevant stakeholders. Establishing learning loops is important to 
be able to adjust to uncertainties and changes in the future – today, yarshagumba has a high 
market price; tomorrow it might be another natural resource. 
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Abstract 
Under present conditions of economic globalization, social-ecological systems undergo rapid 
changes. In this context, internal and external forces put heavy pressure on the governance 
systems of commons to adapt effectively. While institutional learning has been identified as a 
key element for the adaptive governance of social-ecological systems, there is still limited 
knowledge of what roles communities and governmental actors play in these processes. In this 
study, we take the case of yarshagumba (English: caterpillar fungus), a formerly non-valued 
product in the Himalayas, which has recently been transformed into a highly valuable resource 
within a short time. We compare the governance systems in collection sites in the Kailash 
Landscape in India and Nepal by using an analytical framework developed by Pahl-Wostl 
(2009). Our findings show that in these remote mountain areas, communities and community-
led organizations are highly flexible in responding to immediate resource value changes by 
establishing communal management arrangements. At the same time, however, communities 
have difficulties to enforce their newly developed informal and formal arrangements. During the 
process of learning the link between the amendment of arrangements on community-level and 
the revision of formal policies and frames at the state or national level is only partly established. 
Against this background, we argue that in the context of rapid change, adaptive governance 
requires the concerted interaction of actors at the local and the national levels in order to enable 
the sustainable use of common pool natural resources. 
 
Key words: adaptive governance of commons, learning, access rights, ophiocordyceps 
sinensis, Himalaya 
                                               
7 As lead author I conducted the primarily research for the manuscript and contributed the majority of the 
content, with some theoretical and editorial inputs by the other authors.  
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5.1 Introduction: yarshagumba – a highly valuable resource 
Let them the authorities say whatever they say, we are going for collection (Woman from Pangla, 
India, April 2017 – English translation, original language Hindi). 
Most of the high alpine grasslands in the Himalayas of Nepal and India are still used as summer 
pastures for livestock grazing (Bauer 2004). Traditionally, these pastures have been common 
properties governed by communities through local committees, guided by social norms, 
common beliefs and socially and culturally shared understandings (Herrera et al. 2014; Pandey 
et al. 2017). In the late 1990s, Ophiocordyceps sinensis (English: caterpillar fungus; locally 
known as yarshagumba8), a highly valuable product, was discovered on these grasslands at 
altitudes between 3000 and 5200 m (Shrestha and Bawa 2013; 2014; Winkler 2009). Caterpillar 
fungus is collected by hundreds of thousands of people in the Himalayas of India, Nepal and 
Bhutan each year and traded by middlemen as a medicinal product, mainly to China (Baral et 
al. 2015; Shrestha and Bawa 2013).  
In the late 1990s the demand on the Chinese market for yarshagumba transformed 
fundamentally, leading to a tremendous rise in prices (Winkler 2008; Yeh and Lama 2013). The 
high prices for yarshagumba and the perceived easy cash income opportunity for locals 
triggered a ‘gold rush’ in the Himalayan Mountains. The sudden run of collectors to the 
yarshagumba collection sites led to conflicts about access and uncontrolled usage of the 
resource (Negi et al. 2006; Shrestha and Bawa 2013). Especially collectors from distant 
villages, hereafter called “distant collectors,” have exacerbated the pressures on the social-
ecological systems (Pant et al. 2017). Over the last decades the governance systems in these 
high alpine areas where yarshagumba is collected, have struggled to adapt to these changes 
and to set up and enforce management mechanisms for its sustainable collection (Baral et al. 
2015; Cannon et al. 2009; Childs and Choedup 2014; Negi et al. 2006; Weckerle et al. 2010; 
Winkler 2009). Today, the collection is influenced by governance systems consisting of both 
formal governmental institutions and informal communal management arrangements (Cannon 
et al. 2009; Caplins 2016; Childs and Choedup 2014; Negi et al. 2015; Pant et al. 2017; 
Weckerle et al. 2010).  
This development in the Himalayan Mountains brings up the question of how actors and 
institutions in remote areas govern commons when rapid changes in the social-ecological 
system occur. Over the last decade scientists identified adaptive governance and learning 
processes as essential elements for governing social-ecological systems during periods of 
abrupt change (Dietz et al. 2003; Folke et al. 2005; Karpouzoglou et al. 2016; Pahl-Wostl 2009; 
Plummer et al. 2013). However, they note, “our knowledge about resource governance systems 
                                               
8 In Tibetan language yarshagumba is called yartsa gunbu, which means ‘winter worm – summer grass’ 
(Winkler 2008). Yarshagumba is an endoparasitic complex formed by the fungus ophiocordyceps 
sinensis and the host larva of different moth species (Negi et al. 2016). For more details on the biology 
and usage of yarshagumba see Winkler (2008) and Negi et al. (2016). 
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and how they change to deal with present and future challenges is [still] quite limited” (Pahl-
Wostl 2009: 254). 
Contributing to this on-going research area, we focus our analysis on the adaptive capacity and 
learning processes of resource governance systems in remote mountain areas using the case 
of yarshagumba collection. We compare resource governance systems in the collection sites 
of two settings in the Kailash Landscape9: in the Kumaon region of Uttarakhand State in India 
and in the adjacent protected area of the Api Nampa Conservation Area (ANCA) in Nepal. 
These two regions differ in terms of both legal and social context. In India, the commercial 
collection of yarshagumba is legal only in community forests managed by van panchayats 
(community forest councils) with the approval of the State Forest Department (Uttarakhand 
Biodiversity Board 2017). However, collectors harvest yarshagumba wherever possible - within 
state forests or protected areas - regardless of property rights and legal status (Negi et al. 
2016). In Nepal, in contrast, yarshagumba collection and sale in all community forests and 
conservation areas is legal (MoFSC 2017), but conflicts regarding access between villagers 
and distant collectors are common (ICIMOD 2015; Pant et al. 2017).  
While comparing different resource governance systems we aim to understand how these 
systems respond to a rapid increase in the economic value of an available resource. The two 
types of systems we compare are (1) formal governmental institutions and (2) communal 
management arrangements, which consist of both formal committees composed of community 
members, and informal arrangements based on a variety of norms, and both of which are 
essentially community-led. Further, we ask what strategies governments and communities use 
to protect or gain access to these resources. We focus our case study on the following research 
questions: What developments can be identified in the institutional settings and the 
management mechanism in areas where yarshagumba is collected? What are the learning 
process of governmental actors, communities and formal and informal institutions, and how do 
these influence each other in the process of adapting to rapid changes in the high alpine 
grasslands of India and Nepal? Based on these questions we formulate the following 
hypothesis: When the economic value of a common resource in a remote mountain area 
increases and other changes are subsequently triggered, communities are relatively more 
flexible in adapting their management of the common resource than government authorities, 
irrespective of the legal setting of the area.  
We apply the analytical framework of Pahl-Wostl (2009) for analysing the adaptive capacity 
and learning processes in resource governance systems, which is further elaborated in section 
2. Section 3 provides details about the study area and the data collection and analysis. The 
analysis of the changes in the governance systems in India and Nepal where yarshagumba is 
                                               
9 The Kailash Landscape comprises a transboundary region of Uttarakhand State, India, Pulan County, 
China and parts of far western Nepal. The landscape is part of an initiative steered and implemented by 
the governments of China, India and Nepal and the International Centre for Integrated Mountain 
Development (ICIMOD). 
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collected, namely, the formal and informal institutions, the involved state and non-state actors 
and the multi-level interactions and integration is presented in section 4. Further, in section 5 
and 6, we analyse and discuss the roles of governments and communities during learning 
processes for adapting to rapidly changing conditions and, finally, draw our conclusions. 
5.2 Conceptual framework  
Most natural resources, like forests and grazing grounds, are common pool resources 
(Acheson 2006). Common pool resources, like yarshagumba, are subtractable, which means 
the resource consumed by one person cannot be used by another. Secondly, it can be difficult 
to exclude other people from using the resource (Ostrom 1990). It is rational for everyone to 
free ride on the efforts and costs of others when incentives for sustainable usage are lacking 
(Agrawal 2003; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 2005). This collective-action problem applies also to the 
collection of yarshagumba in the high alpine grasslands. The solution to sustainably managing 
such a common pool resource is to establish rules curtailing the resource access and use 
(Acheson 2006; Dietz et al. 2003).  
Social-ecological systems are dynamic. Changes within or outside social-ecological systems 
demand constant adaptation and proper responses by actors and institutions (Young 2009). 
Sudden changes can be triggered by external factors, such as changes in market demands or 
the emergence of new actors, as well as internal factors, such as a change of power relations 
between actors or overlapping institutions (Anderies et al. 2004). Often changes trigger other 
changes or reinforce each other (Young 2009). In our case the price increase of yarshagumba 
in the Himalayas has modified access demands of governmental actors, community members 
and distant collectors, which has further triggered power struggles and conflicts between 
actors. 
The search for the governance system best suited to maintaining the sustainability of resources 
within dynamic social-ecological systems has been under discussion for many years, whether 
local-level management, government regulations or private property rights (Acheson 2006; 
Baland and Platteau 1996; Dietz et al. 2003; Folke et al. 2005; Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990; 
Pahl-Wostl 2009). Governmental actors, especially in remote areas, are likely to face 
challenges regarding the enforcement of regulations due to limited human and financial 
resources or resentments by holders of customary rights (Acheson 2006). Private property 
does not play a role in our case study. Dietz et al. (2003) argue that local communities could 
manage common pool resources effectively, but they usually have challenges when sudden 
changes occur. Often, the change in demand and increased value of local resources overstrain 
the ability of local institutions to regulate the resource use in a sustainable way. Communities 
usually have difficulties applying sanctions and enforcing communal arrangements outside their 
closed community structure (Ostrom 2010).  
In the last decades, researchers have argued for more complex governance systems such as 
‘adaptive co-management’ and ‘adaptive governance’ (Dietz et al. 2003; Folke et al. 2005; 
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Karpouzoglou et al. 2016; Olsson et al. 2006; Plummer et al. 2013), ‘polycentric institutions’ 
(Ostrom 2005) or ‘hybrid institutions’ (German and Keeler 2010). These approaches have in 
common the idea that, for governance to be effective, it “should employ mixtures of institutional 
types that employ a variety of decision rules to change incentives, increase information, monitor 
use and induce compliance” (Dietz et al. 2003: 1910). They differ in terms of setting the 
priorities of governance structures and in the criteria they use to evaluate the performance of 
governance systems for sustainability of commons (Agrawal 2003; Karpouzoglou et al. 2016; 
Sharma-Wallace et al. 2018).  
Governance systems that negotiate and share rights, responsibilities and power among 
different levels and sectors of government and civil society are assumed to encourage 
innovation, learning, adaptation and cooperation among actors to deal with unexpected 
changes (Folke et al. 2005; Huitema et al. 2009; Ostrom 2010; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Pahl-Wostl et 
al. 2013; Sharma-Wallace et al. 2018; Young 2009). Adaptive capacity is defined as the “ability 
of a resource governance system to first alter processes and if required convert structural 
elements as a response to experienced or expected changes in the societal or natural 
environment” (Pahl-Wostl 2009: 355). Learning is considered to be “an exploratory, stepwise 
search process where actors experiment with innovation until they meet constraints and new 
boundaries” (Pahl-Wostl 2009: 358). The adaptive capacity of governance systems determines 
the learning processes and developments of institutions when sudden changes occur. 
Pahl-Wostl (2009) developed an analytical framework to analyse different stages of societal 
learning in resource governance systems. Different from other analytical frameworks related to 
resource governance, such as the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (Binder 
et al. 2013; McGinnis 2011), Pahl-Wostl (2009) focuses specifically on the adaptive capacity 
and learning processes in resource governance systems in response to changes. Her 
framework helps to analyse developments and learning processes within systems over time. 
Therefore, her approach will be used to analyse and compare resource governance systems 
and the associated learning processes in our study. 
These multi-level and multi-loop learning processes range from incremental learning (single-
loop learning) to structural change (triple-loop learning). Single-loop learning refers to a gradual 
improvement of actions towards a strategic goal without questioning the underlying 
assumptions. Double-loop learning refers to a reflection of assumptions, for example about 
cause-effect relationships within a value-normative framework. In triple-loop learning, one 
begins to reconsider underlying values and beliefs to transform the context within which the 
governance system is embedded. Triple-loop learning implies a transformation by changing the 
strategic goals and regulatory frameworks rather than optimizing adaptation strategies. 
Adaptive change remains largely within the reigning paradigm and structural context set by the 
formal policy process. Thus, adaptive change processes are within single and double-loop 
learning (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2013).  
Pahl-Wostl (2009) has identified elements of governance systems that are key for these 
learning processes including institutions and actors, the relationship of state and non-state 
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actors, the multi-level interactions across administrative boundaries and vertical integration, 
and the governance modes distinguishing bureaucratic hierarchies, networks and markets. The 
interplay of these elements determines the adaptive capacity of governance systems to alter 
processes and structures (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2013). This leads us to a comparative analysis of 
roles of communities and governmental actors in learning processes when sudden changes 
occur, using the case of yarshagumba collection in remote Himalayan regions of India and 
Nepal. 
5.3 Study sites and methods 
5.3.1 Study sites 
The Kailash Landscape is one of the main areas of Nepal and India from which yarshagumba 
is collected. According to official national data, the conservation area ANCA in Nepal provides 
amounts of between 629 and 954 kg of yarshagumba annually (ANCA 2018 unpublished). The 
total harvest in the adjacent Kumaon Region, Uttarakhand State, India, amounts to around 350 
to 600 kg per year (Negi et al. 2016). The study area map (Figure 4) shows the potential habitat 
of yarshagumba in the Kailash Landscape (total area approximately 1129 square metres)10.  
                                               
10 We calculated the potential habitat for yarshagumba in the Kailash Landscape using as basis the land cover 
layer of high alpine grasslands of the Kailash Sacred Landscape vegetation map (ICIMOD 2017), adding the criteria 
of precipitation (250 to 450mm), slope degree (0 to 15 degrees) and height (3200 to 5000masl) referring to the 
listed criteria for determining yarshagumba growth in Negi et al. (2015). Inaccuracy of data is possible. 
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Figure 4: Map of study area and potential yarshagumba habitat (own source, based on ICIMOD (2017)) 
 
In the Kailash Landscape, two ethnic groups are predominant: the Rang community, who in 
Nepal are known as the Shauka, located in the upper parts of the Johar, Darma (India) and 
Mahakali valley (Nepal), and the Hindu community, located in the Chameylia valley (Nepal) and 
in the lower parts of Darma valley (India). The Rang/Shauka community traditionally practices 
transhumance. Over centuries, they have established strict customary laws to regulate access 
to and usage of their pasture areas (Hoon 1996; Leder 2003), which are now yarshagumba 
collection sites.  
Over the last decade, the rising market price of yarshagumba has influenced and changed the 
livelihood strategies of the majority of communities in the high Himalayan Mountains (Childs 
and Choedup 2014; Shrestha and Bawa 2014; Shrestha et al. 2017). Today, according to a 
recent study in ANCA (Nepal) the “average household cash income from O. sinensis is USD 
2174 … confirming the dominant role of O. sinensis in cash generation“ (Pouliot et al. 2018: 
65). 
The empirical fieldwork was conducted in four valleys of the Kailash Landscape: in two valleys 
in the Kumaon Region (India) – Darma and Johar valleys – and two valleys of ANCA (Nepal) – 
Mahakali and Chameylia valleys, (see figure 4). The selection of the study areas is based on 
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different existing institutional settings, property rights and management systems in the 
yarshagumba collection sites. Individual sites are very remote, therefore the accessibility of the 
sites additionally had to be considered. Using these criteria we chose seven collection sites in 
four valleys for our case study: Bona, Baling and Tejum in India and Api, Buddhi, Kuntison and 
Lolu in Nepal (see Table 3 for details about the characteristics of each site). 
Table 3: Characteristics of the collection sites 
Location Key characteristics of the collection site 
In
d
ia
 
Bona –  
Johar valley 
• Site located within state forest 
• Traditional grazing institutions 
• Closed site - access exclusively for selected community 
members (Rang community) 
Baling –  
upper Darma valley 
• Site located within community managed forest 
• Traditional grazing institutions 
• Closed site - access exclusively for selected community 
members (Rang community) 
Tejum –  
lower Darma valley 
• Site located within state forest 
• Closed site –access exclusively for selected community 
members (mixed community of Hindus and Rang) 
N
e
p
a
l 
Api – 
upper Mahakali valley 
• Site located within community managed forest and protected 
area ANCA 
• Traditional grazing institutions 
• Closed site - access exclusively for selected community 
members (Shauka community) 
Buddhi –  
upper Mahakali valley 
• Site located within community managed forest and protected 
area ANCA 
• Open site - access not restricted (mainly Hindu community from 
various villages) 
Kuntison – upper 
Mahakali valley 
• Site located within community managed forest and protected 
area ANCA 
• Closed site - access exclusively for selected community 
members (Shauka community) 
Lolu – Chameylia valley • Site located within protected area ANCA 
• Open site - access not restricted (mainly Hindu community from 
various villages) 
 
5.3.2 Data collection and analysis 
The empirical research is comprised of qualitative data collected through key informant and in-
depth interviews, focus group discussions and participatory field observation. The interviewees 
included government officials on central, state and district levels, local leaders, community 
members, traders, collectors from various backgrounds with different gender and age and 
relevant researchers from the region. In total 20 interviews with representatives of higher 
authorities, like national and state departments, were conducted. Additionally, 30 
representatives of local authorities, like van panchayats and ANCA Conservation Committees, 
and 62 community members were interviewed and 13 focus group discussions with community 
CHAPTER 5: Governing the yarshagumba ‘gold rush’: A comparative study ... 
 
 64 
members and traders were organised in 2016 and 2017 (Table 4). The interviews and focus 
group discussions were mainly conducted at the collection sites or in nearby villages. Both men 
and women come for collection to the sites. However, fewer women were interviewed because 
they were more reluctant to answer questions and speak with outsiders. 
Table 4: Interviews and focus group discussions conducted in 2016 and 2017 
 Local authorities  
(forest department, 
ANCA, police) 
Community members 
(collectors, traders, villagers) 
Participants of focus group 
discussions 
male female male female Male female 
India 13 1 24 3 35 17 
Total 14 Total 27 Total 52 (7 mixed FGD) 
Nepal 14 2 25 10 18 9 
Total 16 Total 35 Total 27 (6 mixed FGD) 
Total 30 62 13 
 
As some aspects, like negative implications of government regulations or social conflicts 
between different community groups, are considered sensitive and difficult to discuss openly 
with interviewees, participatory field observation was used as an important method for building 
trust between the interviewer and community members. Additionally, several policies, 
guidelines and directives of India and Nepal guiding natural resource management and non-
timber forest product (NTFP) collection and trade were reviewed. 
For the data analysis we chose the content analysis following Mayring (2015). The interviews 
were translated from Hindi or Nepali into English and transcribed afterwards. Field notes were 
taken in order to document other observations, focus group discussions and informal 
conversations. Following fieldwork, the texts were categorized and coded according to defined 
units of analysis, like formal and informal institutions, types of actors and management 
mechanism. Finally, the results were interpreted, compared and discussed.  
5.4 Results – Development of yarshagumba governance systems 
5.4.1 India: Kumaon Region, Uttarakhand State 
The high alpine grasslands in the Kumaon Region are traditionally used as summer pastures 
and were never of great interest for the Indian state authorities (Gerwin and Bergmann 2012; 
Pandey et al. 2017). The State Forest Department hardly intervened in the local-level resource 
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management systems for livestock grazing, although technically, all forests and grasslands in 
the Uttarakhand State are under their overall responsibility and supervision to manage and 
conserve the available resources (Singh 2016).  
According to the current legislation , the collection of NTFP in the wild is illegal in India. This 
regulation is valid for unclassified forests, state forests and protected areas, except within 
community forests under the management of van panchayats. The collection of NTFPs for 
personal use was never restricted, but commercial collection and sale of the products was 
either prohibited (in the case of rare and endangered species) or permissible in van panchayats 
on the condition that the harvested quantity would be sold via an auction system organised by 
the State Forest Department  (Pauls and Franz 2013; Singh 2016). 
Specifically with regards to yarshagumba collection, the State Forest Department formulated a 
government order in 2013 to regulate its collection and sale, which falls within the remit of van 
panchayats. The Government Order of Uttaranchal State (former name of Uttarakhand State) 
Forest Department 1790/18.1.2002 authorised 20 van panchayats in Johar valley to hand out 
passes to community members for yarshagumba collection and provides regulations for 
sustainable collection and camp management.  
The implementation of the Government Order has failed, however, because of the limited 
cooperation between the State Forest Department and local authorities. The limited support 
and presence of officials in the remote sites makes it difficult for van panchayat leaders to 
manage the available resources in accord with the regulations. Further, through the high level 
of bureaucracy and lack of consultations before issuing new guidelines or directives, the local 
leaders felt their demands were not recognised and valued by the state authorities, as the 
following two statements of community members highlight: 
There was a new directive that we [van panchayat leaders] have the permission to give out passes 
to villagers for collection of yarshagumba. But nobody was authorised to buy it directly. It did not 
make sense. They did not even consult us beforehand (van panchayat leader in Munsyari, India, 
April 2017 – English translation, original language Hindi). 
I think, it [the policy] doesn’t matter. The foresters are not present on the ground anyway. For good 
management it needs strong community structures (Community leader in Dharchula, India, January 
2017 – English translation, original language Hindi). 
De-facto, irrespective of policies and governmental regulations, people in the Kumaon region 
– including both community members and distant collectors – collect in all possible locations 
where yarshagumba can be found, and sell it through their own systems (Negi et al. 2016). See 
annex 1 for some photographs of yarshagumba collection in the Kailash Landscape.  
The governmental institutions are weak in controlling the collectors and resource extraction. 
However, the local communities have a strong interest in gaining or protecting access to sites 
where yarshagumba is found and limiting its collection. For that they have built up communal 
management arrangements specific to the conditions of each site. In the following we present 
different examples of management arrangements that have been set up by the communities 
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and community-led organizations as a response to the rapid changes in the high alpine 
grasslands due to the high value of yarshagumba (refer also to Table 1 in section 3 for details 
about the key characteristics of each collection site in India and Nepal). 
In Baling, upper Darma valley, the villagers are solely from the Rang/Shauka community and 
the local yarshagumba collection site lies with the boundaries of the van panchayat of Baling. 
The van panchayat plays a crucial role in regulating and managing the natural resources 
required on a daily basis by its community members. Their rights consist of excluding outsiders, 
extracting fodder and timber for personal usage, regulating grazing of livestock and formulating 
local management rules (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Singh 2016). The communities make use 
of these rights to regulate yarshagumba collection by excluding distant users and only enabling 
collection for community members from that village (closed site). The van panchayat of Baling 
has limited the collection period and set rules for managing the campsites. Also on specific 
religious and cultural days collection is prohibited, as the statement of a community member 
describes: 
On the next day is a puja [religious ceremony] in the village. So, all people, who are up in the 
collection site will come down for that afternoon. Not everyone agrees to that, especially the youth, 
but there is no other option (Community member from Baling, India, June 2017 – English translation, 
original language Hindi). 
In contrast, another example shows that social norms and beliefs also change over time and 
some are not accepted by all community members anymore: 
All these mountains are sacred to the [Rang] people. One of these beliefs is that women, especially 
during their period but even in general, are not allowed to go to the high mountain areas. But 
nowadays people do not support that belief anymore. Women and children are also collecting 
(Researcher C.S. Negi, Pithoragarh, India, August 2016). 
Consequently, according to the interviewee, more community members - men, women and 
children - go for yarshagumba collection each year and the competition between collectors 
therefore increases. Although the economic impact of yarshagumba has influenced and in 
some cases transformed local traditions, the existence of common social norms and beliefs 
facilitates designing, enforcing and monitoring rules as well as sanctioning collectors for 
violations, as the rules are socially accepted by the whole community.  
Other communal management arrangements for yarshagumba collection, like in Bona, Johar 
valley, are built on traditional grazing rights. For centuries, local institutions have effectively 
regulated the limited resources in the grazing grounds (Herrera et al. 2014). The grazing system 
included well-defined boundaries, payments for resource usage and graduated sanctions for 
violations, which has historically ensured a sustainable usage of the limited resources (Negi et 
al. 2015). The same system is used to regulate the yarshagumba collection in Bona. The 
community has transferred traditional grazing rights to yarshagumba collection. Additionally, 
the community has designed rules limiting the collection period and area, as well as 
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implemented entrance fees and fines for violations. They use the pre-established traditional 
systems and adapt them to the changing conditions.  
In collection sites that are not within the official boundaries of van panchayats, but lie within 
state forests, or are not traditional grazing grounds, like in Tejum, lower Darma valley, local 
leaders negotiated access to a yarshagumba collection site with neighbouring communities as 
soon the run for yarshagumba collection started. Each community got access to one specific 
site. As the community leaders are socially accepted and respected by community members, 
these arrangements are legitimized in these communities, and therefore enforced. This has 
ensured that all nearby communities have access to a site, which has reduced disputes and 
conflicts related to it.  
In addition to the State Forest Department, new governmental actors for natural resource 
management have emerged on state and local levels in recent years: the State Biodiversity 
Board and Biodiversity Management Committees (BMCs). Comparing the rights and functions 
of the actors on village level, the functions of the BMC overlap with rights of the van panchayats, 
especially regarding the regulation of access to resources by community members. The BMCs 
are legalised through the national Biodiversity Conservation Act (2002) . So far 14 BMCs have 
been established in the region, but are not yet fully functional, nor fully socially accepted and 
integrated into the existing local natural resource governance systems. Currently, our data 
show that the van panchayats are more influential on local level, the van panchayat leaders 
are better recognised and their decisions and actions are legitimated by the community 
members. However, in future, the van panchayats might be replaced by the BMCs in the 
communities, if BMCs receive more financial resources and governmental support and 
therefore accumulate more authority and power. 
5.4.2 Nepal: Api Nampa Conservation Area (ANCA), Darchula District 
According to national policies in Nepal collection and sale of NTFPs including yarshagumba is 
legal, but the yearly total quantity of collected yarshagumba for a protected area is restricted 
by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC). In 2017, 690 kg was 
the fixed amount for ANCA (ANCA 2018 unpublished). The ANCA authority collects royalties 
for yarshagumba collection, which currently amounts to 25.000 NPR per kg (250 USD) (MoFSC 
2015). Subsequently, ANCA makes approx. 17.3 Mio NPR (173.000 USD) in revenue per year 
only from yarshagumba collection. 
Similar to India, in Nepal community-led organizations also play a key role in the management 
of high alpine grasslands. Since the 1990s, the Forest Department has handed over patches 
of government-owned forests surrounding the villages to communities who established 
community-forest user groups (CFUG) for the management of the forests. CFUGs are allowed 
to set up rules and regulations to manage their resources. They are allowed to restrict the 
number of users and the usage of resources, to collect fees for the extraction of timber and 
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NTFPs and, in contrast to van panchayats in India, to sell their resources in the open market 
(Agrawal and Ostrom 2001).  
In 2010, ANCA was established in Darchula District under the DNPWC. The establishment of 
ANCA and its community-led committees shifted most of the functions and rights of over 100 
CFUGs in the area to newly formed ANCA Conservation Committees. The CFUGs were not 
dissolved, but new bodies were created and ANCA office with its communal committees 
emerged as new player in the region. Some community members raised concerns in relation 
to these developments: 
The establishment of the ANCA committees is a good progress, because people can raise their 
voice through the committees to officials in Darchula. But in the end all decisions are made in 
Darchula by committee leaders and ANCA, without any involvement of the community (Community 
member, Dumblin, Nepal, May 2017 – English translation, original language Nepali). 
As this statement emphasizes, according to community members, the power relation has not 
changed much following the designation of ANCA, as in many local committees, community 
members have just switched ‘seats’ and power is still concentrated in the main town of 
Darchula.  
The formation of ANCA has also altered the perception and legal status of access rights to 
resources for community members within ANCA. Yarshagumba is found in the five high 
mountain villages of Byash, Rapla, Khandeswori, Ghusa and Chitola. Before the ANCA was 
established, the CFUGs of these five villages both enabled and constrained the access to the 
yarshagumba collection sites. Nowadays, community members from all 21 villages within 
ANCA have the same rights under the umbrella of ANCA, according to ANCA policies. 
Therefore, members from lower villages should also have the same access rights to 
yarshagumba collection sites and benefit from revenues in the same way as the five high 
mountain villages. Consequently, the five villages are reluctant to follow the new ANCA policies. 
The de-facto scenario is that in some sites, like in Api and Kuntison, communities still restrict 
access for members of other communities (closed sites). The sites Api and Kuntison lie within 
a community forest of the Shauka community and the communal arrangements are similar to 
the ones in Bona and Baling, India, like regulating access, fines and the collection period.  
The collection site in Lolu, Chameylia valley, is different, as traditional grazing and community 
forest management systems did not exist in the site before yarshagumba collection began. 
Additionally, the collectors coming to Lolu are from different communities and ethnic groups 
with different social norms. The enforcement of access rights and management regulations is 
challenging for the local community, as the ANCA Conservation Committee is not yet fully 
functional and local arrangements are often not socially accepted by all collectors and therefore 
not followed. Conflicts are the consequence. 
A locally developed guideline for the management of yarshagumba collection in ANCA in 2016 
tried to address these different conflicts and power struggles by negotiating rights and 
responsibilities between the local communities and distant collectors. The guideline increased 
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the transparency regarding the rights and responsibilities of the ANCA Conservation 
Committees, clarified access, entrance fee collection and distribution of revenues and 
regulated the management of campsites. In the collection season of 2016, the committees in 
cooperation with ANCA authorities started its implementation. However, the higher authority, 
the DNPWC, did not approve this ANCA-specific guideline. Instead more general national 
directives for yarshagumba management in protected areas were developed in 2017 (MoFSC 
2017). According to this latest national directive, it is the responsibility and right of the 
government authority in protected areas to control the access to yarshagumba collection sites, 
to distribute entrance permits, to collect entrance fees and to manage the campsites. This has 
shifted rights to control the access to the sites from local committees to government authorities 
without previous consultations and consideration of the local context. The ANCA government 
representatives appreciate these developments as emphasized by the quote:  
We think it is better that ANCA collects the entrance fees for the moment until the system works 
better. Than we can hand over to the community (ANCA warden, Darchula, Nepal, May 2017 – 
English translation, original language Nepali). 
In the protected area, these changes raised tensions between local leaders and governmental 
actors, hindered cooperation and hampered an effective implementation of the directives in the 
collection season of 2017.  
Nevertheless, the partly implementation of both formalised guidelines, the local one in 2016 
and the national one in 2017, has already improved the transparency of fee collection and 
accountability through the involvement of a formal institution. Since 2016, each collector pays 
a fixed amount of 500 NPR (5 USD), 1000 NPR (10 USD) or 3000 NPR (30 USD) depending 
on his/her origin (MoFSC 2017). Beforehand, the collection of entrance fees from collectors 
was a very informal local arrangement made by the nearby communities. This sometimes led 
to threats, bribery and fraud as well as non-transparent usage of the collected fees (ICIMOD 
2015). The guideline also sets up an equal distribution mechanism to all 21 communities within 
ANCA, but at the same time reduces the direct benefit for and the responsibility and customary 
rights of communities living next to the yarshagumba collection sites. A community 
representative of ANCA states his concerns about the latest developments: 
I am not happy about the new directive. It is fine when ANCA [government authority] collects the 
money, but the responsibilities should be discussed and agreed between ANCA and the local 
committees. Monitoring will be difficult for ANCA. They are not in the sites. We can easily implement 
regulations (ANCA Committee leader, Darchula, Nepal, May 2017 – English translation, original 
language Nepali). 
As the statement shows, local leaders fear that management mechanisms in the collection sites 
cannot be sufficiently implemented by ANCA government authorities. They request cooperation 
and sharing of rights and responsibilities among the community-led organizations and 
government authorities in future for effective governance of yarshagumba collection.  
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5.5 Discussion – Governance systems and their learning processes 
Analysing the resource governance systems in different yarshagumba collection sites using the 
framework created by Pahl-Wostl (2009), our findings show that in both countries, the resource 
governance systems in high alpine grasslands have become more complex since 
yarshagumba collection started. Additional actors have appeared, power relations and 
interactions have changed, new institutions have been formed and others neglected. Some 
actors, like the distant collector, have emerged directly due to the rapidly increasing value of 
yarshagumba. Other actors and related institutions, like ANCA in Nepal, or the BMC in India, 
developed due to decisions and policy changes on national and state levels for natural resource 
management. All actors have an interest in benefitting from the increased resource value and, 
therefore, have influenced the governance systems in the high alpine grasslands. Further, all 
actors and institutions interact on multiple levels, but hardly harmonize or complement each 
other. Bureaucratic hierarchy is still the predominant governance mode in both countries.  
In both countries, several institutional and societal multi-level learning processes were initiated, 
which altered the structures of existing resource governance systems and consequently 
triggered new learning processes. In the early years of the 2000s when the ‘gold rush’ started, 
communities set up access and management rules. This can be identified as single-loop 
learning that changed actions to improve established routines (Pahl-Wostl 2009). In some 
cases these rules solved conflicts between collectors and clarified terms of resource extraction; 
in other cases they raised more tensions. We identify four practices of communities to legitimate 
these arrangements in our case study: transfer of formal institutions from one resource to 
another one (example: Baling), consistent strong leadership of community heads (example: 
Tejum), maintenance of a shared sense of community in a site (examples: Baling and Api) and 
retention of established customary rights and responsibilities (example: Bona). The 
arrangements have enabled these communities to retain most benefits for their own community 
and to control users and resource extraction when the design of governmental institutions is 
weak, as is the case in India, or when the governmental institutions override customary rights 
and practices, as it is the case in Nepal. 
These established communal management arrangements are not necessarily legally 
sanctioned by law, especially in India. They are recognized as legitimate by the involved 
community members (c.f. Scott 1999). However in some cases, communities have difficulties 
to enforce these informal regulations, especially towards distant collectors. Distant collectors 
often do not know or neglect these informal arrangements and, therefore, do not legitimate 
them. Additionally, members from within the community are not always willing to respect certain 
traditions, as the example of women collecting yarshagumba shows. By comparing the 
dynamics in the different sites, we deduce that the more the local site arrangements are linked 
to formal community-led organizations, like van panchayats in India or CFUG and the ANCA 
Conservation Committees in Nepal, the more the collection of yarshagumba is regulated and 
the better regulations can be enforced by the community under both community members and 
distant collectors.  
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In India, the State Forest Department is characterised by strong bureaucratic hierarchies and 
limited interaction with local leaders (Singh 2016). On the one hand, the remoteness and 
inaccessibility of the collection sites as well as the limited human and financial resources of the 
State Forest Department hamper the implementation of the existing polices. On the other hand, 
government authorities have not yet responded to the changing situation in the high alpine 
grasslands with major policy revisions. Although local representatives of the State Forest 
Department are aware of their limitations and have an interest in further legalising the collection 
and sale of yarshagumba in order to collect revenues and control the access to the resource, 
at the time of writing, the decision about legalisation was still pending on state level. 
On local and national level, the Nepali government has responded to the yarshagumba ‘gold 
rush’ only recently, when conflicts between actors increased. The local yarshagumba 
management guidelines for ANCA developed in 2016 were an attempt to involve state and non-
state actors on a local level equally to negotiate and share rights and responsibilities, as well 
as to increase their overall cooperation. However, it lacked the acceptance of higher 
government authorities on the central level. The formulation of national directives a year later 
shows that although decentralised community-based programmes have been part of 
government schemes since the late 1990s (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001), power and decision-
making is still situated on national level. Therefore, the vertical integration between local and 
national actors and institutions remains weak. Nevertheless, the local 2016 yarshagumba 
management guideline for ANCA provides a good example of revising the institutional frame of 
the governance system by integrating informal and innovative approaches as well as local 
knowledge of communities in formal processes. This approach linked the single-loop learning 
process (improvements of local actions) with double-loop learning (revisions of the governance 
frame). 
Referring to triple-loop learning (Pahl-Wostl 2009), to date, neither state nor non-state actors 
in India and Nepal are tackling the communities’ strong dependency on yarshagumba 
collection. Governmental programmes could provide incentives to reduce the communities’ 
dependency on NTFP collection and to identify comparable income options to reduce the 
pressure on these natural resources. This could transform the overall socio-economic context 
in the high Himalayan Mountains and would contribute towards greater sustainability of natural 
resources. 
Subsequently, referring to our hypothesis, our findings show that in comparison to government 
authorities, communities adapted more flexibly to protect or gain access to a common pool 
resource when the value of this resource increased. Irrespective of the legal status of 
yarshagumba collection, the resource governance systems in both countries in our case study 
have adapted to the abrupt changes in the high alpine grasslands. The pressures on this 
resource triggered innovative approaches on a community level to protect or gain access to 
collection sites. Following the example in Nepal, the establishment of communal management 
arrangements needs to be followed by and strongly linked with the revision and implementation 
of governmental institutions. This can stabilize and legitimate the adaptive changes in the 
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governance systems, especially when the communities respond in ways that fall outside the 
bounds of formal institutions.  
Going beyond this case study, we elaborate that stages of multi-level learning have to build on 
each other to be able to move from changing actions (single-loop learning) to revising the frame 
by government authorities with the cooperation of communities (double-loop learning) and, 
finally, to transforming the context (triple-loop learning). Therefore, we argue that institutionally-
mixed resource governance systems constituted by multi-level interaction as well as shared 
responsibilities and rights among different institutions and actors can better handle sudden 
resource value changes and other changes triggered subsequently by enabling adaptive and 
transformative learning processes in the governance systems. 
Currently, the limited recognition of the local context in recent policies in India and Nepal, as 
well as the overlapping of institutional rights, such as for van panchayats and BMCs in India 
and ANCA Conservation committees and CFUGs in Nepal, has led to limited vertical and 
horizontal integration between state and non-state actors. This could become even more 
severe in Nepal when the newly established administrative units, gaun palikas (villages) and 
nagar palikas (municipalities), empowered through the new Nepal Constitution of September 
2015, demand their rights to manage natural resources at the local level. This will most likely 
bring a new dynamic into the existing governance structure with outcomes, which so far cannot 
be predicted. A similar situation could occur in India once BMCs on local level and the State 
Biodiversity Board receive more human and financial resources and become more strongly 
socially accepted. As yarshagumba is currently the local resource with the highest value found 
in the Himalayan Mountains (Negi et al. 2016), struggles on state and local level between State 
Forest Department and State Biodiversity Board to benefit from the resource are likely. 
However, the new situations in Nepal and India can also provide opportunities to reflect on 
general questions about equity, power and authority, resource distribution and livelihood 
dependencies in the context of NTFP collection and sale in remote mountain villages to 
encourage transformative change. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Our comparative case study reveals communities’ and governments’ capacities to adapt to 
resource value changes in the high alpine grasslands of the Kailash Landscape. We conclude 
that neither government nor communities alone can ensure effective governance in remote 
mountain areas when resource values rapidly increase. During learning processes the link 
between the amendment of actions (single-loop learning), in our case initiated by communities, 
and the revision of the formal policies and the frame (double-loop learning) is essential to 
ensure that innovative approaches reach the policy level (vertical integration) and can spread 
across administrative boundaries (horizontal interaction). A complex and complementary 
resource governance system consisting of governmental institutions and communal 
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management arrangements is required to adapt adequately and to ensure that learning 
processes are innovative, context-specific, legally sanctioned and enforced.  
Building on this insight we conclude that other common pool resources in the Himalayas face 
similar governance challenges. For example demand and prices for medicinal and aromatic 
plants have increased over the last decades (Pauls and Franz 2013). The majority of them, just 
like yarshagumba, are not cultivated, but harvested wild in remote areas by communities 
(Uprety et al. 2016). Referring to our findings, this will most likely trigger similar power struggles, 
adaptation and learning processes. 
We recommend that the affected regions establish common platforms for actors from different 
levels and sectors, including the government, relevant research facilities and communities. 
Joint meetings could encourage exchange and understanding, create awareness and provide 
the opportunity to share local and scientific knowledge among relevant actors. This would also 
close the gap between the communal and governmental efforts for adaption and encourage 
transformation towards sustainable resource management.  
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Abstract  
To date, the role of borderlands in global production networks is an under-researched topic. In 
this study, we take the production network of the highly valuable non-timber forest product 
ophiocordyceps sinensis (yarsagumba) as a case to study the trans-border connectivities of 
state and non-state actors in the borderland of India, Nepal and China located within the rural 
Kailash Landscape. We present the results of an in-depth qualitative study on the informal trade 
networks through which non-state actors transport yarsagumba from India to Nepali markets, 
and on the related governmental marketing mechanisms for non-timber forest products in India 
and Nepal. By looking through the lens of borderland studies we focus our analysis on the 
power and embeddedness of state authorities and non-state actors on both sides of the border 
within these legal and illegal trade networks and relate the findings to the function of borders 
as both material and institutional demarcation lines. Our case study shows that state authorities 
and non-state actors are closely enmeshed with each other, using or bypassing state 
regulations for their own benefits. This reproduces a ‘licit’ but illegal cross-border trade system. 
Besides economic interdependencies, social relations between actors are crucial for building 
trust between business partners who deal with high product values and cash flows outside 
formal regulatory spaces or between different regulatory spaces across state borders. We 
conclude that the power and embeddedness of actors in the production networks enable a 
network dynamic that undermines the function of the border as a line of separation.  
 
Keywords: Global production networks, borderland studies, informal trade, ophiocordyceps 
sinensis, Himalaya 
                                               
11 As lead author I conducted the primarily research for the publication and contributed the majority of 
the content, with some theoretical and editorial inputs by the other authors.  
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6.1 Introduction 
In the remote border region of the Kailash Landscape in India and Nepal, the local population 
is highly dependent on the collection and trade of ophiocordyceps sinensis, locally known as 
yarsagumba or keera ghaas12, as a source of income (Negi et al., 2016). Yarsagumba is 
currently the most valuable non-timber forest product (NTFP) in the region with prices ranging 
from 8,000 to 14,000 USD per kg on the local market (Pant et al., 2017; Pouliot et al., 2018). It 
is found in the high alpine grasslands and used in traditional Chinese and Tibetan medicine 
(Winkler, 2008). In ayurvedic and other types of traditional medicine in Nepal and India, in 
contrast, yarsagumba is hardly known or utilized, and therefore not in high demand (Negi et al., 
2016). Consequently, the product is traded from the Himalayan Mountains in India and Nepal 
to China.  
In the late 1990s the demand in China for yarsagumba increased tremendously, which led to 
an enormous rise in prices (Linke, 2017; Winkler, 2008; Yeh and Lama, 2013). This price trend 
triggered a ‘gold rush’ in the Himalaya, which led to an unprecedented upsurge in the number 
of collectors (Cannon et al., 2009; Shrestha and Bawa, 2014; Winkler, 2009). The sudden run 
of collectors on the yarsagumba collection sites led to uncontrolled collection and to conflicts 
about access (Pant et al., 2017; Wallrapp et al., forthcoming). At the same time, a well-
organized trade network developed, consisting of several levels of intermediaries linking the 
remote mountain areas of India and Nepal to the global market (Shrestha and Bawa, 2013). 
The network builds on existing kinship, cultural, social and economic relations across the 
region, which have been established over centuries (Bergmann, 2016; Shneiderman, 2013).  
In terms of quantities, Pouliot et al. (2018: 65) calculated that around 384.1 kg13 of yarsagumba 
was collected in the collection sites of Darchula District, Nepal, in the 2014-15 season, with a 
local value of approx. 4.7 million USD. However, the official amount of traded yarsagumba in 
Darchula District registered through the official state authority, Api Nampa Conservation Area 
(ANCA), was 850 kg in 2015 (DNPWC et al., 2018). How does this apparent surplus come 
about? Negi et al. (2016) show that an estimated production of 350 to 600 kg of yarsagumba 
per year takes place in the Kumaon Region in India, just across the border. This surplus can 
therefore be explained by the local population in the Kumaon Region’s preference for a trade 
network through Nepal to sell their yarsagumba harvest. Thus, yarsagumba collected both from 
within ANCA, Nepal and from the Kumaon Region, India is traded in Nepal. Why is this the 
case? And what role does the border play in this regard? 
In this study, we take the global production network (GPN) concept and link it to concepts from 
the emerging field of borderlands studies (Van Schendel and Abraham, 2005; Gellner, 2013; 
                                               
12 In Tibetan language yarsagumba is called yartsa gunbu, which means ‘winter worm – summer grass’ 
(Winkler 2008). Yarsagumba is an endoparasitic complex formed by the fungus ophiocordyceps sinensis 
and the host larva of different moth species (Negi et al. 2016).  
13 There is an uncertainty of several kg in the calculated and estimated figures (see Pouliot et al., 2018).  
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Ghosh, 2011; Goodhand, 2005; Grillot, 2016; Harris, 2013; Nordstrom, 2000; Shneiderman, 
2013; Titeca and Flynn, 2014). To be more precise, we take a non-state-centric perspective 
(Gellner, 2013; Scott, 2009) studying the cross-border trade from both sides of the state border 
(Baud and Van Schendel, 1997). We further analyse the cross-border interactions ‘from below’ 
by focusing on the perspectives of the local population and of relevant local state actors (cf. 
Doevenspeck, 2011; Korf and Raeymaekers, 2013; Jones, 2012).  
While yarsagumba is traded from the Himalayan Mountains of India and Nepal via several 
towns and cities into China, in our case study, we focus only on the production network in the 
rural Kailash Landscape. The production network consists of three processes interrelated with 
each other. Firstly, the governmental marketing system for NTFPs in India is legal, but 
disadvantageous, for Indian collectors and traders. Secondly, their preferred informal trade 
route to sell their yarsagumba harvest runs from India through Nepal, and is discussed in depth 
here. Thirdly, the legalization process through the Nepali governmental mechanism is used for 
yarsagumba harvested both in India and Nepal. We analyse in detail the power and 
embeddedness of state authorities and non-state actors on both sides of the border within these 
processes and relate the findings to the function of a border as line of separation. We argue 
that actors in borderlands question, negotiate, subvert and re-enforce borders. At the same 
time, borders influence the configuration of production networks in borderlands. With this in-
depth case study we show the importance of linking the concept of GPN with findings from 
borderland studies to better understand micro-level power structures and the embeddedness 
of actors in production networks in borderlands. 
6.2 Conceptual framework  
Over the last two decades two main approaches to analysing the relationships between 
production, trade and consumption of products have developed: the global value chain (GVC) 
approach by Gereffi et al. (2005) and the GPN approach by Hendersen et al. (2002). The GVC 
approach primarily follows a linear understanding of production networks and puts the main 
emphasis on the analysis of power relations between companies in their respective institutional 
contexts (Coe et al., 2008; Pauls and Franz, 2013). In comparison, the GPN approach expands 
beyond the linearity of the GVC approach to understand international production and trade as 
a highly complex and dynamic process, incorporating all kinds of network configurations as well 
as formal and informal arrangements. In this study, we apply the GPN concept.  
Hendersen et al. (2002) distinguish three analytical categories: value, embeddedness, and 
power. Aspects of the value of yarsagumba are dealt with in other studies on the region (Pouliot 
et al., 2018; Pyakurel et al., 2018; Shrestha and Bawa, 2013) and therefore will not play a role 
in our study. Embeddedness and power relations, in contrast, are the focus of our work. We 
understand actors’ embeddedness in GPNs as being characterized by their personal 
relationships to other network actors, their opportunities to gain access to resources via theses 
relations as well as their related personal obligations and dependencies (Keck, 2016; Li, 2007). 
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We take power to describe the ability of actors to influence other actors in their doings as well 
as to define, enforce and revoke the prevalent system of rules and regulations (Hendersen et 
al., 2002; Neilson et al., 2014).  
As the GPN approach underlines, production and trade networks are bound by and take place 
within institutional settings that together build regulatory spaces determining the socio-
economic situation of the involved actors. Regulatory spaces may be either generated by states 
as governmental institutions or may be socially produced through customary rights, social 
norms, belief systems or culturally shared understandings. These regulatory spaces determine 
actors’ daily routines, their enabled or constrained access to resources, and their in- or 
exclusion in the community and markets. While the ‘state’ as sovereign is crucial in shaping 
these regulatory spaces, other actors play an important role as well (cf. Pauls and Franz, 2013). 
Jones argues that “rather than understanding sovereignty as unitary and all-encompassing, it 
is better conceptualized as multifaceted, partial and conflicted” (2012: 3). Despite the 
expansion of the sovereign state over the past century, there are many loosely administered 
places within a state territory, where the authority of the state is weak or non-existent. Even at 
the borders of a state, where the performances of sovereign authority are often the most 
conspicuous, the territorial control of sovereigns is incomplete leading to informal networks and 
activities, for example in our case, the yarsagumba trade. State laws are constantly questioned, 
negotiated, subverted and re-enforced by state and non-state actors on the margins of the 
state, particularly in borderlands (Ghosh, 2011; Goodhand, 2005).  
To date, the role of borders in GPNs has been an under-researched topic. Borders demarcate 
the state’s sovereign territory. They can be seen as political divides that gradually emerged 
worldwide with the onset of modern statehood (Van Schendel and Abraham, 2005). Borders 
are key elements in the maintenance of territoriality and the boundary of state sovereignty, the 
principle through which people and resources are controlled and governed (Paasi, 1999). They 
are separation lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and ‘here’ and ‘there’ (Newman, 2006). Yet, while 
many people conceive borders as static and impervious, borderland studies have presented 
plenty of evidence that borders are rather highly fluid, permeable, and in part even connectional 
entities (Gellner, 2013; Paasi, 1999). Borders are constructed through the action of state 
authorities and non-state actors on both sides of the border (Newman, 2006). They “create 
political, social and cultural distinctions, but simultaneously imply the existence of (new) 
networks and systems of interaction across them” (Baud and Van Schendel, 1997: 216).  
Against this background, we introduce the term ‘borderlands’ to describe these spaces at the 
margin of states (Scott, 2009). Borderlands are social, economic and geographical spaces on 
both sides of a border defined by the creation of opportunities and constraints during 
interactions across borders (Chan and Womack, 2016). In our case the borderland of the 
Kailash Landscape is formed by the triangle where India, Nepal and China meet. People living 
in borderlands are often acquainted with different institutional settings, and may be skilled users 
of more than one language and currency for daily interaction and exchange. They can be active 
‘border-crossers’ who make use of such skills to either challenge or comply with given rules of 
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a particular regulatory space and respect or ignore state sovereignty, whichever is more 
profitable for them in order to improve their livelihoods (Chan and Womack, 2016; 
Doevenspeck, 2011).  
From a non-state perspective, people involved in cross-border networks often consider certain 
activities to be legitimate, though the state deems these same acts illegal. These activities are 
accepted in the eyes of the ’border-crossers’ – a common phenomenon, for which Van 
Schendel and Abraham use the term ‘licit’ (2005: 4). Especially in borderlands, legal restrictions 
are often accompanied by socially sanctioned practices such as smuggling. While this may 
have the effect of driving these practices into illegality, it does not eliminate them nor does it 
necessarily force them into obscurity. Hence, informal networks develop, which often build on 
patterns of mobility, trade and exchange as well as on cultural and kinship networks that have 
been in existence for centuries (Van Schendel and Abraham, 2005). They are often based on 
specific codes of conduct, opaque power relations, and rules that are orally passed on. 
Trustworthiness, credibility and reputation are key in these informal networks (Keck, 2016; 
Nordstrom, 2000), especially when it comes to trade across borders (cf. Grillot, 2016; Tong, 
2014).  
In borderland studies, scholars highlight the multi-functional role of state actors in cross-border 
networks. Nordstrom emphasizes the interweaving of state and non-state actors across 
borders by introducing the term ‘extra-state,’ which she uses  
to underscore the fact that while these networks are not comprised by states themselves, neither 
are they entirely distinct from, or opposite to states – they work both through and around formal state 
representatives and institutions. States and these networks exist simultaneously … each presenting 
different forms of authority and politico-economic organisation (2000: 36). 
By taking up this notion of the ‘extra-state,’ we include in our analysis the informal as well as 
legal processes for marketing NTFPs in India and Nepal to understand the different hats state 
authorities wear within the cross-border network of yarsagumba. Yet, clear distinctions between 
legal and illegal, between state and non-state, and local and international often are not possible 
to draw in borderlands (Korf and Raeymaekers, 2013). State and non-state actors have several 
roles and are interlocked and enmeshed with one another, which forms specific configurations 
of production networks in borderlands.   
Taking findings from borderland studies into consideration, we use the concept of GPN as our 
main analytical tool to understand the role that the border – both as a material and institutional 
demarcation line - plays for the production network configuration and its actors in the borderland 
of the Kailash Landscape. 
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6.3 Study area and data collection 
6.3.1 Study area 
The Kailash Landscape encompasses the border region of Darchula District in Nepal, the 
Kumaon Region, Uttarakhand State in India and Pulan County, Tibet Autonomous Region 
(TAR) in China. The mountainous area is geopolitically sensitive and disputed borders have 
led to high military presence in India and China and to restrictions on movement of people and 
goods over the last decades. The area has long been characterised by great economic, social 
and cultural interactions across the borders, which are declining more and more due to political 
and socio-economic changes (Bergmann, 2016; Harris, 2013; Shneiderman, 2013). In former 
times, the Rang community – known as Shauka in Nepal – had the exclusive rights for the 
trans-Himalayan trade through the Kailash Landscape via the mountain valleys from the 
Gangetic plains to the Tibetan Plateau (Bergmann, 2016). With the increase of Chinese 
dominance on the Tibetan plateau in the 1950s and the Indo-China war in 1962, their customary 
rights for transhumance and movement of goods and people were restricted, the Indo-Chinese 
high mountain passes closed, and trade reduced (Bergmann, 2016) (figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Map of the borderland of India, Nepal and China in the Kailash Landscape (detailed map: own 
source; overview map: map data 2018 google) 
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Between China and Nepal, the Tinker pass remained open. The Lipu Lekh pass in India re-
opened in 1992 as an important pilgrimage route to holy Mount Kailash in the TAR, China and 
for limited commodity trade. Currently, trade to China is allowed up to 30 km into Chinese 
territory, to the next market town, Puran/Taklakot in Pulan County. In the last years, more and 
more regulations have been drawn up for this traditional border market limiting the flow of 
commodities and volume of trade (He et al., 2018).  
In contrast, the border between India and Nepal is described as an ‘open’ border (Gellner, 
2013). People and everyday goods can move freely in small quantities without formalities 
across this border. Several treaties have legalised these activities and have regulated customs 
duties and state border controls over the last decades (Kansakar, 2001). Apart from the political 
borders between the countries, physical boundaries such as the Mahakali River between Nepal 
and India or high mountain passes between India and Nepal and the TAR in China, have always 
presented obstacles to the movement of goods and people across the region. This has 
channelled the ‘border-crossers,’ but never halted these activities.  
The closure of trading routes from India to the Tibetan plateau in the 1960s has changed the 
economic status of Indian communities in this region tremendously over the last decades. In 
both India and Nepal, out-migration of young people and whole families has led to barren 
agricultural fields and the extinction of entire villages in the high mountain ranges (Bergmann, 
2016). Over the last decades, the collection of NTFPs, especially yarsagumba, has become 
one of the key income sources for most of the households in these valleys (Negi et al., 2016; 
Pouliot et al., 2018).  
6.3.2 Data collection 
The empirical fieldwork was conducted in four valleys of the Kailash Landscape: two valleys of 
ANCA in Nepal – Mahakali and Chameylia valleys – and two valleys in the Kumaon Region of 
India – Darma and Johar valleys. The empirical research mainly comprises qualitative data 
collected through key informant and in-depth interviews and focus group discussions between 
2014 and 2017. The interviewees included government officials on the central, state and district 
levels, local leaders, community members, traders and collectors from various backgrounds 
with different gender and age. In total 13 focus group discussions with community members 
and traders were organised in 2016 and 2017, 30 representatives of local authorities and 62 
community members were interviewed, and 20 interviews with representatives of higher state 
authorities and regional experts were conducted. Due to the sensitive content of the interviews 
in an internationally disputed border region, no further details on the backgrounds of the 
interviewees are provided. 
As some aspects of the study were difficult to discuss openly with stakeholders, participatory 
field observation was conducted as an important complementary source of information. 
Additionally, for both India and Nepal, relevant policies, guidelines and directives were studied 
and reviewed with stakeholders. 
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For the data analysis we chose the content analysis following Mayring (2015). The interviews 
were translated from Hindi or Nepali into English and transcribed afterwards. Field notes were 
taken in order to document other observations, focus group discussions and informal 
conversations. Following fieldwork, the texts were categorized and coded according to defined 
units of analysis. The results are interpreted and discussed in the following. 
6.4 Results 
The collection and trade of NTFP, particularly of yarsagumba, is the main livelihood source for 
the people in this region and dominates all socio-economic systems in the borderland. Although 
some parts of the cross-border network activities are illegal according to Indian and Nepali law, 
all participants within the system, including state and non-state actors, know the ‘rules of the 
game’ and are interwoven within the wider network.  
We trace the product flow of yarsagumba from the Indian collectors to the international 
wholesalers in Kathmandu, Nepal. The Indian governmental marketing mechanism is not the 
preference for Indian collectors and traders to sell their harvest. Instead, the informal trade 
network and the subsequent legalization process in Nepal offer Indian actors better prices with 
fewer bureaucratic struggles. The borderland context enables a lucrative and well-functioning 
informal trade network formed by strong dependencies and economic and social relations 
between state and non-state actors across the border. 
We present our findings in three sections according to the main processes in the production 
network: (1) the Indian governmental marketing mechanism relevant for all NTFPs in India, (2) 
the informal trade network between India and Nepal, and (3) the legalization process of 
yarsagumba on the Nepali side. The fourth section presents less utilized trading routes for 
yarsagumba in the region. Figure 6 summarizes our findings regarding the legal/illegal product 
flow, the relevant actors and the dominant and subordinate trading routes in the borderland of 
the Kailash Landscape. 
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Figure 6: Trade network of illegal (red) and legal (green) product flows of yarsagumba in the Indian/Nepali 
borderland with relevant state and non-state actors. No. 1 (left) outlines the product flow of yarsagumba 
using the governmental marketing mechanism in India, no. 2 (middle) the informal trade network from 
India to Nepal and no. 3 (right) the legalization process in Nepal. The thick arrows show the dominant, 
the thin arrows the subordinate trading routes. 
6.4.1 The governmental marketing system for yarsagumba in India (no. 1 in 
figure 6) 
The governmental marketing mechanism for NTFPs and medicinal and aromatic plants in 
Uttarakhand State, India, is regulated by the State Forest Department (SFD) of Uttarakhand 
(Pauls and Franz, 2013). In order to sell any cultivated or collected NTFP or medicinal and 
aromatic plants, the SFD authorizes agencies, like the Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam and the 
Bhesaj Sangh, to function as intermediaries between local harvesters, government authorities 
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and traders. These agencies ensure the documentation with the van panchayats (local forest 
management committees) and control the product quality. After completing the required 
process, the products are sold at SFD-organised auctions to registered companies or 
wholesalers. The prices are fixed in advance by the SFD based on the quality of the products 
and market prices. This system is applied to all cultivated and collected NTFPs and medicinal 
and aromatic plants in the state authorized for sale.14 Yet, Indian collectors of yarsagumba do 
not usually trade their collected products via these channels (Negi et al., 2016). Only up to 8 
kg of yarsagumba were auctioned in the years between 2008 and 2012 (CHEA, 2015).  
Although governmental regulations are in place for the sale of NTFPs, there are gaps in the 
regulatory system for the collection and trade of yarsagumba in India (Caplins, 2016; Negi et 
al., 2016; Wallrapp et al., forthcoming). In India, commercial collection of yarsagumba is legally 
permissible only in van panchayats, however, collectors harvest yarsagumba wherever 
possible - within state forests or protected areas - regardless of property rights and legal status 
(Negi et al., 2016). But even for yarsagumba collected within van panchayats, the sale and 
marketing mechanisms are not clearly drawn up. A forester from the region stated:  
To catch them yarsagumba collectors and traders under which act? We can’t do anything. I 
requested my senior to give a clear answer but that was not possible (Interview April 2017 – English 
translation, original language Hindi).  
On the one hand these unclear regulations leave room for interpretation for SFD 
representatives as well as for the collectors and traders. On the other hand, this gives state 
authorities power over local collectors and traders. This power to enforce regulations is 
demonstrated by sporadic arrests when yarsagumba is sold openly (Interview with a trader in 
India, May 2017). Consequently, to avoid arrests and for the personal benefit of state and non-
state actors, payment of bribes and requests for personal favours are common practices.  
Due to pressure by influential local leaders, the SFD has made several attempts to improve the 
marketing system for yarsagumba in the last years by authorizing van panchayat leaders to 
hand out certificates of origin for collected yarsagumba and thereby to allow the sale of 
yarsagumba from specific collection sites via the auction system. Nevertheless, this system 
has provoked critique: 
… the government always offers lower prices, so why should somebody sell for that amount? 
Nobody was interested in selling for that amount. And the other system is well established (Interview 
with community member in Munsyari, India, January 2017 – English translation, original language 
Hindi). 
As this quote indicates, the local population considers the bureaucracy of the marketing system, 
the low prices and the time-consuming procedures to be too complicated and inappropriate. 
They criticize their own inability and lack of power to influence the governmental system and 
                                               
14 For more details on the governmental marketing system in Uttarakhand State, India, see Pauls and 
Franz (2013) and Caplins (2016). 
CHAPTER 6: Production networks and borderlands … 
 
 87 
the unwillingness of state authorities to address their concerns. The dominant role of the SFD 
and the governmental marketing system, which is disadvantageous for the local population, 
force them to look for alternative ways to sell their products. The availability of the Nepali NTFP 
trading system across the border displays such an alternative for the sale of yarsagumba 
collected in India.  
6.4.2 The informal trade network across the border from India to Nepal (no. 
2 in figure 6) 
6.4.2.1 The product flow of yarsagumba from India to Nepal 
Indian yarsagumba collectors usually sell their harvest to traders when they return to their 
villages. Each village in the upper Kumaon Region in India has a specific site in the high 
mountainous area where they collect yarsagumba during the collection season. Governance 
systems consisting of government institutions and communal norms regulate the access to and 
management of the yarsagumba collection sites.15 The Indian collectors mainly meet the 
yarsagumba traders when they return to their villages from the collection site, and less often in 
the site itself or in other trading hubs. During and after the collection season, village traders 
either from India or Nepal visit the villages frequently to negotiate prices with the collectors and 
to check the available quantities. After the purchase of products, they cross the border to Nepal 
(see figure 6, no. 2, dominant trading route).  
Yarsagumba traders from India and Nepal prefer unofficial border crossing points instead of 
the official one between the towns of Dharchula, India, and Darchula, Nepal (figure 5). A bridge 
across the Mahakali River, which forms the border between India and Nepal, connects the two 
towns. Police and customs clearance points on both sides control the movement of goods and 
people. A bit further up the river from Dharchula along the border, several ‘rope bridges’ are 
installed to enable the local people to cross the river (see figure 7 and 8). These are unofficial 
border crossing points. 
                                               
15 For more details about the governance systems for collection of yarsagumba in the Kailash Landscape 
see Wallrapp et al. (forthcoming) and Pant et al. (2017). 
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Figure 7: The Kailash Landscape with the Mahakali river as the border between India and Nepal (own 
source May 2017) 
 
 
Figure 8: A ‘rope bridge’ over the Mahakali River (own source May 2017) 
 
According to the treaties signed between the two countries, the free movement of people and 
commodities in small quantities is legal. Only commodities moving across the border in bigger 
bulk, including medicinal aromatic plants and NTFPs, require legal documents and customs 
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declarations (Kansakar, 2001). Community members from both sides use ‘rope bridges’ 
frequently for daily activities, such as getting to markets, having easier access to road 
infrastructure and transportation, visiting family members or cutting fodder for animals. As ‘rope 
bridges’ are used for everyday activities, police and border control units from both states do not 
regularly check the movement of people and commodities across them. People in the region 
are active ‘border-crossers’ aware of the conditions, regulations and ways around these. As a 
trader from the region states:  
If herbs are transported, people do not have papers. But, they do not transport them in large bulk. 
They carry them in small packages and try not to get caught by police or border controls (Interview 
with trader from Nepal, April 2017 – English translation, original language Hindi). 
On the Nepali side, some teashops along the border function as trading hubs during the 
yarsagumba collection season. There, village traders from India and Nepal meet Nepali ‘town 
traders’ and exchange their products and cash. Some town traders are registered in the 
governmental ANCA office for the collection of yarsagumba. There, they are issued legal 
documents for transportation of yarsagumba within Nepal. Afterwards, town traders transport 
the sealed and cleared yarsagumba packages to Kathmandu. In Kathmandu the packages are 
resold to international wholesalers for export to China. On the Chinese side, the main trading 
hubs for yarsagumba from Nepal are Shigatse and Lhasa, or yarsagumba is flown directly from 
Kathmandu to Guangzhou and other major Chinese cities (He et al., 2018; Linke, 2017; Yeh 
and Lama, 2013).  
One additional challenge for the cross-border network is the currency exchange from Nepalese 
Rupees (NPR) to Indian Rupees (INR), as most of the money comes from international 
wholesalers from Kathmandu in cash in NPR. Withdrawing large amounts of cash is difficult in 
India, especially after the demonetisation of all INR 500 and INR 1000 banknotes in November 
2016. The Government of India declared the banknotes invalid, aiming to curtail the shadow 
economy and counterfeit cash being used to fund illegal activities. In 2017, however, the 
informal cross-border exchange and cash payments related to yarsagumba trade continued as 
before. The currency exchange between NPR and INR is organised through different traders 
and a separate system, which will not be further addressed in this article. 
6.4.2.2 Embeddedness and power of the actors in the informal trade network 
Collectors, village traders, town traders, international wholesalers and state authorities from 
both countries are all relevant actors in the informal trade network from India to Nepal. In our 
analysis, we have identified different aspects regarding the embeddedness and power of actors 
in the network: the network structure, the time-delayed cash transfer in relation to the product 
flow, the social ties and business relations between actors and the local knowledge of actors. 
These aspects are interrelated with each other. 
The network structure of the yarsagumba trade in the borderland becomes increasingly 
condensed along the product flow, as the number of people involved in trade becomes less 
while the volume of yarsagumba grows. While several thousand collectors collect hundreds of 
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pieces of yarsagumba in different collection sites in India and Nepal, only a few village traders 
per village or valley buy the products, pool them together and transport them in packages to 
town. Then, the product flow is channelled through the hands of only a few town traders in 
Darchula, Nepal. Along the product flow, the product can easily change ownership three to five 
times on the way from the collection site until it is transported to Kathmandu.  
In every village and valley one or a handful of traders control and dominate the trade of 
yarsagumba. Traders are usually focused on a certain valley or village depending on kinship 
and existing personal relationships with community members and collectors. In certain areas, 
they demand commission for allowing other traders to get involved in the yarsagumba business. 
This is often combined with the fact that these traders have several functions in the 
communities: they often play the role of moneylenders, shop owners, local politicians and 
community representatives. Poorer households in India and Nepal often sell their future 
yarsagumba stock by taking advances or loaning money from businessmen in the villages 
between collection seasons. In these situations, the two parties agree orally on a certain price 
for the future stock. The relationship between trader and collector and the economic situation 
of each collector determine the bargaining power between the collector and village trader. 
However, poorer collectors in particular can be vulnerable to these dependencies, which may 
lead to distress deals allowing traders to bargain lower prices. It can lock the poor into a patron-
client relationship with local traders (cf. Goodhand, 2005). But for Indian collectors, the prices 
are still higher than the ones offered in the governmental marketing system in India. Traders, 
in contrast, use their dominant position in the communities to bargain prices, concentrate the 
market and block competing traders.  
The power structures and economic embeddedness of actors in the network depend on the 
timing of the product flow in relation to the cash flow. The town traders of India and Nepal are 
mostly located in the trading hubs or towns, but have several village traders working for them 
who buy yarsagumba in the villages and collection sites. Before the season starts, the town 
traders usually receive advances from other businessmen or international wholesalers from 
Kathmandu. After receiving it, the town traders distribute the cash further to village traders, who 
either use it to pay advances to collectors or directly to buy quantities of yarsagumba during 
the collection season. In this way, the town traders ensure that certain quantities are reserved 
for them and that village traders are bound to them. But it also means that they are bound to 
certain buyers, which limits their bargaining power in return. Although advances for 
yarsagumba are distributed within the system between the different actors, the collectors often 
have to wait for weeks or even months for the actual payment for their products. Only after the 
actual payment is made by the international wholesaler, either in Kathmandu or even in China, 
is the pending amount of money settled within the trade network. The cash flow does not take 
place at the same time as the product flow. It creates mutual dependencies between the 
different levels of traders and between the village traders and collectors and influences the 
power of actors to negotiate prices. They are entangled in the network, which determines their 
economic embeddedness. These dependencies are not only established during the 
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yarsagumba collection season (end of April until end of June) in one national regulatory space, 
but persist over the whole year across the Indian, Nepali, and even Chinese borders. 
Although the international wholesalers determine the cash flow, town traders have a crucial 
role in the network structure. International wholesalers have the function of investors in the 
system without having sound local knowledge or relationships with relevant local state and non-
state actors. They depend on the town traders to buy the quantities they want. Town traders 
have good knowledge of the region and good connections to village traders. In addition, they 
have well-established relations to local politicians, local government officials, police, other 
businessmen, traders’ associations and traders from both sides of the border. As only Nepali 
traders are allowed to be issued the legalization documents, they play a dominant role in the 
network.  
In India the unclear governmental regulations about the collection and trade of yarsagumba 
make Indian actors vulnerable. They fear sporadic arrests and confrontations with state 
representatives from the SFD or police if they sell yarsagumba openly. State authorities are 
present in towns and at road-junctions, but hardly come to the remote villages. Therefore, the 
collectors feel safe enough in their villages to sell their harvest directly to village traders there, 
instead of bringing their products down to the trading hubs. Trust between the different levels 
of traders and between the traders and collectors is crucial for the functioning of this informal 
cross-border network, where collectors and traders cannot rely on governmental law 
enforcement and are vulnerable to arbitrary behaviour by state and non-state actors.  
Traders use social relations and social codes of conduct to manage risks for their business 
activities in this informal setting (cf. Linke, 2017). The Rang/Shauka community (52 villages) is 
located in the Kailash Landscape on both sides of the border in India and Nepal and are 
organised in the Rung Kalyan Sanstha (Rang Welfare Society). Yearly meetings of the Rang 
Welfare Society provide an open platform to share and discuss issues, develop a common 
understanding and resolve conflicts within the community. Coming from the same village, being 
from the same community or being related with each other supports the economic relations 
between actors in the trade network. These social relations provide the actors possibilities for 
building pressure within the community and for sanctioning violations against social codes of 
conduct through community measures.   
Besides social relations between actors, the credibility and reputation of a person is important 
in order to be perceived as trustworthy in this kind of business. A village trader stated:  
The relation has nothing to do with being Rang or not. It is about trust and business. It is about 
connection, friendship and knowing a person to build up trust and to make these deals with big 
money (Interview with village trader in Dharchula, India May 2017 – English translation, original 
language Hindi). 
As the statement shows, business partners in the yarsagumba trade do not necessarily have 
to come from the same community, but knowing a person is crucial. Although, traders take a 
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number of measures to manage the risks, this lucrative business is regularly affected by fraud 
and betrayal:   
I agreed with some Nepali trader to sell keera ghaas yarsagumba. We met in a hotel. I exchanged 
the stock, but did not receive the money immediately, and the guy disappeared. He left his clothes 
on the balcony, so everyone thought that he was still in the room, but he had disappeared with the 
stock. I lost a lot of money that day (Interview with trader in Dharchula, India, April 2017 – English 
translation, original language Hindi). 
The story of this trader indicates that, although traders build up their business relationships on 
the basis of social networks and the reputation and credibility of their partners, there still 
remains a great risk of getting cheated. According to traders, it takes several years of trust-
building before a town trader is seen as trustworthy enough to be given advances by 
international wholesalers. The same is true for advances to village traders and collectors or 
exchanges of products and cash.   
State actors on both sides of the border are aware of the informal cross-border trade. They 
restrict it and at the same time, they are part of it. According to traders, the state authorities in 
Nepal and India are reluctant to intervene in the yarsagumba trade, likely due to the personal 
benefits they receive from it. Arrests and confiscations of yarsagumba are rare and interlocutors 
suggested that they might be more related to personal power struggles between traders and 
government representatives than strategic state interventions to restrict the cross-border 
network. Joint patrolling and information exchange between state authorities in India and Nepal 
are regularly conducted to enforce the border and to limit illegal cross-border activities, but this 
has not yet hampered the cross-border yarsagumba trade network.  
6.4.3 Legalization of yarsagumba in Nepal (no. 3 in figure 6) 
The collection and sale of yarsagumba is legal within Nepal and does not require documents 
until the products are transported across district boundaries. Only then does the trader need 
several permits and royalties need to be paid to state authorities, in our case to the ANCA 
office. Firstly, to be able to engage in trade, the trader must have a company registered in the 
district that is specialized in trading NTFPs. Secondly, the trader needs to apply at the ANCA 
office for permission to collect yarsagumba in the conservation area. Thirdly, after the collection 
season the trader pays a royalty for the collected yarsagumba at the ANCA office (in 2017 this 
was 25,000 NPR or 250 USD per kg). There, the trader also requests a transportation permit. 
The yarsagumba is then packed, sealed and legalised as a Nepali product.  
The ANCA office regulates the trade volume of yarsagumba by limiting the harvested quantity 
per year. In addition, ANCA restricts the number of permitted traders in the conservation area 
(in 2017, there were 50 traders). The limitation of traders enforces the concentration of the 
yarsagumba market and forces other non-registered traders from India and Nepal to cooperate 
with the registered ones to trade their products. In this way ANCA and the dominant town 
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traders can jointly influence the selection process of registered traders and channel the product 
flow from India and Nepal.  
Since the approval of the national yarsagumba management policy by the Ministry of Forests 
and Soil Conservation in Kathmandu in 2017, ANCA additionally requests certificates of origin 
filled out by the collectors from the registered traders (MoFSC, 2017). An ANCA representative 
stated: 
In the national directive is the point of ‘certificate of origin’. That will have an effect on the Indian 
traders, because you need to have the certificate cards from collectors from Nepal to be able to get 
the transportation approval by the government (Interview ANCA representative, Darchula, Nepal, 
May 2017 – original language English). 
An Indian trader responded to the same question about the certificates of origin in Nepal: 
About the new rules in Nepal? Yes, I know about that certificate. I need cards to get the documents, 
but no problem. I will get around that (Interview Indian trader, Dharchula, India, May 2017 – English 
translation, original language Hindi). 
The statement of the Indian trader shows that the Nepali governmental regulations increase 
the obstacles for informal network actors, but do not hinder them from continuing to use the 
same Nepali route. Actors in the network are adaptive (cf. Keck, 2016).  
From the perspective of the Nepali state representatives the informal cross-border trade system 
has the advantage that the state earns revenues from the trade of yarsagumba without 
exploiting its own resources. Additionally, personal benefits for individual state representatives 
are common. Adhikari (2015) describes common corruption practices in the forestry sector in 
Nepal, like the payment of royalties for a certain weight of a package, while the actual weight 
is higher. These practices are also found in the yarsagumba trade system. The embeddedness 
of the state actors in the established formal and informal parts of the network enables and 
ensures a smooth operation of informal trade across the India-Nepal border despite the 
formulation of additional regulations.  
In general, traders from Nepal and India accept the formal and informal process for legalization 
of their products through ANCA. They prefer a legalised product to reduce their risks of being 
arrested by state authorities in Nepal. Another reason is that the prices in Kathmandu are higher 
for legal products and the sealed yarsagumba packages are in higher demand by international 
wholesalers than illegally transported yarsagumba (interview with trader from Nepal, August 
2017).  
6.4.4 Alternative trading routes for yarsagumba from India to China (no. 2 in 
figure 6) 
The limited availability of alternative trading routes makes the legalization of yarsagumba in 
Nepal via ANCA even more attractive for Indian traders (see study area map in figure 5). 
Possible alternative yarsagumba trading routes such as via the closed remote Himalayan 
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passes (Johar and Darma valleys) or via the re-opened Lipu Lekh pass from India to the TAR, 
China, are too risky because of the high presence of army and border police (interviews in 
Dharchula, India, January 2017) (figure 6, no. 2, subordinate trading route). The trading route 
from the Indian collection sites in the mountains through Indian territory to Delhi and further to 
China is not well established either. How much is actually transported from India directly to the 
TAR, China, cannot be assessed.  
Another option, the route via the Tinker pass in the northern part of the Kailash Landscape from 
Nepal to the border market town Puran/Taklakot in the TAR, China, is only used for smaller 
amounts of yarsagumba. According to the ANCA warden approximately 20 to 30 kg of 
yarsagumba were transported via this route in 2016 (Interview in Darchula, Nepal, May 2017). 
Traders describe the route as being difficult due to poor infrastructure and increased border 
controls on the Chinese side. The perceived ‘easiest way’ for Indian and Nepali traders to 
market the collected yarsagumba from the Indian Kumaon region is currently via ANCA in 
Nepal. 
6.5 Discussion 
From a state-centric perspective, the Kailash Landscape is considered to be a peripheral 
borderland at the margins of three states: India, Nepal and China. By tracing the informal trade 
network of yarsagumba in this borderland we see that the region is not disconnected from, but 
highly integrated into and stimulated by processes associated with globalisation. The remote 
mountainous villages and people of India and Nepal are highly connected to international 
markets and depend on global demands, especially for NTFPs. The yarsagumba collection 
alone has an approximate yearly turnover of 10.5 million USD for the 850 kg yarsagumba 
collected in this region, according to the official figure of ANCA (DNPWC et al., 2018). With this 
high turnover and very limited other income-generating alternatives in this borderland, it is not 
surprising that state and non-state actors have an interest to get and stay involved in this very 
lucrative and functional production network.  
The existence of different regulatory spaces in India and Nepal, such as the different policies 
for marketing of NTFPs, stimulates the informal cross-border trade network in the Kailash 
Landscape. The unattractive governmental marketing system in India encourages Indian 
collectors and traders to look for alternatives. The perceived ‘easy way’ of legalization of 
yarsagumba products in Nepal provides them an opportunity to sell their products for a better 
price and with fewer bureaucratic obstacles. On the one hand, some local people, for example 
traders, are skilled in navigating these different policies and can therefore take advantage of 
this situation. Non-state actors constantly adapt to multiple forms of national and local 
regulations in order not to be excluded from the production network (cf. Harris, 2013). Examples 
from our case are the demonetarisation process in India in 2016 and the introduction of 
certificates of origin for collected yarsagumba in Nepal. On the other hand, non-state actors, 
like in our case the Indian collectors, feel powerless to influence their own state authorities to 
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revise regulations and reform institutions to better suit their demands. As such, they command 
adaptive capacities, but only limited transformative ones (cf. Keck, 2016).  
Along the product flow, yarsagumba transforms from an illegally collected and traded product 
in India into a packaged and sealed legal product fit for transport from Nepal to China. The local 
population of the borderland and to some degree also the local authorities see the cross-border 
trade between India and Nepal as licit. They are aware that they are violating the governmental 
regulations, but these activities have a routine character and seem normal enough to participate 
in. The trade is socially accepted by collectors and traders and therefore legitimised by them 
(Scott, 1999).  
State authorities in India and Nepal play several roles in the network dynamic and configuration. 
On the one hand, state authorities enforce regulations according to sovereign power through 
border controls and patrols, military presence and implementation of policies regulating the 
NTFP collection and cross-border trade. On the other hand, state authorities are also highly 
embedded in the cross-border network. They may interfere sporadically. Within a few hours or 
days, after the payment of a suitable official or unofficial fine, the violator is free again and life 
goes on as before. Following the arguments of Jones (2012), borderlands are territories with 
incomplete sovereign power. Often state actors use their power to allow themselves to operate 
outside the laws of the state, undermining the state’s goals of regulations and order. In our 
case study, state authorities have not prevented or hindered the informal yarsagumba trade 
across the border, but rather have used it for their own personal gain.  
Our findings show that in this informal setting with exchanges of high cash amounts where 
traders and collectors cannot rely on governmental institutions, social ties between actors are 
not only favourable, but even essential for non-state actors to build up their economic relations 
and dependencies between actors. As our two examples of Indian town traders demonstrate, 
actors are economically and socially embedded in the trade network. The behaviour of the 
actors in this formal and informal institutional, economic and social setting determines the 
trader’s reputation and credibility as a business partner. Actors have to balance between profit, 
credibility and reputation to manage their own risks of fraud and betrayal by business partners, 
as well as of arrests by government representatives. They must also do this successfully to be 
considered trustworthy for their partners for future deals. 
Due to their deep social and economic embeddedness in the cross-border trade network on 
the local level, town traders make transactions and resource flows possible. These traders 
mediate simultaneously between the centre and periphery, state and non-state actors and 
between actors across the borders. In contrast, international traders have the economic 
resources, but usually lack the social embeddedness and local knowledge that would enable 
them to be the dominant actors in the network. As such, the network relations are not 
spontaneous interactions, but all actors have clearly defined roles and functions and depend 
on each other, creating a well-established, organised and lucrative trade network operating 
across the border (Cf. Nordstrom, 2000).  
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As our case study shows, borderlands are determined by global production networks that 
develop through the interconnectedness across the border. Certainly, the ‘open’ border 
between India and Nepal facilitates the cross-border network. The alternative trading routes 
crossing the highly militarized border between India and China are perceived by traders as 
more difficult for smuggling and therefore are currently not preferred. However, even then, 
cross-border networks develop if the demand for the smuggled products and expected profits 
are high (cf. Doevenspeck, 2011; Van Schendel and Abraham, 2005), as other studies from 
the neighbouring Garhwal region in India show (Caplins, 2016; Mathur, 2013). Governments 
have several options for reacting to these informal production networks. Either they ‘close’ the 
border further, which usually has limited success (cf. Doevenspeck, 2011; Gellner, 2013; 
Jones, 2012), they restrict the illegal activities (cf. Goodhand, 2005), or they revise policies to 
provide opportunities to transform the informal network activities into formal ones.16 However, 
due to these well-established lucrative networks and the adaptive capacities of actors, policy 
revisions might not achieve what policy-makers intend them to.  
6.6 Conclusion  
By linking the concept of global production networks with key findings from borderland studies, 
our case study on the yarsagumba trade in the rural Kailash Landscape provides in-depth 
findings about the power and embeddedness of state authorities and non-state actors in the 
yarsagumba cross-border network. The configuration of the production network enables a 
network dynamic that undermines the function of the border as line of separation. The 
dichotomies of legal/illegal and formal/informal become blurred and regulatory spaces are re-
interpreted. Actors are constrained and limited by the border, but at the same time the border 
provides them with new opportunities to improve their livelihoods. State authorities and non-
state actors are closely socially and economically enmeshed with each other across the border, 
forming ‘extra-state’ configurations by using or bypassing state regulations for their own 
benefits. We conclude that these dynamics enable configurations of global production networks 
in borderlands, which constantly question, negotiate and subvert, but also re-enforce the border 
and with it the sovereignty of the state. Thus, the border has a clear effect on production 
networks and their immanent power relations, while at the same time production networks in 
borderlands strengthen the element of connectivity that characterizes borderlands.  
                                               
16 In October 2018 the Uttarakhand State Forest Department in India approved a new regulation for 
yarsagumba allowing its marketing through registered traders independent from the state-organised 
auction system. This will reduce the power and embeddedness of Nepali traders in the GPN and 
strengthen the Indian collectors and traders to market their products via Indian middlemen to China 
directly. Yet, it is difficult to predict if traders will prefer the well-established route via Nepal or develop 
further alternative routes directly to China, and therefore the impacts on the current cross-border trade 
network remain to be seen.  
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Although the concept of GPN is very comprehensive including formal and informal 
arrangements, different types of actors and their embeddedness and power relations within the 
network, our case study shows that linking the concept of GPN with considerations of 
borderland studies differentiates the analysis of production networks further in terms of in-depth 
understanding of spatial, institutional and socio-economic dynamics in borderlands. As an 
outlook for further research on GPN we suggest considering the specific dynamics of 
borderlands as a peripheral area with demarcated territories and different regulatory spaces, 
but with high connectivity across borders and linkages to and dependencies on global markets. 
Thus, a borderland should be considered as one production and trade region including both 
sides of the border with different regulatory spaces.  
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7 Discussion 
This section returns to the central questions of the study presented in the introduction section 
1.2.2: 
- How do actors adapt governance systems regulating commercial collection and trade 
of the resource in response to changes in relation to the resource, like an increased 
resource value?  
- What kinds of production networks emerge in borderlands? 
- What roles do state and non-state actors play in the negotiation processes shaping 
governance systems that control access to and benefit from commercial NTFP 
collection and trade in borderlands?  
In the following two sections I discuss the answers to these questions in detail. 
7.1 Governance systems and networks are more than institutions 
Through the increased demand for yarshagumba on the Chinese market over the last 20 years, 
this natural product growing in the high alpine grasslands of the Himalayas transformed into a 
highly valued tradable commodity commercially collected by the local people. Its high value 
and the risk of its overexploitation forced and encouraged state authorities and local 
communities to adapt governance systems in order to secure or gain access to the resource 
and to benefit from the trade through informal and formal channels. These governance systems 
and networks on the ground are diverse, adaptive and complex including rights, institutions, 
power structures, and social and economic relations between actors. 
This study shows that both yarshagumba and the high alpine grasslands are resources 
produced through social, economic and political dimensions. This transformation of a natural 
product into a resource is a dynamic process and not static. It is possible that tomorrow, another 
plant or product will be hyped by Chinese society for its medicinal use and replace 
yarshagumba. Or the Nepali government may declare yarshagumba an endangered species 
and put a ban on yarshagumba collection and export. The resource is thus socially constructed 
by market demands, governmental interventions, governance systems, contemporary 
discourses on property right regimes for conservation and natural resource management, as 
well as in this specific case, on medicinal practices. These features can change at any time, 
which will influence the governance system of the resource and vice versa.   
Through the commercialisation of yarshagumba, our findings show that the production network 
of yarshagumba has become complex in this trans-boundary region and triggered different 
developments. In response, more actors have appeared who demand access to the resource, 
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the dependency of the local communities on the resource as an income source has increased, 
signs of habitat degradation have become visible and the risk of overexploitation of 
yarshagumba has risen (cf. Pant et al. 2017; Shrestha et al. 2017). Global market demands 
and political and economic decisions of state authorities and powerful non-state actors – like 
traders and consumers – influence the behaviour of local collectors and push them further into 
dependency on the resource and on other actors’ decisions (cf. Caplins 2016; Stewart 2014). 
This therefore leads to degradation of the habitats through intensified collection and more 
pressure on the governance systems to regulate access and resource extraction. Following the 
understanding of political ecology, dependency on resources and environmental changes 
reinforce each other. As a result, local communities are vulnerable to other actors’ demands, 
to environmental changes in the habitats, changes within the market structure of the resource, 
and changes in property rights or rules for collection and trading due to governmental 
interventions. However, marginalisation is only one side of the yarshagumba phenomenon, 
which is happening in the study area.  
At the same time, in both parts of my case study – the collection and the trade of yarshagumba 
– the results show that the local people are vulnerable to some extent as they depend on the 
demands of the global market and are exposed to governmental regulations, but they are not 
passive players in the collection and trading systems. They are active participants along with 
the state authorities in shaping governance systems and trading networks suitable and 
appropriate to their demands and interests. The in-depth analysis of the local situation shows 
that state and non-state actors have reacted to the changing conditions through the use of their 
own agency. They have formed new institutions, established networks using opportunities 
across the national borders and adapted regulations for resource extraction and trade securing 
their own benefits. In this regard, systems regulating access to NTFP collection and the related 
trading networks are complex, linking multiple scales, actors and dimensions.  
These established resource governance systems and networks are the outcomes of 
negotiation processes between state and non-state actors. Every collection site of 
yarshagumba has an individually-designed governance system consisting of governmental 
regulations and local communal arrangements, which are either complementary to or replace 
governmental regulations. Rather than formal rules and regulations, negotiation processes 
between actors play a key role to determine who has access to the resource and who benefits 
from the trade network. Thus, governance systems and networks in relation to commercial 
collection of resources are complex constellations. They are an interplay of rights, institutions, 
power structures, and social and economic relations between actors adapting to changing 
conditions. They are dynamic and differ from resource to resource and from location to location.  
7.2 Negotiation processes between state and non-state actors 
As discussed above, in the first part of the thesis about the collection of yarshagumba, the 
findings show that the negotiation processes between state authorities and communities 
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formed complex governance systems in each collection site to regulate access to the common 
pool resource yarshagumba. Since yarshagumba collection started, additional actors have 
appeared and power relations and interactions have changed. Collectors from distant villages 
demanded access to the collection sites, putting the local communities under pressure to share 
their locally available resources with them. Communities reacted immediately by setting up their 
own communal management arrangements to regulate access and extraction of yarshagumba 
in their collection sites, appropriate to each specific location. They justify their claims on the 
basis of customary rights and have re-enforced them; in other words, they have formed new 
institutions on the basis of governmental regulations or have effectively replaced these 
regulations according to their demands and interests. Further, they have legitimated these 
arrangements within their community and social group, not necessarily through formal property 
right regimes, but instead through, for example, traditional grazing rights and through social 
dimensions, like strong leadership. Thus, informal institutions and social dimensions play a key 
role in claiming and protecting access to common resources. 
The state authorities, responsible for natural resource management in the high-alpine 
mountains, hardly intervene in these local systems. As governmental authorities are far from 
the collection sites and have limited human and financial resources, they are often powerless 
to implement and enforce governmental regulations. However, recently, in both countries, 
governments have revised their policies regarding yarshagumba, regardless of the community 
management arrangements in the sites and without involving the local community in the policy-
process. With these revisions, the government authorities want to ensure their involvement 
within the lucrative yarshagumba business. The findings of the case study demonstrate the 
power game between the state and non-state actors about profiting from the lucrative locally 
available resources through designing and establishing governance systems in the collection 
sites that serve their own advantage and goals.  
Who wins and who loses in the negotiation processes about the control of the locally available 
resources? From the findings it is apparent that, on the one hand, the governments of Nepal 
and India have designed new or revised existing policies relevant for yarshagumba collection, 
but on the other hand, they have not restricted the local communal management systems, 
although communities regularly violate current state law. State authorities sometimes intervene 
on the Indian side when the product is sold. However, rather than strategic enforcement of 
governmental law, this more strongly appeared to be a demonstration of power by individual 
state representatives. In this regard, in the collection sites the implementation of the newly 
designed policies from the governments of India and Nepal remains to be seen. Most likely, on 
the basis of earlier experiences, once they do so, the local actors will again be creative and 
adapt accordingly. The power game and the negotiation processes continue. 
The negotiation process between state and non-state actors about access to the collection 
sites shows that communities have power and capacities to adapt to the changing conditions 
and situations on the local level. However, so far they are excluded from the process of 
transforming and revising governmental regulations. Out of necessity, communities are forced 
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to set up their own systems to secure or gain access to a collection site, due to their high 
dependency on the resource. This leads to natural resource governance systems that are often 
accepted by the nearby communities, but not sanctioned by law. Therefore, their process of 
negotiation with state actors is a continuous process and power game that will last until either 
the communal management arrangements are formalised or their dependency on this one 
resource is reduced.  
Both the communal management arrangements and the revised governmental regulations in 
India and Nepal are ‘immediate’ actions to adapt to the changing situation and changing 
conditions, rather than long-term strategic natural resource management interventions. Longer 
term strategic interventions would involve seeing the current challenges related to the 
commercial collection of yarshagumba on a bigger scale linking the yarshagumba collection 
with the property rights regimes in the high-alpine grasslands, with contemporary discourses 
and governmental strategies on conservation of flora and fauna in remote high mountain 
regions and, last but not least, with the dependency of the communities on one resource as 
their main income source. If these different aspects are not addressed and considered in 
negotiation processes between state and non-state actors, it is unlikely that sustainable income 
for the local people and the sustainable management of the resource and the habitats will be 
ensured.  
In the second part of the thesis about the trade of yarshagumba within the Kailash Landscape, 
the findings show that also in the trading system, state and non-state actors are closely 
enmeshed in the informal trading network across the Indian-Nepali border. Similarly to the 
negotiation processes between actors regulating the collection of yarshagumba, the 
governance system and networks for trading are a mixture of governmental regulations and 
informal arrangements, which are built on social and economic embeddedness of actors and 
power games between the different state and non-state actors. Both state representatives and 
non-state actors, like collectors, village traders and town traders, are closely enmeshed with 
each other forming these networks, in which actors utilise, bypass or neglect governmental 
regulations where they find it appropriate, and set up their own arrangements and ‘rules of the 
game’.  
State and non-state actors either question or enforce sovereign power in borderlands, 
depending on what is more suitable for them. State authorities are either directly involved and 
enmeshed with the traders or do not intervene strategically and thoroughly. As shown in the 
case study in chapter 6, state actors have several roles, which enables non-state actors to 
negotiate a trading system with state representatives. These systems enable a functioning 
trading network in the borderland, in which all actors involved benefit from the locally available 
resources.  
The network configurations are not formally institutionalised. Ensuring the functioning of the 
networks, actors know the ‘rules of the game’. They are embedded in the network based on 
social and economic dimensions. These networks are built on trust, credibility and reputation 
of actors as key features to limit the risks of various forms of abuse that can occur without 
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formal contracts and reliance on legal tools (cf. Grillot 2016; Nordstrom 2000). Additionally, 
trading routes and network configurations are built on social cohesion, like between the Nepali 
and Indian collectors and traders and state authorities, but are also influenced by issues related 
to state stability and security on the state-level. In the case study, the continuous tensions 
between India and China as well as the tensions within TAR related to the occupation of Tibet 
by the Chinese in the 1950s influence perceptions of local people. Although the actual disputes 
lie a long time in the past, the unsolved historical issues affect the border area and the decisions 
of the traders themselves.  
As in the case of yarshagumba, local people can be pushed into illegal activities, which in this 
case is especially the illegal sale of yarshagumba in India and the subsequent informal trade 
across the border to Nepal. However, in contrast to the understanding of Scott (2009), who 
speaks about resistance of local people to government authorities in the margins of states, my 
detailed analysis of the trading network in the borderlands of India and Nepal shows that local 
people do not resist governments, but are active participants in the governance systems and 
networks, although not all practices are considered legal by law. Thus, local people are not 
resisting sovereign power, but out of necessity, negotiate spaces jointly with state 
representatives from both sides of the border enabling the informal cross-border trade network.  
Borderlands are regions with opportunities producing cross-border social and economic spaces 
through trans-border connectivities and cross-border networks. There, territoriality, sovereign 
power and the border are continuously negotiated and reinforced by state and non-state actors. 
Governance systems of NTFP commercially collected and traded in borderlands are formed by 
negotiation processes between state authorities and non-state actors from both sides of the 
border, rather than purely based on governmental regulations and sovereign power of the state.  
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8 Conclusion  
The thesis provides an in-depth understanding of the negotiation processes between state 
authorities and non-state actors to shape governance systems and networks for commercial 
NTFP collection and trade in border regions. The thesis uses the case of the resource 
yarshagumba in the remote high Himalaya of the Nepal-India trans-boundary region within the 
Kailash Landscape to explore this topic. The negotiation processes between actors within the 
case study are triggered through increased prices of the resource on the global market, through 
new actors demanding access to the resource, and through state and non-state actors’ 
interests in securing or gaining access to the resource and in benefitting from its trade. The 
product is collected in the high alpine grasslands of the Himalaya of India and Nepal, informally 
traded from India and Nepal and legalised through the Nepali governmental marketing system. 
In this regard, political ecology provided an important basis to critically scrutinize the political, 
social and economical dimensions of the trans-boundary production network of the natural 
resource yarshagumba. 
As a result of these negotiation processes between actors, I conclude that, in the margins of 
states, governance systems and networks for commercial collection and trade of NTFP move 
in and out of legality and use or bypass governmental regulations; the transitions are fluid. 
These governance systems and networks on the ground are complex constellations. Both state 
authorities and non-state actors are closely socially and economically enmeshed in these 
formal and informal governance and network structures. State authorities play different roles 
and can have several functions, using, neglecting or misusing their sovereign power. The trade 
flow does not stop at borders and actors in borderlands do not restrict themselves to one 
territory and regulatory space. Negotiation processes beyond borders form the governance 
systems, rather than governmental regulations. Thus, governance systems are more than 
institutions. They are an interplay of rights, institutions, power structures and social and 
economic relations between actors. Therefore, the narratives of the local state authorities and 
non-state actors are essential in the process of negotiating. The configuration and thus 
functioning of production networks in borderlands is continuously negotiated by actors to 
ensure their access to the locally available resources, and their participation in the profitable 
trade network. Any changes in the conditions of the networks and regulatory spaces can shift 
the power and embeddedness of actors and require adaptation.  
Production networks and governance systems in borderlands are specific and complex and 
need appropriate and adjusted analysis and perspectives in order to capture all formal and 
informal as well as all political, social and economic dimensions. Looking at the case study and 
the results of the thesis, I conclude that a non-state centric perspective has enabled me an in-
depth analysis of the complexity of the commercialisation of NTFP, especially when collected 
and traded in borderlands.  
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Building on the recommendation of chapter 5 and 6, as an outlook for further research on 
governance systems of commons in margins of states, I suggest to consider a non-state centric 
perspective, looking beyond governmental regulations and sovereign power, but taking a 
realistic point of view on governance systems regulating resource access, extraction and trade. 
Using these perspectives enables an understanding of various actors and dimensions on 
multiple scales, as well as of the different practices, dependencies, power structures and 
behaviours of non-state actors as well as state representatives. I make a similar suggestion for 
further research on the concept of GPN. Considering the borderland as one production and 
trade region including both sides from the border does not limit the study to one territory and 
sovereign power, but enables a comprehensive analysis of local realities and power and 
embeddedness of actors within a production network beyond borders. 
8.1 Is yarshagumba a curse or good fortune? 
It is certain that yarshagumba has incorporated the local population in India and Nepal more 
tightly into the cash economy. In one way, this simultaneously marginalises them, making them 
highly vulnerable to international traders and finally to Chinese consumers. Traditional or other 
livelihood options are limited. In general, local people are optimistic: “When yarshagumba 
vanishes, another resource will come” (interview with collector in Nepal, May 2017). At the 
same time, as I show in this study, local people are active participants and central in the 
commercialisation process of resources by shaping the governance systems and networks 
controlling access and trade of the locally available resources.  
Although the collection and trade of yarshagumba is partly informal, it is the main income 
source of the local population and it is currently central for the economic development of the 
mountainous border region in the Kailash Landscape. The borderlands within the Kailash 
Landscape are remote margins of three states, India, Nepal and China, far from the capital 
cities. The states, especially China and India, mainly invest in infrastructural development 
related to militarization and protection of the borders. The local economic development is 
mainly built on trade of NTFP and other products. Yarshagumba collection alone has an 
approximate yearly turnover of 10.5 million USD (based on 850 kg of collected yarshagumba) 
in the Kailash Landscape. Additionally, other NTFP and products are traded via similar 
networks between the three countries. Therefore, the partly informal production networks of 
locally available resources are not marginal, but central to the cash economy on the individual 
household level and for the development of the region in India and Nepal. 
The governments, especially the Nepali authorities, also profit significantly from the 
yarshagumba trade. ANCA, the Nepali government authority in the border region, which is 
responsible for the legalisation of yarshagumba in Nepal, earns official revenues of up to 
212,000 USD per year (MoFSC 2015). Additionally, as shown in the study, state actors on both 
sides, India and Nepal, are highly involved and enmeshed in the informal Indian-Nepali trade 
network, profiting through bribes and other requests for personal favours.  
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Consequently, the transformation of yarshagumba into a highly valuable resource demanded 
on the global market is both a good fortune and a curse for the local people, the region and the 
respective governments. Further, we should see the phenomenon of yarshagumba as an 
example of commercialisation of NTFP. The resource yarshagumba might vanish over the 
coming years, but it is likely that another natural resource will appear with high commercial 
demands triggering similar effects in the region.  
8.2 Recommendations for policy-making processes 
The findings of this thesis point to a handful of recommendations for international and national 
development agencies, which support policy-making processes related to natural resource 
management and especially to NTFP collection and trade in the Himalayan region. The 
recommendations are formulated based on the resource yarshagumba from the case study, 
but most of them can be easily transferred to any other locally available natural resource 
collected or harvested in remote areas of a state.  
Encourage state actors to recognize and to formalize the communities’ efforts for natural 
resource management: As seen in my analysis of the collection and trade of yarshagumba in 
India and Nepal, local communities are the key stakeholders in the collection process and 
natural resource management in the high alpine grasslands. They are the custodians of the 
high mountainous regions and have a high interest in and concern for sustainable management 
of yarshagumba collection to ensure their future income. Through the different established 
communal management arrangements in the collection sites, first steps are taken towards 
regulating access rights and sustainably managing the collection sites. Although some of these 
arrangements are not legal by law, the state should recognize these efforts and support a 
process to formalize them. These arrangements are socially accepted by community members, 
are adjusted to the local context and contribute towards sustainability of the resource. 
Encourage state actors to engage multiple actors in decision-making processes: In the 
collection and trade of yarshagumba, several actors are involved with several functions within 
the collection and trading system, leading to complementary or overlapping institutions and 
actions, as well as sometimes to neglect. As seen in the case study, especially in regions at 
the margin of states like borderlands, state authorities and representatives can be closely 
enmeshed in trading networks across borders. This requires policy-makers to take a 
perspective that looks beyond technical and managerial questions in relation to natural 
resource extraction and trade. Instead, policy-makers should be aware of political, social and 
economic dimensions within resource production networks and should consider these 
dimensions in the process of policy design and its implementation. Further, this requires state 
authorities to be more reflective regarding their own regulations and processes of decision-
making, as well as about their behaviours and formal and informal involvement in natural 
resource management and trading networks. Open dialogues between state and non-state 
actors would be a first step to create a common understanding of the local realities, build up 
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trust between community members and state authorities and identify appropriate solutions, 
which meet the different demands and interests.  
Support research and exchange on the effectiveness of communal management 
arrangements and regulations in the collection sites: There is a need to assess these 
diverse and emerging efforts at the grass roots level, to monitor their effectiveness and help 
develop sustainable collection arrangements. This activity could follow a research and 
exchange model where those currently experimenting with different management 
arrangements could share with each other. Communities across the region are dealing with the 
same issues and trying different techniques, like limiting the time of collection, limiting the 
number of collectors or rotating the collection sites per season. The region is large and diverse, 
but some areas are having success in their collection management practices, and could offer 
suggestions to others. Additionally, scholars have gathered information and knowledge about 
sustainable management of NTFP in other areas, which could enrich the discussions about 
effectiveness. Communities perceive that quantities of yarshagumba are reducing, and there 
is therefore a high interest from their side to get support and knowledge to better regulate 
yarshagumba collection. 
Support a delineation process of collection sites based on existing communal 
management arrangements: For both countries, there is a need to jointly delineate collection 
sites for yarshagumba in the high alpine grasslands. This needs to be a joint effort by the local 
communities and the respective government authorities to define collection sites for each 
community and clarify access rights. As recommended in the first point, this process needs to 
be based on existing communal management arrangements in the collection sites and 
customary rights in the high-alpine grasslands. Further, livelihood dependencies of 
communities and conservation aspects of flora and fauna should be considered to meet the 
different interests and demands of the actors. By involving the different actors in the process 
and mapping the different arrangements, interests and rights, a transparent knowledge platform 
for open negotiation processes between actors can be built. This will also provide the 
opportunity to formalize some of the communal management arrangements and to define the 
rights of actors for resource extraction, as well as to define their responsibilities towards 
resource management. The delineation process can also stimulate discussions about 
environmental impacts, like the location of the campsites or possibilities for introducing a 
rotation system for collection and camp sites or even temporarily closing some sites. 
Encourage state actors to think beyond the state borders: As my case study shows, state 
and non-state actors especially in borderlands are innovative and flexible in making use of 
opportunities and building networks beyond the state border. Both state and non-state actors 
in the borderlands are flexible in adapting to changing conditions to ensure benefit from the 
lucrative trade. Seeing a border region as one unit of analysis helps to build a better 
understanding of the cross-border networks, the social and economic relations across borders, 
and possible implications of interventions. Governments must be aware that policy revisions 
on one side of the border have effects on the other side of the border, as well as on the cross-
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border networks. Furthermore, governments can learn from the findings of borderland studies 
that informal networks and illegal trade cannot be restricted only through regulations and 
reinforced border control. These activities will continue unless appropriate marketing 
mechanisms and regulations are implemented providing incentives to collectors and traders, 
then they might give preference to formal trading networks and marketing options. 
Encourage state actors to think beyond sectors: Policy-makers and government authorities 
should see the region as a whole unit – as one social-ecological system – and not from the lens 
of one sector only. Natural resource management is not only a technical challenge for 
ecologists and foresters. For sustainable management of yarshagumba all social, political and 
economic relations within the production network, as well as the ecological relations, need to 
be understood and considered. In the short term, governmental programmes, which provide 
incentives to reduce the communities’ dependency on NTFP collection and to identify 
comparable income options, will most likely not reduce the pressure of the collectors on the 
resource. The current price of yarshagumba is so high that there will always be community 
members who have an economic interest in continuing to collect yarshagumba. Instead, as 
mentioned earlier in other recommendations, enabling the adaptation and formalisation of 
governance systems for the collection and trade, which are built in consensus with 
communities, will encourage sustainability of the resource and will reduce its informality. 
 
 
 
References (Chapter 1,2,3,7 and 8) 
 
 111 
References (Chapter 1, 2, 3, and 7) 
Acheson, J.M, (2006): Institutional Failure in Resource Management. In: Annual Review of Anthropology 
35: 117-34. doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.35.081705.123238  
Adhikari, K., (2015): Perception or reality? A case study of corrupt practices in the forestry sector in 
Nepal. In: European Bulletin of Himalayan Research 46: 9-34.  
Agrawal, A. (2003): Sustainable Governance of Common Pool Resources: Context, Methods, and 
Politics. In: Annual Review of Anthropology 32: 243-62. doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro. 
32.061002.093112 
Agrawal, A. and Ostrom, E. (2001): Collective Action, Property Rights and Decentralization in Resource 
Use in India and Nepal. In: Politics and Society 29, no. 4: 485-514. doi:10.1177/ 
0032329201029004002  
ANCA (Api Nampa Conservation Area) (2016): Yartsa gunbu (ophiocordyceps sinensis) status, recent 
management practices and sustainable management options in ANCA, Kailash Landscape. 
Presentation by Ashok Ram and Corinna Wallrapp at the Workshop “Tracking Options for 
Sustainable Management and Trade of Yarshagumba in the Kailash Sacred Landscape” 8-
12.August 2016, Paro, Bhutan.  
Anderies, J. Janssen, M. and Ostrom E. (2004): A framework to analyze the robustness of social-
ecological systems from an institutional perspective. In: Ecology and Society 9, no. 1, 18. 
Baland J. M. and Platteau J.P. (1996): Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for 
Rural Communities? Oxford, UK: Clarendon. 
Baral, B., Shrestha, B. and Teixeira da Silva, J.A. (2015): A review of Chinese Cordyceps with special 
reference to Nepal, focusing on conservation. In: Environmental and Experimental Biology 13: 
61-73. 
Baud, M., and Van Schendel, W., (1997): Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands. In: Journal of 
World History 8, 2 (fall): 211-242. doi: 10.1353/jwh.2005.0061 
Bauer, K.M. (2004): High Frontiers, Dolpo and the Changing Wold of Himalayan Pastoralists. New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
Bauriedl, S. (2016): Politische Ökologie: nicht-deterministische, globale und materielle Dimensionen von 
Natur/Gesellschaft-Verhältnissen. In: Geographica Helvetica 71: 341-351. 
Belcher, B. and Schreckenberg, K. (2007): Commercialisation of non-timber forest products: a reality 
check. In: Development Policy Review 25, no. 3: 355–77. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7679.2007. 
00374.x 
Bergmann, C. (2016): The Himalayan Border Region – Trade, Identity and Mobility in Kumaon, India. 
Springer International Publishing Switzerland. 
Blaikie, P., and H. Brookfield (1987): Land degradation and society. London: Methuen. 
Bloomer, J. (2009): Using a political ecology framework to examine extra-legal livelihood strategies: a 
Lesotho-based case study of cultivation of and trade in cannabis. In: Journal of Political Ecology 
16: 49-69. Doi: 10.2458/v16i1.21691  
Bowen, G. A. (2009): Document analysis as a qualitative research method. In: Qualitative research 
journal 9 (2): 27-40. doi: 10.3316/QRJ0902027  
Bryant R. and Bailey, B. (1997): Third World Political Ecology. New York: Routledge. 
Bum, T. (2016): Guardians of Nature: Tibetan Pastoralists and the Natural World. In: Asian Highlands 
Perspectives 42. 
References (Chapter 1,2,3,7 and 8) 
 
 112 
Cannon, P.F., Hywel-Jones, N.L.  Maczey, N., Norbu, L., Tshitila, Samdup, T. and Lhendup, P. (2009): 
Steps towards sustainable harvest of Ophiocordyceps sinensis in Bhutan. In: Biodiversity 
Conservation 18: 2263-81. doi: 10.1007/s10531-009-9587-5. 
Caplins, L. B. (2016): Political ecology of cordyceps in the Garhwal Himalaya of Northern India. Graduate 
Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 10913. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/10913. 
Caplins, L., Halvorson, S.J. and Bosak, K. (2018): Beyond resistance: A political ecology of cordycepts 
as alpine niche product in the Garhwal, Indian Himalaya. In: Geoforum 96: 298-308. 
Castree, N. (2001): Socializing Nature: Theory, Practice, and Politics. In: Social nature: theory, practice, 
and politics, edited by N. Castree and B. Braun. 1-21, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.  
Castree, N. and Braun, B. (2001): Social nature: theory, practice and politics, Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Publishers. 
Chan, Y. W., and Womack, B., (2016): Not merely a border: borderland governance, development and 
transborder relations in Asia. In: Asian Anthropology 15, 2: 95-103. doi: 10.1080/1683478 
X.2016.1214352 
Childs, G. and Choedup, N. (2014): Indigenous Management Strategies and Socioeconomic Impacts of 
Yartsa Gunbu (Ophiocordyceps sinensis) Harvesting in Nubri and Tsum, Nepal. In: Himalaya. 
34 (1). 
Choudhary, D., Kala, S.P., Todaria, N.P., Dasgupta, S., Kollmair, M., (2014): Drivers of exploitation and 
inequity in non‐timber forest products (NTFP) value chains: the case of Indian Bay Leaf in Nepal 
and India. In: Development Policy Revision 32: 71–87. 
Cleaver, F. (2003): Reinventing institutions. Bricolage and the social embeddedness of natural resource 
management. In: Securing Land Rights in Africa, edited by Benjaminsen, T.A. and Lund, C., 11-
30. London: Frank Cass. 
Demeritt, D. (2001): Being constructive about nature. In: Social nature: Theory, practice, and politics, 
edited by N. Castree and B. Braun. 22-40, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers. 
Desai, V. and Potter, R B (2006): Doing development research. London, UK: SAGE.  
Dhakal, B. (2014): The Local Environmental, Economic and Social Tragedies of International 
Interventions on Community Based Forest Management for Global Environmental Conservation: 
A Critical Evaluation. In: Open Journal of Forestry 04, no.1: 58–69. Doi: 10.4236/ojf.2014.41010 
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E. and Stern, P.C. (2003): The struggle to govern the commons. In: Science 302: 
1907–12. doi:10.1126/science.1091015 
Doevenspeck, M., (2011): Constructing the border from below: Narratives from the Congolese-Rwandan 
state boundary. In: Political Geography 30: 129-42. doi:10.1016/J.polgeo. 2011.03.003 
Doolittle, A. (2010): Stories and Maps, Images and Archives. Multimethod Approach to the Political 
Ecology of Property Rights and Natural Resource Management in Sabah, Malaysia. In: 
Environmental Management 45, 1: 67–81.  
Escobar, A. (1999): After nature: steps to an antiessentialist political ecology. In: Current anthropology 
40 (1): 1-30. 
Flick, U., von Kardorff, E. and Steinke, I. (2003): Qualitative Forschung, Ein Handbuch, Reinbek bei 
Hamburg: Rowohlt. 
Folke, C. (2007): Social–ecological systems and adaptive governance of the commons. In: Ecological 
Research 22:14-15. Doi: 10.1007/s11284-006-0074-0 
Folke, C., Hahn, T, Olsson, P. and Norberg, J. (2005): Adaptive governance of social-ecological systems. 
In: Annual Review Environmental Resources 30: 441-473. doi: 10.1146/annurev.energy. 
30.050504.144511 
Gaull K, and Hauser M. (2009): Pro-poor Commercial Management of Non-timber Forest Products in 
Nepal’s Community Forest User Groups: Factors for Success. In: Mountain Research and 
Development 29 (4): 298-307. Doi: 10.1659/mrd.00051  
References (Chapter 1,2,3,7 and 8) 
 
 113 
Gellner, D. (2013): Borderland Lives in Northern South Asia. Duke University Press, Durham and 
London. 
German, L.A. and Keeler, A. (2010): Hybrid institutions: applications of common property theory beyond 
discrete property regimes. In: International Journal of the Commons 4 (1): 571-96. doi: 
10.18352/ijc.108. 
Ghate, R. and Chaturvedi, R. (2016): Unpacking the governance conundrum for better natural resource 
management. ICIMOD Working Paper 2016, no. 2, Kathmandu: ICIMOD. 
Goodhand, J. (2013): Epilogue: The View from the Border. In: Violence on the Margins: States, Conflict, 
and Borderlands. Edited by B. Korf and T. Raeymaekers: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Goodhand, J., (2005): Frontiers and Wars: The Opium Economy in Afghanistan. In: Journal of Agrarian 
Change 5, 2: 191-216. doi: 10.1111/j.1471-0366.2005.00099.x 
Grillot, C., (2016): “Trust facilitates business, but may also ruin it”: the hazardous facets of Sino-
Vietnamese border trade. In: Asian Anthropology 15, 2: 169-85. doi:10.1080/1683478X. 
2016.1216281 
Hamilton, A.C., (2004): Medicinal plants, conservation and livelihoods. In: Biodiversity Conservation 13, 
1477–1517. 
Hardin, G. (1968): The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162: 1243–48.  
Harris, T. (2013): Trading places: New economic geographies across Himalayan borderlands. In: 
Political Geography 35: 60-68. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2012.12.002 
Hausner, S.L. and Sharma, J.R. (2013): On the Way to India: Nepali Rituals of Border Crossing. In: 
Borderland Lives in Northern South Asia. Edited by D. Gellner (2013) Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 94-116. 
He, J., Yang, B., Dong, M., and Wang, Y. (2018): Crossing the roof of the world: Trade in medicinal 
plants from Nepal to China. In: Journal of Ethnopharmacology 224: 100-110. doi: 10.1016/ 
j.jep.2018.04.034 
Heinen JT and Shrestha-Acharya R. (2011): The non-timber forest products sector in Nepal: Emerging 
policy issues in plant conservation and utilization for sustainable development. In: Journal of 
Sustainable Forestry 30, 6: 543–63.  
Hendersen, J., Dicken, P., Hess, M., Coe, N., and Yueng, H. W. (2002): Global production networks and 
the analysis of economic development. In: Review of International Political Economy 9, 3: 436-
464. doi: 10.1080/09692290210150842 
Herrera, P. M., Davies, J. and Manzano, P. (2014): Governance of Rangelands: Collective Action for 
Sustainable Pastoralism. New York: Taylor & Francis.  
Hoon, V. (1996): Living on the Move: Bhotiyas of the Kumaon Himalaya. New Delhi: Sage Publications.  
Hopping, K. Chignell, S. and Lambin E. (2018): The demise of caterpillar fungus in the Himalayan region 
due to climate change and overharvesting. In: PNAS, 1-6. Doi: 10.1073/pnas. 1811591115 
Howard, T. (2015): The “Rules of Engagement”: A Socio-legal Framework for Improving Community 
Engagement in Natural Resource Governance. In: Oñati Socio-legal Series [online], 5 (5), 1209-
1235.  
ICIMOD (2010): Kailash Sacred Landscape Conservation initiative – Target Area Delineation Report. 
International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development. Kathmandu: ICIMOD. 
ICIMOD (2011): Kailash Sacred Landscape Conservation initiative – Feasibility assessment report. 
Edited by Zomer, R and Oli, KP Kathmandu: ICIMOD. 
ICIMOD (2015): Across the Mahakali. video. http://lib.icimod.org/record/32086. accessed on: 28.2.2018. 
Kathmandu: ICIMOD. 
ICIMOD (2016): Tracking Options for Sustainable Management and Trade of Yarshagumba in the 
Kailash Sacred Landscape. Workshop proceedings 8-12.August 2016, Paro, Bhutan, 
Kathmandu: ICIMOD. 
References (Chapter 1,2,3,7 and 8) 
 
 114 
ICIMOD (2017): Vegetation Type and Land Cover Map of Kailash Sacred Landscape. Map. Kathmandu: 
ICIMOD. 
Ives, J. and Messerli, B. (1989): The Himalayan Dilemma – Reconciling Development and Conservation. 
The United Nations University. London and New York: Routledge. 
Jones, R. (2012): Spaces of Refusal: Rethinking Sovereign Power and Resistance at the Border. In: 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 102: 1-15. doi:10.1080/00045608. 
2011.600193 
Kala, C.P., Dhyani, P.P. and Sajwan, B.S. (2006): Developing the medicinal plants sector in northern 
India: challenges and opportunities. In: Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine 2 (32): 1-15. 
doi:10.1186/1746-4269-2-32  
Kanel, K. R. and Kandel B. (2004): Community Forestry in Nepal: Achievements and Challenges. In: 
Journal of Forest and Livelihood 4, no. 1: 55–63. 
Keck, M. (2016): Navigating real markets. The economic resilience of food wholesale traders in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. Franz Steiner, Stuttgart. 
King, N. and Horrocks, C. (2010): Interviews in qualitative research. Los Angeles: SAGE.  
Korf, B. and Raeymaekers, T. (2013): Violence on the Margins: States, Conflict, and Borderlands. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kumar, A. (2006): Van Panchayats in Uttaranchal. In: Local Governance in India – Decentralization and 
Beyond. Edited by N.G. Jayal, A. Prakash and P. Sharma. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Kunwar, R.M., Mahat, L., Acharya, R.P., Bussmann, R.W., (2013): Medicinal plants, traditional medicine, 
markets and management in far-west Nepal. In: Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomed. 9, 1.  
Kusters, K., Achdiawan, R., Belcher, B. and Ruiz Pérez M. (2006): Balancing development and 
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Plummer, R., Armitage, D.R., de Loë, R.C. (2013): Adaptive comanagement and its relationship to 
environmental governance. In: Ecology and Society 18, no. 1. Doi:10.5751/ES-05383-180121.  
Pouliot, M. (2016): Into thin air: mapping and quantifying the national-level trade in medicinal plants from 
Nepal. Presentation at 5th Conference of the Asian Borderlands Research Network: Dynamic 
Borderlands: Livelihoods, Communities and Flows. 12-14 December 2016. Kathmandu, Nepal. 
Pouliot, M., Pyakurel, D., and Smith-Hall, C. (2018): High altitude organic gold: The production network 
for Ophiocordyceps sinensis from far-western Nepal. In: Journal for Ethnopharmacology 218: 
59-68. doi:10.1016/j.jep.2018.02.028. 
Pyakurel, D., Sharma I.B. and Smith-Hall-C. (2018): Patterns of change: The dynamics of medicinal plant 
trade in far-western Nepal. In: Journal of Ethnopharmacology 224: 323-334. Doi: 
10.1016/j.jep.2018.06.004  
Rasul, G., Choudhary, D., Pandit, B.H., Kollmair, M., (2012): Poverty and livelihoods impacts of a 
medicinal and aromatic plants project in India and Nepal: an assessment. In: Mountain Research 
and Development 32: 137–148. doi.org/10.1659/MRD-JOURNAL-D-11-00112.1 
Ribot, J. C. and Peluso, N.L. (2003): A Theory of Access. In: Rural Sociology 68, no. 2: 153–81. 
doi:10.1111/j.1549- 0831.2003.tb00133.x. 
Robbins, P. (2012): Political Ecology – A Critical Introduction, Second Edition. West Sussex UK: John 
Wiley and Sons Ltd. 
Schippmann, U., Leaman, D., Cunningham, A.B., (2006): A comparison of cultivation and wild collection 
of medicinal and aromatic plants under sustainability aspects. In: Medicinal and Aromatic Plants 
edited by Bogers, R.J., Craker, L.E., Lange, D. Amsterdam: Springer.  
Scott, J. (2009): The Art of Not Being Governed – An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. Yale 
University Press. 
Scott, R. (1999): Institutions and Organisations. Sage Publications. 
Sharma-Wallace, L., Velarde, S. and Wreford, A. (2018): Adaptive governance good practice: Show me 
the evidence! In: Journal of Environmental Management 222: 174-188. 
Doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2018.05.067. 
Sharma, S. (2004): Trade of Cordyceps sinensis from high altitudes of the Indian Himalaya: Conservation 
and biotechnological priorities. In: Current Science 86 (12): 1614-1619. 
Shneiderman, S.B. (2013): Himalayan border citizens: Sovereignty and mobility in the Nepal – Tibetan 
Autonomous Region (TAR) of China border zone. In: Political Geography 35: 25-36. doi: 
10.1016/j.polgeo.2013.04.001 
Shova, T. and Hubacek, K. (2011): Drivers of illegal resource extraction: an analysis of Bardia National 
Park, Nepal. In: Journal of Environmental Management 92: 156–164. 
Shrestha, U., Dhital, K. R., and Gautam, A.P. (2017): Economic Dependence of Mountain Communities 
on Chinese Caterpillar Fungus Ophiocordyceps Sinensis (Yarsagumba): A Case from Western 
Nepal. In: Oryx. Cambridge University Press: 1–9. doi.org/10.1017/ S0030605317000461. 
References (Chapter 1,2,3,7 and 8) 
 
 117 
Shrestha, U.B. and Bawa, K.S. (2013): Trade, harvest and conservation of Caterpillar Fungus 
(Ophiocordyceps sinensis). In: Biological Conservation 159: 514-520. doi:10.1016/j.biocon. 
2012.10.032.  
Shrestha, U.B. and Bawa, K.S. (2014): Economic contribution of Chinese caterpillar fungus to the 
livelihoods of mountain communities in Nepal. In: Biological Conservation 177: 194-202. 
doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2014.06.019.  
Shrestha, U.B., Shrestha, S., Ghimire, S., Nepali, K., Shrestha, B.B., (2014): Chasing Chinese caterpillar 
fungus (OphioOphiocordyceps sinensis) harvesters in the Himalayas: harvesting practice and its 
conservation implications in western Nepal. In: Society and Natural Resources 27: 1242–1256. 
doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2014.928394 
Sikor, T. and Lund, C. (2009): Access and property: a question of power and authority. In: Development 
and Change 40, no. 1: 1-22. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2009.01503.x. 
Singh, B. P. (2017): Yarsagumba collectors say buy now, pay later. In: KathmanduPost. National 
newspaper from Nepal, published on 13.10.2017. file:///Users/cowallrapp/Desktop/Dr.%20 
Yarsagumba/Zeitung/Kathmandu%20Post-Oct2017Yarsagumba%20collectors.webarchive, 
accessed on: 15.10.2017. 
Singh, N., Pathak, R. Kathait, A.S., Rautela, D. and Dubey, A. (2010): Collection of Cordyceps sinensis 
(Berk.) Sacc. in the Interior Villages of Chamoli District in Garhwal Himalaya (Uttarakhand) and 
its Social Impacts. In: Journal of American Science 6 (6): 5-9. 
Singh, S. (2016): The Local Governance: Politics, Decentralization and Environment. New Dehli: Oxford 
University Press. 
Stewart, M.O. (2014): The Rise and Governance of ‘Himalayan Gold’: Transformation of the Caterpillar 
Fungus Commons in Tibetan Yunnan, China. PhD diss., University of Colorado, Boulder. 
Subedi, A., Kunwar, B., Choi, Y., Dai, Y., van Andel, T., Chaudhary R.P., de Boer H. and Gravendeel, 
B. (2013): Collection and trade of wild-harvested orchids in Nepal. In: Journal of Ethnobiology 
and Ethnomedicine 9, 64. 
Tan, G.G. (2018): Chapter 7: Caterpillar Fungus and Transforming Subjectivities. In: Pastures of 
Change: Contemporary Adaptations and Transformations Among Nomadic Pastoralists of 
Eastern Tibet edited by G.G. Tan: Springer International Publishing AG, Springer. 
Thapa, B.B. Panthi, S., Rai, R.K, Shrestha, U.B. Aryal, A., Shrestha, S. and Shrestha B. (2014): An 
Assessment of Yarsagumba (Ophiocordyceps sinensis) Collection in Dhorpatan Hunting 
Reserve, Nepal. In: Journal of Mountain Science 11 (2): 555-562. Doi: 10.1007/s11629-013-
2692-7  
The Record Nepal (2014): Police brutality on Dolpo’s “black day” under investigation. In: The Record 
Nepal. National newspaper of Nepal, published on 05.06.2014. 
https://www.recordnepal.com/wire/ police-brutality-on-dolpos-black-day-under-investigation/, 
accessed on 14.08.2017. 
Thoms, C. A. (2008): Community Control of Resources and the Challenge of Improving Local Livelihoods 
: A Critical Examination of Community Forestry in Nepal. In: Geoforum 39: 1452–1465. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j. geoforum.2008.01.006  
Tong, C. K. (2014): Rethinking Chinese Business. In: Chee Kiong Tong, C.T., 2014. Chinese Business. 
Rethinking Guanxi and Trust in Chinese Business Networks. Springer, Singapore. 
Tsing, A. L. (2015): The Mushroom at the End of the World – On the Possibilities of Life in Capitalist 
Ruins. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Uprety, Y., Poudel, R.C, Gurung, J., Chettri, N. and Chaudhary R. P. (2016): Traditional use and 
management of NTFPs in Kangchenjunga Landscape: implications for conservation and 
livelihoods. In: Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine 12, no. 19. Doi:10.1186/s13002-016-
0089-8. 
Uttarakhand Biodiversity Board (2017): Study on “Science-Policy Interface” focussing on Access & 
Benefit Sharing (ABS) and Trans-boundary issues, Kailash Sacred Landscape Conservation and 
Development Initiative. Dehradun: Uttarakhand Biodiversity Board.  
References (Chapter 1,2,3,7 and 8) 
 
 118 
Van Schendel, W., and Abraham, I. (2005): Illicit Flows and Criminal Things. Indian University Press, 
Bloomington. 
Vasisht, K., Sharma, N. and Karan, M., (2016): Current perspective in the international trade of medicinal 
plants materials: an update. In: Current Pharmaceutical Design 22: 4288–4336. doi: 
10.2174/1381612822666160607070736 
Wade R. 1994. Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India. Oakland: 
ICS Press. 
Wallrapp, C. Keck, M. and Faust, H. (2018): Institutional Issues, Power Struggles and Local Solutions – 
Governance Systems of Yarshagumba Collection in India and Nepal in the Kailash Landscape. 
In: Aktuelle Forschungsbeiträge zu Südasien, 8.Jahrestagung des AK Südasien, 19./20. Januar 
2018, Köln edited by C. Butsch, A. Follmann and Müller J. Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises 
Südasiens in der Deutschen Gesellschaft der Geographie. 
Wallrapp, C., Faust, H. and Keck, M. (2019): Production networks and borderlands: cross-border 
yarsagumba trade in the Kailash Landscape. In: Journal of Rural Studies 66: 67-76. 
Wallrapp, C., Keck, M. and Faust, H. (forthcoming): Governing the yarshagumba ‘gold rush’: a 
comparative study of governance systems in the Kailash Landscape in India and Nepal. In: 
International Journal of Commons, accepted for publication. 
Wangchuk, K. and Wangdi J. (2015): Mountain pastoralism in transition: consequences of legalizing 
cordyeps collection on yak farming practices in Bhutan. In: Pastoralism: Research, policy and 
practice 5 (4). doi: 10.1186/s13570-015-0025-x  
Wangchuk, K. Sangay, Norbu Nawang, and Sherub (2012): Impacts of Cordyceps Collection on 
Livelihoods and Alpine Ecosystems in Bhutan as Ascertained from Questionnaire Survey of 
Cordyceps Collectors. Bumthang Royal Government of Bhutan: UWICE Press.  
Watts, M. (2000): Chapter 16: Political Ecology. In: A Companion to Economic Geography edited by 
Sheppard, E. and Barnes, T.J.  
Weckerle, C., Yang, Y., Huber, F.K. and Li, Q. (2010): People, money, and protected areas: the collection 
of the caterpillar mushroom Ophiocordyceps sinensis in the Baima Xueshan Nature Reserve, 
Southwest China. In: Biodiversity Conservation 19: 2685–98. doi:10.1007/s10531-010-9867-0 
Winkler, D. (2005): Cordyceps sinensis (Berk.) Sacc.: Economy, Ecology and Ethno-Mycology of Yartsa 
Gunbu, a Medicinal Fungus Endemic for the Tibetan Plateau. In: International Journal of 
Medicinal Mushrooms 7 (3): 481-482. 
Winkler, D. (2009): Caterpillar Fungus (Ophiocordyceps sinensis), Production and Sustainability on the 
Tibetan Plateau and in the Himalayas. In: Asian Medicine 5: 291-316. doi: 
10.1163/157342109x568829 
World Health Organisation (WHO) (2002): WHO Traditional Medicine Strategy. World Health 
Organization, Geneva.  
World Health Organisation (WHO) (2013): WHO Traditional Medicine Strategy 2014–2023. World Health 
Organization, Geneva. 
Yeh, E. and Lama, K. T (2013): Following the caterpillar fungus: nature, commodity chains and the place 
of Tibet in China’s uneven geographies. In: Social and Cultural Geography 14, no. 3: 318 – 340. 
doi:10.1080/14649365.2013.765025 
Young, O.R. (2009): Institutional dynamics: Resilience, vulnerability and adaptation in environmental and 
resource regimes. In: Global Environmental Change. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009. 10.001 
 
Acknowledgment 
 
 119 
Annex 
Annex 1: Pictures of the yarshagumba collection 
 
Picture 1: Collectors with camping luggage (June 2017) 
 
Picture 2: Collectors searching for yarshagumba (May 2017) 
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Picture 3: Yarshagumba when collected (May 2017) 
 
 
Picture 4: Campsite of collectors (May 2017) 
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Annex 2: Guiding questions for interviews 
Questionnaire (Version: 06. April 2017) – India - Nepal 
1. Assessing governance structures for NRM and yarshagumba collection 
Topic Key questions for interviews 
General info 
of available 
Institutions 
(government 
or community 
lead) 
What institutions regulate NRM in the valley?  - FD, GP, VP, ASKOT, community 
head (Bada), religious leaders, women groups 
What powers/influences do the institutions have? (de jure) – decision-making, 
planning, revenue collection, spending power, enforcement …. 
What mandate, role, rights related to NTFP (collection and sale of timber and NTFP, 
regulating access, ownership, management of NR) 
What is their main interest and concern? 
What is their capacity? 
What structure (members, how selected, how leaders elected, decision making 
process, Representation of different social groups (women, dalits, SC, ST, elders, 
young..) 
How often do they meet? Are other persons invited? 
Have you ever participated in a meeting of the committee (GP, VP, VDC, ANCA 
Committee) 
Are the members in the different meetings the same, or different? 
Who makes decisions? Jointly or by the head? 
Coordination between different institutions? (GP, VP, District magistrate, VDC, ANCA 
Committee) 
Are saving groups within the community? (members, successful, how long) 
Are these institutions recognised by authorities? 
How are these institutions influencing yarsha management? 
Perception of 
people 
How do you perceive the different institutions, their work and interests? Which 
institution powerful, which not? Why? Work appreciated?  
Does it benefit all, or only a few? 
Do you feel represented by the current leaders? 
Changes in 
NRM 
institutions 
 
When were the „new“ institutions/conditions established? By whom? 
 Est. ASKOT 1986, BMC in India, ANCA 2010 
Who took part in the process and contributed to it? Who opposed it?  
Did some rightsholders or stakeholders take the lead? “winners” 
Did others feel “left out”? “losers”? 
Who was then in charge of deciding about natural resources?  
Was there some form of continuity? What remained of the earlier institutions and 
arrangements? 
How did the situation evolve?  
Policies to 
NRM – NTFP 
– 
endangered 
species 
Knowledge about policies, government orders, regulations related to collection and 
marketing 
How implemented? By whom? 
Challenges related to the policies? 
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What other 
institutions 
What beliefs, customs exist relevant for NRM? (sacred groves, community leader) 
(women not allowed in high altitude pastures) 
What role/function do they play in the community? 
Are these institutions recognised by authorities? 
What is their interest and concern?  
How are these institutions influencing yarsha management? 
Past: access 
to alpine 
pastures  
How was the access and usage of the alpine pastures regulated and managed before 
yarsha collection started? Main differences to now? 
Who had access? 
Challenges? 
Change of 
institutions 
due 
yarshagumba 
Did institutions change due to yarshagumba collection?  
How? Loosing of power, gaining power? Which institutions?  
What is good about that? What bad? 
Future Which institution (formal and informal) should regulate more the access to the 
collection sites, the trade? How to organise? 
What roles do you think can communities play to manage the collection sites and 
reduce illegal trading? 
 
2. Assessing yarshagumba management - detailed 
Topic Key questions for interviews 
Access to 
collection 
sites 
 
Which community members have access to the sites? When? How long? 
how controlled and enforced? By whom?  
How many collectors/families do come every year? How changed over time? 
Are tensions created between different groups? Between whom? What is the 
perception of these tensions?  
Have all people from the village same access to the sites? SC, ST, poor? 
Any challenges? Weighting of challenges? 
Usage of 
pastures 
Besides yarsha collection how are the pastures used during the year? By whom? 
Which animals are grazing?  
Are the same institutions managing the pastures during the rest of the year?  
degradation 
of pastures / 
sites 
Have the pastures / collection sites changed over the years?   
Factors causing the degradation? Collectors, grazing of animals? 
Does the degradation have an influence on the production/reduction on yarshagumba 
collection?  
Yarshagumba 
harvesting 
how much yarshagumba harvested per person per season? 
How much yarshagumba harvested in the valley/ VP/ region? Estimations? 
How many of the families are collecting? Who is the best person collecting? Why? 
Everyone same chances? 
Is yarshagumba overharvested? (perception) 
Factors that influence decline/increase? 
Description of 
sites and 
Who manages the site? (waste, forest management, drinking water) 
What activity implemented? By whom? 
How financed? How many fees are collected? By whom? 
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management 
structures 
How changed over time? 
Who decides what to do? How? 
Who participates during the meeting? (authority? Community member?) 
Do cultural beliefs play a role? How? 
How many collectors? How many tents?  
How many vendors/tea shops? (fee? To whom to be paid?) 
How good organised/managed according to own ranking? Any management 
measures in place?  
What challenges? 
 
3. Assessing yarshagumba trade 
Topic Key questions for interviews 
Yarshagumba 
trade 
regulations 
In general who regulates the trade of NTFP/MAP? (local authorities?) 
How does the trade of yarshagumba work? Who involved? Which route? 
Which certificates and registrations required? How much royalty to pay – to whom? 
How many traders involved? Registered? Indian/Nepali? District, locals? 
India Why do you think the government marketing mechanisms for NTFP/yarhsagumba 
were not yet successful? 
What needs to be done? What is your suggestion? 
How many death cases were registered last year? 
Nepal 
(ANCA) 
How many trading permission do you hand out per year? 
What is the average amount of kg, which are trader deals with? 
What criteria does a trader need to fulfil? (registration? ….) 
How many traders involved? 
Does the trader association have a role? What role? 
For NTFP trade, what government institutions are involved?  
How many death cases were registered last year? 
Yarshagumba 
sale by 
collectors and 
middlemen 
Processing and grading: before selling what do you do with the yarsha? 
how does the yarsha value chain proceeds? Who buys, who sells? who consumes? 
to whom do you sell? Do you have a kind of contract/arrangement with him/her? 
Always the same?  
When do you sell? in the site, in the village, in town? Why do you choose to do so? 
Do you think you would earn more if you do it differently? 
Can you change? What hinders you? 
Where are the risks/ obstacles in that business? – price fluctuations, storage, 
business relations, financial transactions? Advance cash? 
How do you deal/cope with these risks? 
How do you know about prices? From where do you receive the information? When? 
Are they fluctuating? 
How would you describe the relationships between the traders and local collectors 
(amicable, debt bounding, brotherhood)? 
consumption Do you know where does the product go after you have sold it to the trader? 
How to consume? 
What medicinal use? 
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4. Assessing borderland networks and relations 
Topic Key questions for interviews 
formal 
institutions 
Contact with other country counterpart?  
Any regular border meetings? What topic to discuss? How often? Who participates? 
Do you think it is important to exchange across the border?  
What is the challenge in cooperation? 
Costumes 
between 
Nepal and 
India 
 
What main items are traded between the two countries?  
What products allowed being exported and imported? What about NTFP/MAP? 
What certificates and papers required for China/ India/ for Nepal? Which fees to be 
paid? For export and import? 
Where to get the documents? 
Established costumes point in Tinker? In Lipu Lek Pass? 
individual 
level – 
general 
relation 
 
How do you perceive the government authorities (Indian, China, Nepal) from the other 
country? 
Connect with Nepalis/Indians? With whom? people from which villages? What about 
people living in another valley? 
How are you related to Indians/Nepalis? Through what? culture? Social relationships? 
Economic relationships? grazing rights? 
How are the Nepali/Indian different? Binding elements, distinguish elements? 
What are the advantages/benefits living next to the border (India, Nepal, China) – 
opportunities and restrictions? 
Yarsha 
network 
In relation to trade and yarsha, how does the network work? Did these network existed 
before the trade started in 2000+? 
What was traded/exchanged earlier?  
What are the risks related to the yarsha trade and network? Who takes the main risk? 
Money flow? Product exchange?  
 
5. Assessing socio-economic of collectors and traders 
Topic Key questions for interviews 
  
Yarshagumba 
in comparison 
to other 
income 
sources 
What are the other livelihood sources/options for you?  
How did that change over the last years? 
In comparison to other livelihood activities, yarshagumba collection more difficult and 
hard work or less?  
Spending of 
yarshagumba 
money – risk 
of losing 
income 
source for 
collectors and 
traders 
How do you perceive the risk that yarshagumba may not be there next year or prices 
are dropping? 
In comparison to other livelihood sources, how risky/unreliable you would say is 
yarshagumba collection and trade? Why?  
What changes do you foresee? (future scenario?)? 
Do you have an alternative, if you would not be able collect/trade yarshagumba 
anymore? 
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Development 
of region 
Do you think ‘yarshagumba’ contributed to the development of the region? To out-
migration? In what way? And to what extent? 
What other economy did arise due to yarshagumba income (tea shops, alcohol 
shops, restaurants, along the way and in the bigger towns, hotels) in your valley? 
Was the investment coming from yarshagumba money? 
How do you see the future of the villages? Of the valley? 
Major 
government 
schemes 
Any affirmative action policies (scheduled tribes) by state, region, national – Bhothias 
are recognised ST since 1967. 
What are major government schemes in the landscape? BRCLIP by FD, JFM, ANCA 
Access to rations and funds? 
 
6. Assessing the context of the landscape 
Topic Key questions for interviews 
Socio-
economic 
situation in 
landscape 
Access to basic infrastructure (communication, road, health care, school, market for 
other commodities) 
Access to financial institutions 
Actually and perceived by different groups 
Economic developments? Poverty rate? 
Nepal: why so many Shauka in high positions on district level? (political party leaders, 
ANCA chairman, economic powerful traders) 
Description 
of 
ethnic/social 
groups 
What are the different groups (social, religious, ethnical) in the landscape 
How do they see themselves? 
Livelihood sources: Agricultural production declining? Out-migration? What are the new 
livelihood sources? 
Migratory pastoralism declining? 
Solidarity between the groups? Families? – social boundaries? 
Annex 3: List of interview partners 
A) Nepal – community level 
No. valley location position m/f date 
1 Mahakali Darchula ANCA staff m May ‘17 
2 Mahakali Darchula ANCA staff m May ‘17 
3 Mahakali Sunsera Community member m May ‘17 
4 Mahakali Dumblin ANCA staff m May ‘17 
5 Mahakali Sunsera Police personal M May ‘17 
6 Mahakali Dumblin Community member M May ‘17 
7 Mahakali Dumblin ANCA staff m May ‘17 
8 Mahakali Bhuddi ANCA staff m May ‘17 
9 Mahakali Bhuddi Police personal m May ‘17 
10 Mahakali Kuntison  Community member m May ‘17 
11 Mahakali Changrue Community member M May ‘17 
12 Mahakali Changrue Community member M May ‘17 
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13 Mahakali Changrue ANCA staff m May ‘17 
14 Mahakali Changrue ANCA staff f May ‘17 
15 Mahakali Rakanpani Community member m May ‘17 
16 Mahakali Tinker Community member f May ‘17 
17 Mahakali Tinker Community member f May ‘17 
18 Mahakali Tinker Community member m May ‘17 
19 Mahakali Changrue Community member m May ‘17 
20 Mahakali Changrue Community member f May ‘17 
21 Mahakali Api Base Camp ANCA Committee m May ‘17 
22 Mahakali Api Base Camp Community member m May ‘17 
23 Mahakali Api Base Camp Community member f May ‘17 
24 Mahakali Api Base Camp Community member m May ‘17 
25 Mahakali Api Base Camp Community member f May ‘17 
26 Mahakali Kuntison site ANCA Committee f May ‘17 
27 Mahakali Kuntison site Community member m May ‘17 
28 Mahakali Kuntison site Community member m May ‘17 
29 Mahakali Bhuddi site Community member f May ‘17 
30 Mahakali Bhuddi site Community member f May ‘17 
31 Mahakali Bhuddi site Community member m May ‘17 
32 Mahakali Dumblin Government official  m May ‘17 
33 Mahakali Darchula ANCA staff M May ‘17 
34 Mahakali Darchula Local leader M May ‘17 
35 Mahakali Darchula ANCA staff m May ‘17 
36 Mahakali Sunsera Local leader m May ‘17 
37 Mahakli Changrue Community member m May ‘17 
38 Chameylia Makarighad Community member M May ‘17 
39 Chameylia Makarighad Community member f May ‘17 
40 Chameylia Makarighad Community member M May ‘17 
41 Chameylia Kajekot Local leader M May ‘17 
42 Chameylia Kajekot Community member M May ‘17 
43 Chameylia Kajekot Community member f May ‘17 
44 Chameylia Dhaula Ole Community member m May ‘17 
45 Chameylia Dhaula Ole Community member M May ‘17 
46 Chameylia Dhaula Ole Community member M May ‘17 
47 Chameylia Dhaula Ole Community member M May ‘17 
48 Chameylia Dhaula Ole Community member f May ‘17 
49 Chameylia Ghusa Community member M May ‘17 
50 Chameylia Darchula Community member M May ‘17 
51 Chameylia Paribagar Community member m May ‘17 
 
B) India – community level 
No. valley location position m/f date 
1 Mahakali Pithoragarh Van panchayat leader m Aug. ‘16 
2 Mahakali Pithoragarh Community member M Aug. ‘16 
3 Mahakali Pithoragarh Community member m Aug. ‘16 
4 Mahakali Dharchula Van panchayat leader m Jan. ‘17 
5 Johar Munsyari Community member m Jan. ‘17 
6 Johar Munsyari Community member m Jan. ‘17 
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7 Johar Munsyari Community member m Jan. ‘17 
8 Darma Baling Van panchayat leader M April ‘17 
9 Mahakali Dharchula Community member m April ‘17 
10 Mahakali Dharchula Van panchayat leader m April ‘17 
11 Darma Tejum Community member m April ‘17 
12 Darma Tejum Community member m April ‘17 
13 Darma Sundum Community member M April ‘17 
14 Darma Sundum Community member m April ‘17 
15 Mahakali Pangla Van panchayat leader f April ‘17 
16 Mahakali Pangla Community member f April ‘17 
17 Mahakali Pangla Local leader m April ‘17 
18 Mahakali Galati / Baling Community member m April ‘17 
19 Mahakali Dharchula Community member m April ‘17 
20 Mahakali Dharchula Forest guard M April ‘17 
21 Johar Munsyari Forest guard m April ‘17 
22 Johar Bona Local leader M April ‘17 
23 Johar Bona Community member M April ‘17 
24 Johar Bona Community member M April ‘17 
25 Johar Bona Community member m April ‘17 
26 Johar Darati Local leader M April ‘17 
27 Johar Darati Community member m April ‘17 
28 Mahakali Dharchula Local leader m June ‘17 
29 Darma Baling Van panchayat leader M June ‘17 
30 Darma Baling Community member m June ‘17 
31 Darma Baling Community member m June ‘17 
32 Darma Baling Community member M June ‘17 
33 Darma Baling Community member M June ‘17 
34 Darma Baling Community member F June ‘17 
35 Darma Baling Police personal m June ‘17 
36 Darma Tejum Community member M June ‘17 
37 Darma Tejum Community member M June ‘17 
38 Darma Dar Community member M June ‘17 
39 Darma Dar Community member F June ‘17 
40 Darma Dar Community member m June ‘17 
41 Darma Dar Community member m June ‘17 
 
C) List of interview partners – outside community structures 
No. country location Authority / occupation m/f date 
1 Nepal Kathmandu Researcher m Aug. ‘17 
2 Nepal Kathmandu Member of trader association Humla m July ‘17 
3 Nepal Kathmandu President of chamber of commerce Humla M July ‘17 
4 Nepal Kathmandu Representative of DNPWC m July ‘17 
5 Nepal Kathmandu Researcher of Tribuhan University M July ‘17 
6 Nepal Darchula Officer of Police Darchula m April ‘17 
7 Nepal Darchula Member of trader association Darchula m Jan. ‘17 
8 Nepal Darchula Officer of Army m May ‘17 
9 India Pithoragarh Representative of State Forest Department m Aug. ‘16 
10 India Pithoragarh Researcher m Aug. ‘16 
Curriculum Viate 
 
 128 
11 India Dehra Dun Researcher M Jan. ‘17 
12 India Pithoragarh Representative of State Forest Department m Jan. ‘17 
13 India Jaulijibi Member of NGO m Jan. ‘17 
14 India Dharchula Representative of State Forest Department m Jan. ‘17 
15 India Munsyari Journalist m Jan. ‘17 
16 India Nainital Representative of State Forest Department m Aug. ‘16 
17 India Munsyari Researcher M April ‘17 
18 India Almora Researcher M May ‘17 
19 India Dehra Dun Representative of State Biodiversity Board m June ‘17 
20 India Dharchula Member of NGO m Jan. ‘17 
Annex 4: List of focus group discussions 
No. country valley location participants date 
1 Nepal Mahakali Api Base 
Camp 
Community members ANCA committee 
members:  
May ‘17 
2 Nepal Mahakali Kuntison site Community members, ANCA committee 
members 
May ‘17 
3 Nepal Mahakali Bhuddi site Women group May ‘17 
4 Nepal Mahakali Bhuddi site Community members,  May ‘17 
5 Nepal Mahakali Bhuddi site Community members, ANCA committee 
members 
May ‘17 
6 Nepal Chameylia Dhaula Ole Community members May ‘17 
7 India Darma and 
Chaudans 
Pithoragarh Community members Aug. ‘16 
8 India Darma and 
Chaudans 
Pithoragarh Community members, Van panchayat 
leaders 
Jan. ‘17 
9 India Johar Munsyari Community members Jan. ‘17 
10 India Darma Tejum Community members, Van panchayat 
leaders 
April ‘17 
11 India Mahakali Galati / Baling Community members, Van panchayat 
leader 
April ‘17 
12 India Johar Bona Community members, Van panchayat 
leader 
April ‘17 
13 India Johar Darati Community members, Van panchayat 
leader 
April ‘17 
 
